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SUMMARY 
 
Affirmative action with its wide array of manifestations, ranging from BEE (Black 
Economic Empowerment) to special measures within the Public Procurement sector, 
was intended to aid South Africa in redressing past patterns of disadvantage and 
realising a more equal society and economic dispensation.  Whether the present 
policy has achieved this goal or is capable of doing so has been the subject of much 
controversy. 
 
The aim of my thesis is to rethink the justifications and limits of the current race-
based affirmative action policy of South Africa in view of current debates, in which 
both its potential as a tool for eradicating inequality at the individual and systemic 
levels and the constitutionality and viability of different policy options are contested.  
In my thesis, a range of conceptual and theoretical tools are employed which are not 
only derived from the constitutional law literature, but also from jurisprudence, moral 
philosophy and political theory. Compensatory and distributive theories of justice are 
analysed and juxtaposed to each other, as are substantive and remedial conceptions 
of constitutional equality and recognition-based and redistributive notions of politics. 
Throughout, my focus is on the perspectives that these theories can bring to bear on 
the justifications and limits of affirmative action.  It is also asked whether a re-crafted 
affirmative action policy would not be better able to reach the intended goals.  With 
this end in mind, alternative affirmative action policies are analysed, namely, a class-
based affirmative action policy which uses socio-economic standing as a measure for 
identifying beneficiaries and an affirmative action policy based on Sen‘s capability 
approach. 
 
The thesis also contains a comparative analysis of the affirmative action policies of 
Malaysia, Brazil and India. The aim of this study is to ascertain whether there are any 
valuable lessons to be learnt from their respective successes and failures. 
 
It is argued that affirmative action as currently applied has an assortment of negative 
consequences, ranging from stigmatization of beneficiaries as incapable individuals, 
the perpetuation of racial division and a detrimental impact on the South African 
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economy as a result of a loss in efficiency.  These issues could possibly be better 
addressed if the specific beneficiaries of affirmative action are rethought.  In this 
regard, it is suggested that, if a class-based affirmative action policy is thought to be 
too radical, South Africa should follow India‘s example of excluding the ―creamy 
layer‖ from the current affirmative action beneficiaries.  This should ensure that 
affirmative action benefits are not continually distributed and redistributed to the 
same individuals, whilst also ensuring that a wider range of individuals do in fact 
benefit.  However, it must be borne in mind that transformation will always be stifled if 
educational resources and policies do not keep up with social and political policies. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Regstellende aksie met sy wye reeks manifestasies, wat strek van SEB (Swart 
Ekonomiese Bemagtiging) tot spesiale maatreëls in die voorkeurverkrygingsektor, is 
oorspronklik ingestel om ‗n meer gelyke samelewing en ekonomiese verspreiding te 
verseker.  Of die huidige regstellende aksiebeleid wel hierdie doel bereik het of in 
staat is om dit te bereik, is egter die onderwerp van heelwat kontroversie.  
 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die regverdigings en beperkings van die huidige 
rasgebaseerde regstellende aksie beleid van Suid Afrika te heroorweeg in die lig van 
debatte waarin beide sy potensiaal as hulpmiddel vir die uitskakeling van 
ongelykheid op individuele en sistemiese vlakke en die grondwetlikheid en 
lewensvatbaarheid van verskillende beleidsopsies, in geskil gestel word.  Die studie 
maak gebruik van ‗n reeks konseptuele en teoretiese hulpmiddels wat nie net vanuit 
die staatsregtelike literatuur afgelei word nie, maar ook vanuit jurisprudensie, morele 
filosofie en politieke teorie.  Kompenserende geregtigheid (―compensatory justice‖) 
en verdelende geregtigheid (―distributive justice‖) word geanaliseer en naas mekaar 
gestel, sowel as substantiewe en remediële opvattings van konstitusionele gelykheid 
en erkenning-gebaseerde en herverdelende opvattings van politiek.  Die fokus strek 
deurentyd op die perspektiewe wat hierdie teorieë kan bied met betrekking tot die 
regverdigings en beperkings van regstellende aksie.  Dit word ook bevraagteken of 
dit nie moontlik is om die regstellende aksie beleid op so ‗n manier te verander binne 
die raamwerk van die bogenoemde retoriek dat dit ‗n groter kans staan om sy 
bedoelde uitkomste te bereik nie.  Met hierdie doel in gedagte word alternatiewe 
vorme van regstellende aksie beleid, naamlik klasgebaseerde regstellende aksie en 
‗n beleid gebaseer op Sen se ―capability‖ benadering, geanaliseer.   
 
Naas hierdie teoretiese raamwerk word daar ook ‗n regsvergelykende studie gevolg 
deur ag te slaan op die regstellende aksie beleide van Maleisië, Brasilië en Indië.  
Die uiteindelike doel hiervan is om vas te stel of daar enige waardevolle lesse te leer 
is uit hierdie nasies se welslae en mislukkings. 
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Die studie argumenteer dat die regstellende aksie beleid soos wat dit tans toegepas 
word ‗n wye reeks negatiewe gevolge het, wat strek van stigmatisering van 
begunstigdes as onbekwame individue, tot die voortbestaan van rasse verdeeldheid 
en die nadelige impak op die Suid Afrikaanse ekonomie as gevolg van die verlies 
aan doeltreffendheid.  Hierdie kwessies kan moontlik beter aangespreek word indien 
die spesifieke groep begunstigdes herbedink word.  In hierdie verband word daar 
voorgestel dat, indien ‗n klasgebaseerde regstellende aksie beleid as te drasties 
gesien word, Suid Afrika dit moet oorweeg om Indië se voorbeeld te volg en die 
―romerige laag‖ (―creamy layer‖) van die groep regstellende aksie begunstigdes uit te 
sluit.  Dit behoort te verseker dat regstellende aksie voordele nie deurentyd aan 
dieselfde individue verdeel en herverdeel word nie, en dat ‗n groter groep individue 
daarby baat.  Dit moet egter in gedagte gehou word dat transformasie altyd 
belemmer sal word indien opvoedkundige bronne en beleid nie tred hou met sosiale 
en politieke beleid nie. 
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1.1  Scope of research problem 
 
―I can predict when SA‘s "Tunisia Day" will arrive. Tunisia Day is when the masses 
rise against the powers that be, as happened recently in Tunisia. The year will be 
2020, give or take a couple of years.‖1  This contentious statement was made by 
Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of former South African president Thabo Mbeki.  It refers 
to the recent social upheavals and general revolt that occurred in Tunisia as a result 
of decades of oppression and dictatorship under the rule of President Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali.  In his opinion piece, Mbeki states that the BEE (Black Economic 
Empowerment) and affirmative action strategies chosen by the post-apartheid  
government are detrimental to the nation as a whole and only serve the interests of 
an exclusive, elite class of individuals.  Furthermore, he predicts that upheavals 
similar to those that occurred in Tunisia would occur in South Africa if the necessary 
reform does not take place.  Mbeki‘s views, while controversial, draw attention to the 
deeply contested nature of the government‘s affirmative action policies. Signs of 
unrest and discontent with the slow pace of transformation suggest that affirmative 
                                                     
1
 M Mbeki ―Wealth creation: Only a matter of time before the hand grenade explodes‖ (10-2-2011) 
Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=133902 (accessed 15-2-2011). 
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action per se is a limited tool for effecting social change and that the empowerment 
of a relatively small black elite through BEE and affirmative action will do little to 
pacify the expectations and grievances of those who feel that the transition to a non-
racial democracy has done little to redress centuries of deprivation and exploitation 
under colonialism and apartheid.2  
 
It is against this background that I will examine the justifications and limits of 
affirmative action.  Despite its controversial nature, I believe that affirmative action is 
still a policy without which South Africa cannot do. The aim of my thesis is to rethink 
the justifications and limits of affirmative action in view of current debates, in which 
both its potential as a tool for eradicating inequality at the individual and systemic 
levels and the constitutionality and viability of different policy options are contested.   
 
My thesis employs a range of conceptual and theoretical tools, derived not only from 
the constitutional law literature but also from jurisprudence, moral philosophy and 
political theory. Compensatory and distributive theories of justice are analysed and 
juxtaposed to each other, as are substantive and remedial conceptions of 
constitutional equality and recognition-based and redistributive notions of politics. 
Throughout, my focus is on the perspectives that these theories can bring to bear on 
the justifications and limits of affirmative action. What light can these theories shed 
on current debates about affirmative action, and how do they enable us to rethink the 
possibilities, aims and beneficiaries of affirmative action, as well as the constraints to 
which it is – and should be – subject?  
 
1.2  Outline of research project 
 
Chapter one will consist of a brief overview of the affirmative action policy of South 
Africa, bearing in mind that the term ―affirmative action‖ has its origin in the United 
States.3  Historically and within the academic arena, affirmative action has proven to 
                                                     
2
 Service delivery protests are a frequent occurrence within the informal sector and poverty-stricken 
communities.  
3
 R Dhami, J Squires and T Modood ―Developing positive action policies: Learning from the 
experiences of Europe and North America‖ (2006) Department for Work and Pensions: Research 
Report No. 406   
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be highly contested – even at the definitional level.  For the purposes of the current 
study, the following definition of affirmative action was constructed: ―A programme 
designed to give preferential treatment to certain groups in order to redress the 
imbalances of the past, to facilitate the elimination of unfair discrimination and to 
create equal opportunities, with the eventual goal of creating a more equal society‖.  
Along with an overview of the affirmative action legislation applicable to South Africa, 
this chapter also outlines the main justifications provided for such policies.  The main 
justifications for affirmative action originate from two key considerations: the need to 
redress past disadvantage and past imbalances, and the vision of an egalitarian 
society.  This is confirmed by the Constitutional Court‘s interpretation of Section 9(2) 
of the Constitution.4   Which of these justifications is emphasised in a particular case, 
may have an important bearing on the construction of the scope and limits of 
affirmative action.  This, in turn, will determine (or possibly even bypass) the possible 
negative consequences of the particular affirmative action policy.5   
The two key considerations mentioned can also be categorized as either backward-
looking or forward-looking.  Redress is a backward-looking justification while the 
creation of an egalitarian society is a forward-looking justification.  A backward-
looking justification is premised on the notion that it is only through positive measures 
that deep structural inequalities resulting from past discrimination can be adequately 
addressed.  It also holds that, in view of the historical events that took place, we as a 
society have incurred certain duties towards those who have been harmed.6  These 
duties are not only determined on a utilitarian basis.  In other words, reparations are 
not owed just because of the good that it would do society, but because of their 
underlying moral force.7  We have to tip the moral scales in order to position them as 
they would have been had it not been for past injustices.8     
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-
2006/rrep406.pdf (accessed 15 September 2007) 1 53. 
4
 Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC). 
5
 A McHarg and D Nicolson ―Justifying Affirmative Action: Perception and Reality‖ (2006) Journal of 
Law and Society 1 9. 
6
 TE Hill ―The Message of Affirmative Action‖ in SM Cahn (ed) The Affirmative Action Debate (1995) 
179. 
7
 TE Hill ―The Message of Affirmative Action‖ in SM Cahn (ed) The Affirmative Action Debate 179.  
The duties referred to above include that of ―fidelity, justice, gratitude, and reparation.‖ 
8
 J Kekes ―The Injustice of Affirmative Action Involving Preferential Treatment‖ in SM Cahn (ed) The 
Affirmative Action Debate (1995) 197.  
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The forward-looking approach, on the other hand, essentially focuses on present day 
dilemmas facing South Africa – poverty; homelessness; inadequate healthcare; and 
unemployment, to name but a few.9  This view generally demands that a stronger 
form of distributive justice be adhered to in order to correct current inequalities.   
These two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. When attempting to 
justify affirmative action, one should bear in mind visions of the past, in order to 
adequately grasp the gravity of the harms done, whilst simultaneously envisioning the 
ultimate goal one seeks to achieve.   
Several of the problems associated with affirmative action are identified in this 
chapter.  It has been argued that affirmative action ―benefits and harms the wrong 
people.‖10  Certain groups who are not necessarily previously disadvantaged enjoy 
the protection and advantages of affirmative action programs.  For this reason it is 
stated that affirmative action is over-inclusive.  At the same time, this comes directly 
at the expense of others who are in need of redress, which effectively renders the 
policy under-inclusive.11   
Affirmative action policies can be described as extensions of equality.  Chapter two 
illustrates the jurisprudential restrictions created by equality rhetoric in the South 
African courts.  The equality jurisprudence of South Africa‘s Constitutional Court 
relies primarily on the notions of substantive equality and remedial or restitutionary 
equality.  Substantive equality acknowledges the fact that society is based on an 
unequal system; it recognises the structure for what it is and aims to identify the 
vulnerable groups.  These groups are treated differently to ensure that they have the 
opportunity to reach their fullest potential and are capable of meaningful participation 
in society.12  Substantive equality is particularly valued for its strong transformative 
                                                     
9
 O Dupper ―Remedying the past or reshaping the future? Justifying race-based affirmative action in 
South Africa and the United States‖ (2005) The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 89 97. 
10
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 356. 
11
 O Dupper ―Remedying the past or reshaping the future?‖ (2005) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 89 112. 
12
 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development of 
an indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ (1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 248 254. 
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potential.13 Transformation in this sense is to be understood as the shift from 
oppressive apartheid practices to policies aimed at creating an egalitarian society.   
In this section a definition of remedial and restitutionary equality will be constructed 
as these concepts have, unfortunately, not received thorough academic analysis.  
The notion was first introduced in the well known case of National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others,14 in reaction to 
the claim that the court‘s equality jurisprudence was incapable of addressing material 
inequality.  The Constitutional Court asserted that if not expressly remedied, past 
injustices and unfair discrimination will continue to exist.15  The chapter will also 
contain an outline of section 9 of the South African Constitution, as well as a critical 
analysis of Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden.16 
Chapter three will mainly focus on compensatory and distributive theories of justice. 
In South Africa, justice has been subverted due to oppressive apartheid policies 
imposed in the past and this aberration needs to be corrected. How one should go 
about doing so depends on which theory of justice one applies.   
The overarching rationale behind compensatory justice is that justice is restored by 
the correcting of past wrongs.17  From this it is reasonable to infer that the 
compensation, whatever method is chosen, should be made by the aggressors or 
perpetrators, as it is due to their actions that the victims had experienced 
suppression in the first place.   In the South African example that would be the 
government – or ―the state‖.18  The majority of the victims, of course, were the black 
community – and most other communities of colour.19  
                                                     
13
 C Albertyn ―Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 253 
253. 
14
 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
15
 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) par (60). 
16
 2004 (12) BCLR 1125 (CC). 
17
 For a brief outline of the rationale and theory behind compensatory justice, see C Mbazira 
―‗Appropriate, Just And Equitable Relief‘ In Socio-Economic Rights Litigation: The Tension Between 
Corrective And Distributive Forms Of Justice‖ (2008) SALJ  Vol 125 Is 1 71 72-75. 
18
 The terms ‗government‘ and ‗state‘ are used interchangeably in this context.  As the government is 
the most prominent representative of the state, its actions are equated to those of the state. See HPP 
Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 83 93, for 
reasons why the state should be held accountable for the actions (and non-actions) of governments. 
19
 It should be noted, however, that although the State as an agent of society was the primary 
perpetrator in advancing discriminatory principles and norms, other relevant agents should also be 
considered, such as individual perpetrators and the beneficiaries of apartheid legislation.  The neglect 
of such groups to not actively oppose apartheid also enabled the regime to persist. 
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Compensatory justice entails bringing the victim to the condition he would have been 
in had the damage never occurred; however, accurate estimations of these positions 
are undoubtedly near impossible to make.  The compromise: placing victims in the 
positions in life that they would have been in, but for the major injustice that occurred, 
would have to suggest transferring them to a state of equal moral worth in relation to 
the rest of the members of society.  The aggressors are to make a commitment to 
restore and correct their injuries, and in terms of society as a whole, aggressors bear 
the responsibility to ―equalize the relationship between victim and perpetrator.‖20     
Today, South Africa is predominantly governed by black people.  Is it still reasonable 
to expect the government to compensate victims today when it is run by the precise 
group being compensated?  Furthermore, can it be fair to compensate victims today, 
when many of those who have truly suffered have already died?  Questions such as 
these will be addressed in detail in this section. 
Distributive justice is not so much a singular theory of justice as it is a collective noun 
for various theories concerned with how material and non-material goods should be 
distributed in society. As it is virtually impossible to incorporate all the divergent 
theories into a single approach, I will, instead, examine the primary theorist of 
distributive justice, John Rawls, and his difference principle as a theory of distributive 
justice. The difference principle is concerned with how public social institutions that 
determine the ―basic structure‖ of society should distribute social goods amongst 
different members of society and is therefore regarded as a forward-looking theory.  
Primary goods issued to each individual should at least enable him or her to be an 
active and constructive member of society.21  Not only are social goods to be seen as 
public commodities or a ―collective asset‖, but individual talents are to be regarded in 
the same manner.22  Individual talents are used to the benefit of all.   
The difference principle dictates that society can only be just when a particular 
distributive model places the worst off members of society in the best possible 
                                                     
20
 HPP Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 95. 
21
 See J Rawls Theory of Justice (1971) 19. 
22
 J Rawls Theory of Justice (1971) 179.  Talents are viewed as accidents of nature and therefore ―the 
contingencies of social circumstance must be nullified.‖ DL Phillips ―The equality debate: what does 
justice require?‖ (1977) Theory and society Vol 4 247 253.  Allowing all members to share in one 
another‘s good fortune creates a situation where it is not necessary to ―‘even out‘ endowments in order 
to remedy the arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies.‖ M Sandel Liberalism and the limits of 
justice (1998) 70. 
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position.23  Therefore, certain economic inequalities are allowed, and may even be 
necessary, if that means that it would be to the benefit of the least advantaged 
member of society, but society is expected to strive for equality as far as possible 
unless inequality makes it more prosperous.   
Such a distributive model would allow the least advantaged individuals to have higher 
expectations of achieving their life goals and economic independency.  It would 
encourage redistributive taxations already present in South African economic 
policies.  So, too, would the priority of improving the education system be an 
important distributive principle. 
What the difference principle would take issue with is the definition of the least 
advantaged group.  It would argue that it is essentially unjust to limit this group only 
to black people, as there are many other categories of people that are similarly 
poverty-stricken.  Furthermore, the affirmative action policy in South Africa would also 
be considered unjust because of the minimising of the expectation of white 
individuals to pursue certain career opportunities.   
Chapter four‘s purpose is to  examine the intersection between various theories from 
different disciplines, in order to determine whether (a) the notion of substantive 
equality or remedial and restitutionary equality  and (b) the difference principle or 
compensatory justice best makes sense of the constitutional equality provision, in 
general, and section 9(2), in particular.  The eventual goal of the study is to examine 
existing affirmative action policies to determine whether they comply with the 
standards of the identified theory (or theories) of equality and justice. 
Although the norms of compensatory justice and remedial and restitutionary equality 
derive from different disciplines, overlapping frequently occurs.  If we assess 
affirmative action in terms of compensatory justice, it would be appropriate to do so 
with the end goal of attaining remedial and restitutionary equality.  
Similarly, another way to serve the endeavour towards an equal society is to apply 
the difference principle as a measure of justice in order to support substantive 
equality. The value of affirmative action is centred in the positive outcomes that can 
                                                     
23
 What Rawls probably implies by this is that though we cannot in any way have absolute certainty 
about the consequences of certain distributions, we are still expected, however, to be reasonable 
when determining and planning the distributions that are to apply. 
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be expected such as greater representivity and a more equal society where all are 
able to attain full self-realisation.  Justice, in this case, would entail the distribution of 
―benefits in society that would have accrued to racial [groups] in the absence of 
racism.‖24  But racism alone did not create the unequal society we currently have and 
the inequalities faced today stem from a multifarious range of sources although, it 
may be argued, racism may be the chief cause.  Similarly, upliftment of victims of 
apartheid alone will not serve the ends of justice. 
The difference principle may be used as a redistributive tool to determine who is 
eligible to receive certain goods – and it will enhance the future career and life 
expectations of those who are least advantaged in society.25  Those who 
experienced racial discrimination in the past are clearly not capable of reaching their 
full potential and are by default entitled to social resources that would enable them to 
compete on fair terms with other members of society.  The social institutions that 
currently determine the probable outcome of one‘s life need to be re-aligned.  As Van 
Wyk states: ―the fact that a person is born into a poor rural black family is simply a 
fact; however, the fact that legal institutions attach the consequences of inferior 
education to the circumstances of his or her birth is unjust.‖26 
This chapter will also employ the theoretical tools outlined in previous chapters to 
analyse how affirmative action can be better conceived in relation to disadvantage 
based on gender and disability.  Largely informed by Fraser‘s reflections on the 
relationship between redistribution and recognition, on the one hand, and her 
distinction between transformative and affirmative strategies on the other, it is asked 
which understanding of equality and which theory of justice best enable a 
transformative approach capable of responding to the specific harms associated with 
patterns of discrimination against women and the disabled, respectively. 
Research has shown that affirmative action has the unfortunate consequence of 
serving an elite class,27 which is continually growing stronger and more powerful, 
while the lower classes continue to suffer.  The average lower class citizen is 
                                                     
24
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative action, and justice (2001) 96. 
25
 S Stroud ―The aim of affirmative action‖ (1999) Social Theory and Practice Vol 25 No 3 385 386; 
WE Schaller ―Rawls, the difference principle, and economic inequality‖ (1998) Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly Vol 79 368 382. 
26
 MW Van Wyk ―Towards a Rawlsian justification for affirmative action‖ (2000) South African Journal 
of Labour Relations 58 70. 
27
 See for example D Herman The Naked Emperor (2007) 36-42. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
experiencing poor public service and is not receiving an adequate education which 
would effectively prepare him/her for a successful occupation.  In the past few years, 
academic and non-academic authors have questioned the definition of the group of 
people who are to benefit from affirmative action policies.  It is argued that the focus 
should shift from race to the individual‘s socio-economic position in society.28 This 
approach could remedy the problems of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness 
referred to above. Rather than simply equating race with socio-economic class, it 
would focus on the actual material deprivation and real-life contexts of individuals. In 
this respect, it resonates closely with the idea of substantive equality.29   
In chapter five, I will examine the potential of a class-based approach to address the 
current problems of race-based affirmative action such as the entrenchment of racial 
categories and the fortification of a black elite. I will also inquire into the limits of 
class-based affirmative action. My inquiry will be framed, in part, by Nancy Fraser‘s 
analysis of the relationship between class and status harms, or between 
maldistribution and misrecognition.30 I will also draw upon a second distinction 
introduced by Fraser, namely the distinction between affirmative and transformative 
strategies. While affirmative strategies aim to redress disadvantage without 
addressing its root causes, transformative strategies seek to transform the 
―underlying generative framework‖ which caused the inequalities in the first place. It 
could possibly be argued that class-based affirmative action would be more deeply 
transformative, as it is directly concerned with material deprivation and could have 
the effect of transforming, rather than affirming, reified racial identities.31 
                                                     
28
 See for example D Herman The Naked Emperor: Why Affirmative Action Failed (2007) 82-87; R 
Kahlenberg ―Class-Based Affirmative Action‖ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1037-1099; D Malamud 
―Class-based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats‖ (1996) Vol 74 Texas Law Review 1847-1900; 
JW Young and PM Johnson ―The impact of an SES-based model on a college‘s undergraduate 
admissions outcomes‖ (2004) Vol 45 Research in Higher Education 777-797; CD Cunningham and 
NR Madhava Menon ―Race, class, caste…? Rethinking Affirmative Action‖ (1999) Vol 97 Michigan 
Law Review 1296-1310; C Cimino ―Class-based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After 
Miller v Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?‖ (1997) The University of Chicago Law 
Review Vol 64 1289-1310. 
29
 R Roach  ―Class-Based Affirmative Action‖ (2003) Black Issues in Higher Education 22-26. 
30
 N Fraser ―Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and participation‖ in 
N Fraser and A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 7. 
31
 N Fraser ―Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and participation‖ in 
N Fraser and A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 75.  
The value of transformative strategies, as opposed to affirmative strategies, is that they are able to 
―redress status subordination by deconstructing the symbolic opposition that underlie currently 
institutionalized patterns of cultural value.‖  On the advantages and shortcomings of transformative 
strategies, see 77-78. See also, on the link between equality and ―transformative constitutionalism‖, C 
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Chapter six will explore the affirmative action policies of Malaysia, India and Brazil 
respectively.  Specific attention will be paid to the legal and historical justifications for 
this policy, with particular reference to the beneficiaries.  Malaysia was chosen as a 
significant case study because, just as in South Africa, the defined group of 
beneficiaries comprises the majority of the citizens.32  As in the case of South Africa, 
Malaysian affirmative action is aimed at ―returning people who had been excluded 
from the political dispensation to their legitimate position.‖33  India, on the other hand, 
was chosen as a unique example of a class- or caste-based system.34  A thorough 
study of its policy could bear valuable fruit (in terms of lessons and warnings) if South 
Africa should ever decide to introduce similar methods of addressing inequality.35  
Lastly, this chapter will explore the Brazilian application of affirmative action due to its 
race-based approach.36  In doing so, it should become apparent whether the 
problems faced in South Africa are unique to South Africa, or rather a general 
symptom of a race-based policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Albertyn ―Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 257; C 
Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ (1998) SAJHR Vol 14 248; E Van Huyssteen ―The Constitutional 
Court and the redistribution of power in South Africa: Towards transformative constitutionalism‖ (2000) 
African Studies Vol 59:2 245 257. 
32
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative action policy in Malaysia: To restructure society, to eradicate poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 189-221; I Emsley The Malaysian experience of affirmative 
action (1996); E Phillips ―Positive discrimination in Malaysia: A cautionary tale for the United Kingdom‖ 
in B Hepple and EM Szyszczak Discrimination: the limits of law (1992); J Castle ―Affirmative action in 
three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South 
African Journal of Labour Relations 6-34; LH Guan ―Affirmative action in Malaysia‖ (2005) Southeast 
Asian Affairs 211-228; T Sowell Affirmative action around the world (2004) 55-77.  
33
 D Herman The Naked Emperor (2007) 25. 
34
 D Kumar ―The affirmative action debate in India‖ (1992) Asian Survey Vol 32 290-302; T Sowell 
Affirmative action around the world (2004) 23-54; T Weisskopf Affirmative action in the United States 
and India: a comparative perspective (2004); T Deane ―A commentary on the positive discrimination 
policy in India‖ (2009) Vol 1 PER 28-52; F De Zwart ―The logic of affirmative action:caste, class and 
quotas in India‖ (2000) Vol 43 Acta Sociologica 235-249. 
35
 Affirmative action in India is ―aimed at addressing the hierarchical differences in the caste system.‖ 
D Herman The Naked Emperor (2007) 55. 
36
 M Lloyd ―In Brazil, a new debate over color‖ (2004) Vol 50 Chronical of Higher Education 38-40; M 
Lloyd ―In Brazil, a different approach to affirmative action‖ (2004) Vol 51 Chronical of Higher Education 
49-52; C Yang, GC D‘Souza, AS Bapat and SM Colarelli ―A cross-national analysis of affirmative 
action: an evolutionary psychological perspective‖ (2006) Vol 27 Managerial and Decision Economics 
203-216; T Boston and U Nair-Reichert ―Affirmative action: perspectives from the United States, India 
and Brazil‖ (2003) Vol 27 The Western Journal of Black Studies 3-14; LGM Tavolaro ―Affirmative 
action in contemporary Brazil: two institutional discourses on race‖ (2008) Vol 19 Int J Polit Cult Soc 
145-160; RHL Pedrosa, JNW Dachs, RP Maia and CY Andrade ―Academic performance, student‘s 
background and affirmative action at a Brazilian university‖ (2007) Vol 19 Higher Education 
Management and Policy 67-86; LC De Sousa and P Nascimento ―Brazilian national identity at a 
crossroads: the myth of racial democracy and the development of black identity‖ (2008) Vol 19 Int J 
Polit Cult Soc 129-143; M Htun ―From ‗racial democracy‘ to affirmative action: changing state policy on 
race in Brazil‖ (2004) Vol 39 Latin American Research Review 60-89; SR Bailey ―Group dominance 
and the muth of racial democracy: antiracism attitudes in Brazil‖ (2004) Vol 69 American Sociological 
Review 728-747. 
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Finally, chapter seven will attempt to pull together the different strands comprising 
this thesis, and draw conclusions relating to backward-looking and forward-looking 
justifications for affirmative action; substantive equality and remedial and 
restitutionary equality; recognition and redistributive considerations; compensatory 
justice and the difference principle; class-based affirmative action; and comparative 
affirmative action policies. I am interested, in the first place, in the light these 
concepts and theories can shed on the constitutional equality provision in general, 
and section 9(2) in particular. Secondly, I will use these theoretical perspectives to 
appraise the broad legislative and policy framework for affirmative action in South 
Africa, and to comment critically on current practices. Specific conclusions about the 
definition of the class of beneficiaries will be drawn. Conclusions will also be drawn 
on the question whether a deferential or interventionist judicial stance is appropriate 
in cases involving affirmative action. 
 
1.3  Research questions and research methodology  
 
A range of research questions relating to the Constitutional Court‘s equality 
jurisprudence, notions of justice, forms of affirmative action, and comparative law are 
posed in this thesis.  Two notions of equality are analysed, which have both 
contributed to the Constitutional Court‘s equality jurisprudence.  These are: 
substantive equality, and remedial or restitutionary equality.  Substantive equality 
recognises the differences in order to advance the goal of creating an equal society.  
Remedial and restitutionary equality, on the other hand, recognises harms done in 
the past in order to make up for past injustices, and thus to ensure a more equal 
society.   The possibilities and limits of a strategy based on substantive equality and 
of a strategy seeking to advance remedial and restitutionary equality will be 
juxtaposed within the specific context of affirmative action. 
Theories of justice are also regularly invoked as tools of interpretation and 
justification of affirmative action policy and legislation.  It is asked whether an 
affirmative action policy which aims to restore compensatory justice is better 
equipped to foster transformation than distributive justice.  Rawls‘s difference 
principle is selected as a theory of distributive justice and the purpose is to see 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
whether it is capable of restructuring the social and economic order in society, and 
specifically in South Africa, so as to create a more egalitarian society. 
Various forms of affirmative action based on the selected beneficiaries can be 
defined.  In this thesis, South Africa‘s race-based affirmative action scheme will be 
analysed according to its strengths and weaknesses.  It is questioned whether other 
forms of affirmative action, such as a class-based affirmative action policy or one 
based on Sen‘s capability approach, might perhaps be more capable of reaching the 
goals more effectively.  Throughout the project, Fraser‘s theories of redistribution and 
recognition are employed as yardsticks to gage the possible outcomes of different 
conceptions of equality and different theories of justice.   
Finally, it is questioned whether foreign affirmative action policies, such as those in 
Malaysia, Brazil and India, can serve as meaningful examples in the South African 
context.  These societies differ markedly from South Africa in terms of historical 
background; ethnic composition; wealth and social (dis)order.  Nevertheless, it is still 
useful to ask how South Africa can benefit from their experiences. 
The research methodologies employed in this thesis thus include: an analysis and 
critique of the South African affirmative action policy and judicial pronouncements on 
the beneficiaries and limits of affirmative action; a study and evaluation of different 
constitutional understandings of equality and different theories of justice; a contextual 
analysis of different constructions of disadvantage and how they impact on the 
identification of the class of affirmative action beneficiaries; and a comparative study 
of different approaches to affirmative action. 
 
1.4  Parameters of research 
 
Affirmative action debates often focus on the sphere of labour law.  Other areas 
which are affected by affirmative action policies include preferential procurement of 
government tenders; education, especially higher education; and social welfare 
spending.  Although I will inevitably refer to these contexts, particularly the 
employment context, I will not attempt to provide a detailed and exhaustive analysis 
of the legislation in question or of its interpretation by the courts. The focus falls, 
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rather, on the normative justifications for the existence of an affirmative action policy.  
Various justifications have been advanced for the current policy, which essentially 
entail that compensation should be made for past injustices and that redistributive 
strategies should be employed to create an egalitarian society.     
The philosophical theories chosen which are aimed at the achievement of justice in 
this case are, firstly, that of compensatory justice and, secondly, Rawls‘s difference 
principle as a theory of distributive justice.  Various other philosophical approaches 
could have been chosen, such as utilitarianism, strict egalitarianism, restorative (or 
corrective) justice or libertarian theories.  However, the two selected theories tie in 
closely with the South African goals for affirmative action mentioned above as the 
idea of compensatory justice relates closely to mending the scars of past injustices, 
whereas Rawls‘s difference principle can be utilised as a mechanism for the 
achievement of an egalitarian society through its prescribed distributive principles. 
Once the appropriate justifications for affirmative action have been discussed, I will 
focus more closely on the operationalisation of a preferred policy of affirmative 
action.  Currently, race is central to the affirmative action policy practised in South 
Africa. It will be discussed whether this model is capable of achieving the forms of 
justice and equality that the Constitutional Court ascribes to.  The current race-based 
approach will be juxtaposed to the alternative of a class-based approach. The focus 
in this regard will be restricted to the capability of such a policy to reach as many 
disadvantaged individuals as possible.  Another theory that will also be explored is 
Sen‘s capability approach.  Various other bases for affirmative action are employed 
in foreign law but will not be discussed.  These include gender-based affirmative 
action (as in the case of Germany and the People‘s Republic of China); 
neighbourhood-based affirmative action (as in the case of France); ethnic-based 
affirmative action (as in the case of Slovakia and Malaysia); and even linguistic-
based quotas (as in the case of Finland). 
The evaluation of various foreign affirmative action policies is deemed useful for the 
reason that South Africa could adapt its policy to avoid their failures or even emulate 
their successes.  The three key comparators, as mentioned above, are those of 
Malaysia, Brazil and India.  The justifications for this selection will be presented in the 
appropriate chapter.  At this point, suffice it to say that two of the three policies were 
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selected for the features that they have in common with South Africa, i.e. having a 
racial majority that are beneficiaries of affirmative action (Malaysia) or having a race-
based affirmative action policy (Brazil).  India will serve as an example of an 
affirmative action policy in which social class plays an important role.  Other nations 
that also employ affirmative action policies include Japan, the USA and, closer to 
home, Namibia.  
 
1.5 Definition of affirmative action 
 
The official use of the term ―affirmative action‖ has its origin in the United States.  A 
troublesome racial history ―rooted in plantation slavery and the historical persistence 
of race inequality, coupled with the demands and struggles of the civil rights 
movement‖ have to a large extent led to the development and entrenchment of 
affirmative action policies in the United States.37  During the 1960s, black leaders in 
the USA were at the forefront of urging the government to recognise that merely 
eliminating racial barriers will not amount to sufficient measures to compensate for 
the preceding racial segregation. Ultimately, the objective of the struggle was to 
ensure that minority groups were adequately represented in areas of employment, 
education and public programs.38   
President John F. Kennedy‘s 1961 Executive Order 10925 represented the first 
official use of the term affirmative action.3940  It explicitly required that affirmative 
action measures be taken ―to ensure that applicants are treated equally without 
                                                     
37
 R Dhami, J Squires and T Modood ―Developing positive action policies: Learning from the 
experiences of Europe and North America‖ (2006) Department for Work and Pensions: Research 
Report No. 406   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-
2006/rrep406.pdf (accessed 15 September 2007) 53. 
38
 I Krstić ―Affirmative Action in the United States and the European Union: Comparison and Analysis‖ 
(2003) Law and Politics 6 825-843.   
39
R Dhami, J Squires and T Modood ―Developing positive action policies: Learning from the 
experiences of Europe and North America‖ (2006) Department for Work and Pensions: Research 
Report No. 406   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-
2006/rrep406.pdf (accessed 15 September 2007) 53; I Krstić ―Affirmative Action in the United States 
and the European Union: Comparison and Analysis‖ 2003 Law and Politics 827. 
40
 Although other sources argue that the first time the term was used was in the US National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, or as it is more popularly known, The Wagner Act. 
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regard to race, colour, religion, sex or national origin‖.41  In South Africa, however, 
under-represented and grieved members of society were to wait nearly three 
decades for the dream of possible relief to become a reality.42   It should be taken 
into account, though, that affirmative action policies in these two sovereign states 
differ greatly in respects of targeted beneficiaries and the adequate measures to be 
taken, amongst others.  The main and most obvious reason for this is that the 
previously disadvantaged group in the United States only consists of a minority of 
members of society, whereas in the case of South Africa, those who are unequal due 
to past injustices, or the previously disadvantaged, comprise a substantial majority of 
members of society.   
When considering contentious issues such as the nature, consequences and 
justifications of affirmative action, it is preferable to commence with a suitable 
definition of the topic under discussion.  The reason is that affirmative action policies 
have been given several labels in the past, such as ―positive discrimination‖, ―reverse 
discrimination‖, and ―preferential treatment‖, each having its own positive and 
negative connotations.   
Given that affirmative action programmes can be categorised within different 
contexts, it is essential for current purposes to construct an adequate working 
definition of the term in question.  The Bill of Rights Handbook merely states that 
―[a]ffirmative action means preferential treatment for disadvantaged groups of 
people…The grounds of preference are usually race or gender‖.43  This definition 
merely identifies some of the grounds for ‗preferential treatment‘ but fails to provide 
justifications for such advancement.44  Perhaps the most appropriate way to define 
affirmative action would be by paying close attention to the aims of affirmative action.   
                                                     
41
 R Dhami, J Squires and T Modood ―Developing positive action policies: Learning from the 
experiences of Europe and North America‖ (2006) Department for Work and Pensions: Research 
Report No. 406   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-
2006/rrep406.pdf (accessed 15 September 2007) 53. 
42
 The Employment Equity Act was only introduced in 1998.  Since then, other affirmative action 
legislative measures have frequently appeared. 
43
 I Currie and J De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2005) 264.  In Equality, 
Affirmative Action and Justice (2001), J Rabe attributes a similar definition to affirmative action. 
44
 Note that in its more comprehensive discussion of affirmative action, this text does mention South 
Africa‘s discriminatory past and current inequalities in light of the evils that equality legislation is aimed 
at eradicating. 
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One of the most prominent vehicles for affirmative action in South Africa is the 
Employment Equity Act (EEA), which contains detailed affirmative action provisions 
in Chapter III.45  According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Employment 
Equity Bill, the aim of the EEA is ―the elimination of unfair discrimination in 
employment, to redress the imbalances of the past and to create equality in 
employment by means of affirmative action‖.46  The Act itself defines affirmative 
action policies or measures as ―measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a 
designated employer.‖47  From a purely ‗labour law‘ perspective, this definition is 
sufficient, for within each term lies a wide spectrum of qualifications.48  For the 
purposes of the current study, a wider definition is required as theories of moral 
philosophy and political theory are not as context specific.  A clinical, purely labour 
law orientated definition of affirmative action would reduce the scope of the measure 
or policy and, in turn, the study itself.  Affirmative action measures should instead be 
viewed as restitutionary and compensatory instruments, primarily based on historical 
injustices, designed to facilitate the conception of a free and equal society by means 
of establishing institutional and policy-based measures.  Therefore, for the purposes 
of this discussion, the following working definition of affirmative action will be 
adopted:  An affirmative action programme is a programme designed to give 
preferential treatment to certain groups in order to redress the imbalances of the 
past, to facilitate the elimination of unfair discrimination and to create equal 
opportunities, with the eventual goal of creating a more equal society.   
 
1.6 Legislation 
 
The main agent for achieving equality is undeniably the South African Constitution.49  
Section 9 of the South African Constitution contains what is referred to as the 
                                                     
45
 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
46
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 368; Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Employment Equity Bill (1998) 19 ILJ 1345, 1346. 
47
 Section 15 EEA of 1998. 
48
 Such as suitably qualified people referring to a person‘s ability to do a job based on the 
qualifications set out in Sec 20(3)(a)-(d) EEA of 1998, or designated groups pertaining to black people, 
women and people with disabilities as set out in Sec 1 EEA of 1998. 
49
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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―equality provision‖.  Section 9(1) states that everyone is equal before the law and 
that everyone has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.50  An entity 
would not be in violation of section 9(1) if he/she/it differentiated between certain 
cultures or groups when it served as a vehicle for change, provided that there was a 
―rational relationship between the differentiation made and the legitimate 
governmental purpose which is provided to validate it‖.51 Without any rational 
connection, the measures in question will necessarily be invalid.   
The Constitution emphasises the importance of equality by encompassing principles 
of both formal and substantive equality.52  Formal equality requires that ―the law must 
treat individuals in like circumstances alike.‖53   In essence, the application of formal 
equality is neutral, whereas substantive equality ―requires that the actual social and 
economic circumstances of groups and individuals must be examined to determine 
whether any action violates the principle of equality‖.54  Substantive equality, as it 
features in section 9(2), permits that legislative and other similar measures may be 
taken in order to redress the inequitable social standing of those who were 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.   Affirmative action provisions are an 
embodiment of these measures authorised by Section 9.   
Section 9(3) and 9(4) of the Constitution only prohibit unfair discrimination, which 
indirectly serves as a ground of justification for claims that affirmative action practices 
are discriminatory.  Therefore, ―remedial measures which favour certain groups are 
not automatically in violation of the provision‖.55  One of the most important cases in 
South Africa regarding equality is that of Harksen v Lane.56  In this case, the Court 
gave a detailed process by which to determine whether section 9 was violated.57  To 
summarise, after it was established whether section 9(1) was violated as stated 
above, one needs to look at whether a particular state or individual conduct 
amounted to unfair discrimination.  This is done by firstly establishing whether the 
                                                     
50
 Section 9(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
51
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 297-298.   
52
 The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 
AC Basson, MA Christianson, C Garbers, PAK le Roux, C Mischke and EML Strydom Essential 
Labour Law (2005) 215; I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  (2005) 232-234. 
53
 I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 232. 
54
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice  (2001) 291. 
55
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 294. 
56
 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
57
 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) par 54.  See Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 
121 (CC). 
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differentiation between categories of people amounted to discrimination, and then 
secondly, whether such discrimination amounts to unfair discrimination.  Unfair 
discrimination will only be allowed if such discrimination is held to be justifiable under 
the limitations clause in section 36.  
For the purpose of this discussion, it is not necessary to go into further detail 
regarding equality at this stage.  Issues concerning equality, more specifically 
substantive, remedial and restitutionary equality, will be discussed at length under 
the Constitutional Court‘s equality jurisprudence.  
Several pieces of labour law legislation have been implemented, as authorised by 
section 9(2) of the Constitution, in order to give effect to the Constitutional equality 
provision.58  These include, amongst others, the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act 5 of 2000 and the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997.  The most 
prominent sets of affirmative action legislation are the Labour Relations Act59 (LRA) 
and the Employment Equity Act60 (EEA).  The LRA contains specific provisions 
rendering a dismissal automatically unfair when the dismissal is based on one of the 
listed grounds.61  When accused of dismissing an employee on discriminatory 
grounds, an employer can turn to Section 187(2) as a defence.  This section holds 
that dismissals shall be considered fair ―if the reason for dismissal is based on an 
inherent requirement of the particular job‖ or if the dismissal is based on the 
employee‘s age when the employee had ―reached the normal or agreed retirement 
age for persons employed in that capacity‖.62  Schedule 2 of the EEA repealed 
Schedule 7 item 2(1)(a) of the LRA and subsequently the EEA now regulates unfair 
discrimination against applicants for employment and employees.63 
The affirmative action provisions of Chapter III of the EEA, as well as the aim as set 
out in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Employment Equity Bill, have been 
referred to in the above section.  Section 2 of the EEA dictates the purpose of the Act 
and reads as follows: 
                                                     
58
 Sec 9(2) states: ―Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.‖ 
59
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
60
 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
61
 Grounds for automatically unfair dismissals are listed in Section 187(1) LRA. 
62
 Sec 187(2) Labour Relations Act. 
63
 Sec 6(1) Employment Equity Act lists the grounds upon which employers may not discriminate. 
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―The purpose of this Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by 
(a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and 
(b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their 
equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce.‖64 
Similarly, section 13 places an obligation on designated employers to undertake 
affirmative measures as set out in section 15.  Section 15(1) of the Employment 
Equity Act describes these affirmative action measures as ―measures designed to 
ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal employment 
opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels 
in the workforce of a designated employer‖.65  This provision contains many key 
words, which are all defined in the EEA itself.  ―Equitable representation,‖ however, is 
not.66  Section 42 of the Act creates the impression that equitable representation ―is 
determined by a consideration of the demographic profile of the national and regional 
economically active population, the pool of suitably qualified people in the designated 
groups from which the employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint 
employees, and also the economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in 
which the employer operates‖.67  According to the EEA, a designated employer must 
prepare an employment equity plan upon conducting the required consultation with 
the representative trade union or nominated employees;68 do an analysis by 
identifying barriers adversely affecting employees or members from designated 
groups;69 prepare and implement an employment equity plan;70 submit reports to the 
Department of Labour;71 and report income differentials of employees to the 
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 Sec 2 of the Employment Equity Act. 
65
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Employment Conditions Commission.72  These actions as a whole are known as the 
Employment Equity Plan which Basson et al describe as the ―centerpiece in the 
procedure for implementing affirmative action in the workplace.‖73   
 
1.7 Forward-looking and backward-looking approaches 
 
The main justifications for affirmative action originate from two key considerations: 
the need to redress past disadvantage and past imbalances, and the vision of an 
egalitarian society.  This is confirmed by the Constitutional Court‘s interpretation of 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution.74   McHarg and Nicolson suggest that the way in 
which affirmative action is conceptualised, depends on which justificatory strategy is 
chosen. This, in turn, will determine (or even bypass) the possible negative 
consequences of the particular affirmative action policy.75  For these reasons they 
posit that there are essentially three justificatory routes available for affirmative 
action, namely: reverse discrimination and compensatory justice; non-discrimination 
and distributive justice; and preferential treatment and social utility, each described in 
brief along with the concomitant problems associated with it.76  The authors further 
distinguish between strong and weak affirmative action policies.  Strong or ‗hard‘ 
affirmative action policies generally refer to affirmative action measures 
conceptualised as ‗positive discrimination‘, ‗reverse discrimination‘ or ‗preferential 
treatment‘.  Weak or ‗soft‘ forms of affirmative action are generally labelled ‗positive 
action‘.77 
The first justificatory theory, compensatory justice, which is based on the elected 
definition of affirmative action as reverse discrimination, holds that those who have 
suffered in the past should be compensated by those who have caused their 
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suffering.78  Both compensatory and distributive justice will be discussed at length 
later on.  At this stage it is merely essential to note that these two theories are 
extensive and controversial, and therefore not without limitation.  Concerning the 
problems associated with compensatory justice, McHarg and Nicolson state that the 
form and duration of compensatory measures are uncertain.79  Of stronger 
importance and gravity is the argument surrounding the ‗innocent victims‘ and 
‗undeserving beneficiaries‘.  Simply put, ―those who are required to ‗pay‘, for 
instance, by losing out in the allocation of positions or contracts, are generally not 
responsible for the past discrimination, whereas the beneficiaries may themselves 
have escaped significant discrimination.‖80  Yet, easily overlooked, are the ―faceless 
victims of past discrimination‖ and current, as well as future, victims of an unequal 
society.81  The third and final problem mentioned in connection with compensatory 
justice relates to the emotional consequences of affirmative action strategies, in that 
those who do not benefit from such policies experience ―righteous anger‖ instead of 
―moral guilt‖ for past wrongs.82 
Justifications relating to distributive justice can be applied to affirmative action 
policies conceptualised as non-discriminatory.    This method of justification portrays 
equality as substantive equality and affirms a notion of equality of opportunity rather 
than equality of treatment.83  For these reasons, affirmative actions should be 
interpreted as ―natural extension[s] of current anti-discrimination law‖.84  Effective as 
this justification might seem, the authors argue that it has several drawbacks, relating 
mainly to the pull between formal and substantive equality. These include practical 
issues; confusion between differential and preferential treatment; group-based 
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policies giving rise to ‗genuine grievances‘; and more general problems surrounding 
proportionality.85   
In the last instance, social utility justifications should be applied to affirmative action 
based on preferential treatment.  This utilitarian view accepts as a given that 
preferential treatment occurs.  However, such preferential treatment is justified as 
forming part of an ―overarching social or organizational goal‖ which takes into 
account social inclusion and ―the need to defuse social tension.‖86  The benefits of 
such an approach are, firstly, that it avoids the usual negative associations that follow 
anti-discriminatory practices because this justification deals with ―disadvantage and 
exclusion‖ and therefore it effectively caters for the actual victims of past injustices.87  
Secondly, this approach avoids the opprobrious consequences of affirmative action 
specifically in relation to the victims themselves.  Victims are no longer stigmatized as 
being needy but are considered valuable members of society who are also capable 
of making contributions.  However, this approach also has certain shortcomings.  In 
the first instance, the approach has a tendency to devalue state neutrality.  Criticism 
includes the fact that preferential treatment programs have a strong paternalistic 
nature.88  Furthermore, without any reference to remedial equality, it is very difficult to 
persuade all members of society to agree to and appreciate a particular social goal.  
It is important for all members to value such goals because only then will they agree 
that the heavy costs involved are justified.  Essentially, the aim is to combat prejudice 
and anti-discrimination policies should be centered on this goal. 
It should be noted, however, that one should be cautious when committing to certain 
fixed conceptualisations.  Theories of compensatory justice and distributive justice 
are far more complex and should not necessarily be as firmly constrained or tied to 
the abovementioned conceptions of affirmative action.  Conversely, considerable 
value can be gained from forward-looking and backward-looking justifications of 
affirmative action.  The reason for this is because, as will be established at a later 
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stage of this inquiry, theories of compensatory and distributive justice are congruent 
with backward-looking and forward-looking justifications of affirmative action 
respectively.  The theory of compensatory justice embodies the need to redress past 
disadvantage by focusing on the damage suffered by the victim,89 whereas 
distributive justice is primarily concerned with the allocation of scarce economic 
goods in society with the main objective being to create an (equal) egalitarian 
society.   
The injunction to redress the legacy of past injustices and unfair discrimination 
resonates with the emphasis in section 9(2) that the right to equality includes full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  With this, the Constitution implies that 
the aim of affirmative action can (amongst others) be viewed as remedial or 
compensatory in nature.90 This backward-looking justification, alluded to above, rests 
on the premise that it is only through positive measures that deep structural 
inequalities resulting from past discrimination can be adequately addressed.  It also 
holds that, but for the historical events that took place, we as a society have incurred 
certain duties towards those who have been harmed.91  These duties are not only 
determined on a utilitarian basis, in other words, reparations are not owed because of 
the good that it would do society, but because of their underlying moral force.92  We 
have to tip the moral scales in order to position them as they would have been had it 
not been for past injustices.93  In addition to the duties owed to contemporary blacks, 
the backward-looking argument also states that it is the present day whites who 
should make such amends.  Hill illustrates this by means of the ―inherited stolen 
bicycle analogy‖, stating that it is wrong for a person who has inherited a stolen item 
to keep it, even though he or she had not participated in stealing the bicycle in the 
first place.  Hill states the following with regards to current reparations: 
―…[P]resent-day whites owe reparations to contemporary blacks, not because 
they are themselves guilty of causing the disadvantages of  blacks, but because 
they are in possession of advantages that  fell to them as a result of the gross 
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injustices of their ancestors.  Special advantages continue to fall even to 
innocent whites because of the ongoing prejudice of their white neighbors.‖94  
Proponents of backward-looking arguments contend that such an approach confers 
real value on the interests of, and disadvantages facing blacks.  Possible future 
benefits are therefore not as important as the current interests involved.  A major 
focal point is therefore that all individuals, black and white, are not treated as mere 
instruments who are all enlisted to serve as a means to an end, namely to serve as 
pawns in the creation of a more equal society. Each is awarded his or her own set of 
rights, and individual (personal) interests are deemed to be highly valuable.   
Conversely, this justification also has some drawbacks.  Thomas E Hill believes that 
we should focus on the message of the social theory that is being analysed.  The 
message that the backward-looking justification for affirmative action seeks to convey 
is that reparations should be paid back in kind.95  Rightfully noted is that the ―kind‖ of 
discrepancies involved in the present matter not only involve the actual loss of jobs, 
property and education, but more importantly it includes the emotional disadvantages 
suffered by the victims.  The denial of rights of the black population is certainly a core 
issue that needs to be rectified, but what we have to bear in mind and should not 
deny is that ―prejudicial attitudes damaged self-esteem, undermined motivations, 
limited realistic options, and made even ‗officially open‘ opportunities seem 
undesirable.‖96  How then should reparations take place or be measured?  What is 
obvious though is that reparations should take place.  It is the extent of which where 
the uncertainty lies.  Forward-looking justifications place less emphasis on past 
occurrences and (if anything) view them as mere indicators of which changes are 
more likely to bring about certain consequences.97 
The forward-looking approach essentially focuses on present day dilemmas facing 
South Africa.  The list includes problems such as poverty, homelessness, inadequate 
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healthcare and unemployment.98  This view generally demands that a stronger form 
of distributive justice be adhered to in order to correct current inequalities or societal 
handicaps that are a direct result of past practices and policies.   
Regarding the forward-looking rationale, Dupper suggests that such a notion would 
encompass two elements.  Firstly, this view holds that affirmative action should serve 
as a tool to change the current attitudes towards members of disadvantaged groups 
in order to overcome societal prejudices.  Individuals in society often formulate their 
opinions of other groups based on what they have (only) seen these groups do in the 
past, and therefore they find it difficult to conceive that black people, amongst others, 
may be able to operate on a higher and more professional level in the labour market 
than before.  This attitude-changing argument therefore concerns the transformation 
of societal opinions of disadvantaged groups by allowing members of those groups to 
hold professional positions which require more skill and a higher level of 
proficiency.99  Dupper also adds that this argument would not only benefit the 
members receiving preferential treatment, but the whole group itself would benefit 
and acquire a higher standing.100   
The second leg of the forward-looking approach is the integrative argument.101  This 
view links up with the above mentioned attitude-changing approach in that affirmative 
action serves as a method to integrate members of disadvantaged groups into the 
democratic society, specifically by allowing them to perform tasks which require 
higher levels of ability.  The integration of all members of society is crucial as the 
segregation of groups has a ―causal impact on two core ideals, namely equality of 
opportunity and democracy.‖102   
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As with backward-looking justifications for affirmative action, the forward-looking 
approach is not without critique.   Thomas Sowell points out that a free market would 
have the same (or even more efficient) results as affirmative action policies, and by 
implication it would not bear the burden of negative stigmas often associated with 
affirmative action.103  As it was explained above, Hill also criticises this approach with 
regards to the supposed message that it sends to the beneficiaries specifically, which 
is the following: 
―Never mind how you have been treated.  Forget about the fact that your race or 
sex has in the past been actively excluded and discouraged, and that you yourself 
may have had handicaps due to prejudice.  Our sole concern is to bring about 
certain good results in the future, and giving you a break happens to be a useful 
means for doing this.  Don‘t think this is recognition of your rights as an individual 
or your disadvantages as a member of a group.  Nor does it mean that we have 
confidence in your abilities.  We would do the same for those who are privileged 
and academically inferior if it would have the same socially beneficial results.‖104 
Justifying affirmative action in terms of a single approach allows for readily available 
criticisms.  Therefore, when attempting to justify affirmative action, one should bear in 
mind visions of the past, in order to adequately grasp the gravity of the harms done, 
whilst simultaneously envisioning the ultimate goal one seeks to achieve.  
Beneficiaries (or victims) have not forgotten the hardships with which they have had 
to contend, and the battles they have had to fight, in order to get where they are 
today.  The path to transformation cannot exclude reparations or necessary 
apologies.  
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1.8 General problems related to affirmative action 
 
It has been accepted, and is indeed indicated throughout this thesis, that a definite 
necessity for affirmative action exists, yet its general application is not uncontested.  
Affirmative action, as it functions in South Africa, is not a policy void of complications 
or issues.  It is important to take note of such problems in order to identify whether 
the issues exist on a policy level, or on a deeper societal level.  Furthermore, 
identifying the problems could also indicate whether, and to what extent, outlined 
goals have been reached and what steps are necessary to complete the process.  
The problems created by affirmative action as implemented in South Africa range 
from the entrenchment of racial divisions in society, to the innocent victim issue and a 
reduction in general efficiency. 
Johan Rabe lists a number of disadvantages of affirmative action within the South 
African context.  Firstly, Rabe notes that persons advantaged by affirmative action 
are stigmatised by preferential treatment.105  There is often such a degree of 
contempt and hype surrounding preferential appointments, that the beneficiaries are 
bound to face a twofold battle.  The first is that they themselves are likely to feel 
inferior towards co-workers for not having to compete on an equal footing for the 
post.  They may also feel that they have not truly earned the position that they were 
awarded.  This, in turn, will lead to a lowering of self-esteem, and once more a 
reduction in productivity.106  It has been suggested that in cases such as these, 
management should take responsibility and ensure that there are no 
misunderstandings or misconceptions about a particular employee‘s ability to do the 
job.107  This brings us to the second difficulty that employees face in the labour 
market, which is that their co-workers too feel that they (the recipients of the 
preferential appointment) are unable to perform at the required level because they 
are merely affirmative action appointments.  Resentment grows as those candidates 
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who are not members of the ―suitably qualified‖ group lose out, even when they were 
in fact not the best candidates for the job.108    
The second problem that affirmative action has created is that instead of facilitating 
the harmonious integration of racial and cultural groups, affirmative action has in fact 
even further diversified society and caused the perpetuation of racial division.109  The 
use of race as a method to differentiate between people, causes society to be even 
more sensitive to the racial and cultural differences between them.  This is rather 
ironic, when one considers the fact that the Constitution expressly states that it aims 
at creating a society based on ‗non-racialism‘.110  Rabe states that even though racial 
divisions and antagonism between cultures are inevitable in the short term, 
affirmative action policies are still very valuable in the long run because they promote 
integration by ensuring the socio-economic success of black people.111   
In the third instance, there are those who fear that preferential treatment will lead to 
reduced efficiency.  A major issue that the South African courts have had to deal with 
in recent years, was the tug of war between the constitutional ideals of representivity 
and efficiency.112  These issues become magnified when dealing with the public 
sector.  The result of paying too much attention to representivity and too little to 
efficiency should be obvious: ―the bigger the discrepancy in the qualifications of those 
appointed and the other applicants are, the bigger the drop in productivity will be.‖113  
Employers should give adequate consideration to representivity as well as efficiency, 
but representivity, or rather, equality, should as a Constitutional imperative take 
preference in certain circumstances. 
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The fourth disadvantage that affirmative action policies have brought about is that 
they have benefited and harmed the wrong people.114  The previous apartheid 
regime did not benefit all white South Africans and in the same manner it also did not 
disadvantage all ‗Black‘ South Africans.115 It would therefore not serve the purpose of 
equality in creating a policy that would benefit those Black South Africans that do not 
need it and,116 in turn, further disadvantage White South Africans who are already 
experiencing hardship and poor socio-economic conditions.  This illustrates the issue 
of affirmative action being over-inclusive but at the same time under-inclusive, which 
is a crucial reason on its own to justify altering the system.  Affirmative action is said 
to be over-inclusive, as confirmed by case law, because it is a system based on 
group rights and not on individual need.117  This means that certain groups who are 
not necessarily ‗previously disadvantaged‘ enjoy the protection and advantages of 
affirmative action programs (therefore, over-inclusive), but this comes directly at the 
expense of others who are indeed in need of redress (and as such, under-inclusive).  
Proponents of affirmative action and the group-based system argue that for practical 
reasons, no person has an individual right to affirmative action because measuring 
degrees of disadvantage is virtually impossible and highly impractical.118  
Furthermore, it is very likely that the majority of the beneficiaries have been 
disadvantaged by discrimination in the past.119  It would obviously be unreasonable 
to propose a wholly individually based system, but perhaps other alternatives should 
be considered.   
A far less convincing argument is that affirmative action infringes upon the freedom of 
the individual.120  The argument goes that these policies force employers to make 
certain decisions that they would not have made, had they had a choice in the 
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matter.  This is also often referred to as the ―managerial prerogative‖.121  The reason 
why this reasoning does not hold is the following: ―In South Africa this state 
intervention is unfortunately essential as there may be no other way to achieve a 
more equitable distribution in a very unequal society.‖122 
Lastly, Dupper warns that affirmative action could cause a problem of 
entrenchment.123  No specific time limit has been set and the goals set out by the 
EEA are not so clear that affirmative action can be abolished as soon as they are 
met.  Another vital fact is that the major supporters of affirmative action in South 
Africa are the beneficiaries who happen to be 88% of the population and whose 
political party has all the political power they need in order to keep affirmative action 
from disappearing.124  It is therefore no wonder in the light of a nation dissatisfied 
with the slow pace of transformation, that the government would still endorse 
affirmative action as a ―showpiece of success‖.125 
A more trenchant issue that deserves mentioning is the close relationship between 
affirmative action in the employment sphere, on the one hand, and palpable skills 
shortages experienced, generally, on the other. The disparity between former model 
C schools and black schools is also worthy of our attention.  Although affirmative 
action is particularly useful in ensuring increased representation of previously 
disadvantaged groups in the workforce, which includes the private and the public 
sphere, much of the successes have been rather underwhelming due to a lack of 
transformation in the educational sphere.  This is, firstly, due to the severe disparities 
in quality of education obtained between former model C schools and black schools, 
with the latter predominantly falling short of the required standards.  Former model C 
schools are only partly subsidised by the government and, therefore, also receive a 
large part of their contributions from school fees generally paid by parents.  Black 
schools, on the other hand, receive practically all their contributions from the South 
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Industrial Relations 130. 
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African government, a subsidy which is not always sufficient in meeting all the 
demands.  Ultimately, the quality of education attained suffers.  Secondly, research 
has shown that there are an alarmingly high number of black learners who leave 
school at secondary level before completing their final matriculation exams.126  These 
individuals are less likely to contribute to the skilled workforce in future than those 
who had completed their schooling.  Research has also shown that there are 
disparities in the quality of education offered at tertiary level which also serves as an 
obstacle to transformation.127  Dropout rates in certain tertiary educational 
programmes amongst black individuals are also relatively high in comparison to other 
races.128  What needs to be understood is the supreme importance of a sound 
educational infrastructure and the role that it plays in furthering growth.  In this regard 
Bloch states the following:   
―Education contributes to the base of skills that enable the economy and society to 
function and grow; and allows the individual access to channels of advancement 
and hope.  Further, it provides the citizenship and social orientations that ensure 
peace and stability, and shared perspectives for joint activity to enable society to 
progress for the benefit of all.‖129 
What this points to, is that the educational system bears a considerably higher 
responsibility to ensure that learners are adequately prepared to enter the workforce 
when they are of age in order to contribute to the social structure.  Various obstacles 
that would necessarily inhibit this include ―[h]unger, malnutrituion, HIV/AIDS, child 
abuse, criminal gangs, lack of books or people to assist at home and general 
ravages of poverty‖.130 
Affirmative action is generally seen as a strategy that is intended to create more 
equal opportunities in the labour force.  The factors listed above that prevent 
educational achievements indicate that if true transformation is to occur, affirmative 
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 P Moleke Inequalities in higher education and the structure of the labour market (2005) 
Employment and Economic Policy Research Programme, Occasional Paper no. 1 3  
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 M Breier ―Introduction‖ in J Erasmus and M Breier (eds) Skills shortages in South Africa: case 
studies of key professions (2009) 9; S Godfrey ―Law professionals‖ in J Erasmus and M Breier (eds) 
Skills shortages in South Africa: case studies of key professions (2009) 174. 
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 S Godfrey ―Law professionals‖ in J Erasmus and M Breier (eds) Skills shortages in South Africa: 
case studies of key professions (2009) 172.  For example, research has shown that the dropout rate 
for black students studying law was 17% higher than the average dropout rate. 
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 G Bloch ―The complexity of systems change in education‖ in S Maile (ed) Education and poverty 
reduction strategies: issues of policy coherence (2008) 126. 
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action cannot be the sole means for doing so.  Other policies and strategies need to 
be employed in unison with the affirmative action policy, such as skills development 
strategies.  Economic growth will inevitably suffer if the necessary pool of skills runs 
dry, and without economic growth, transformation is delayed.  Equal representation 
of all races within the workforce can hardly be achieved if there is an insufficient 
number of individuals who receive employment opportunities.  Furthermore, skills 
developmental strategies suffer debilitating losses when senior employees, experts, 
and leaders within pertinent fields and companies, seek employment abroad as a 
result of affirmative action strategies as this phenomenon hampers ―the ability of the 
workforce to absorb young entrants.‖131 
 
1.9 Limits? 
 
There are various ways in which the affirmative action policy, or even the existence 
of it, can be seen to have limited potential.  The first of these is the question whether 
an affirmative action strategy in itself is capable of transforming current day 
inequalities?  This thesis will examine this statement in various ways.  As the current 
model is based on a race-based strategy, it needs to be ascertained whether this will 
not merely result in pure surface reallocations which do not have the ability to 
penetrate the social structure and thereby truly transform society.  As will be 
explained at a later stage, seemingly superficial reallocations might not necessarily 
be detrimental as Fraser indicates that such affirmative strategies might perhaps 
develop into transformative strategies in the long run if adequately paired with 
additional strategies (such as the enrichment of the educational structure or boosting 
skills developmental programmes).   
The race-based model can be juxtaposed to a class-based affirmative action model 
which instead of basing preferential treatment upon race, instead assigns socio-
economic standing as the key indicator for upliftment.  As an alternative, this strategy 
may be better equipped to address the potential shortcomings of a race-based 
system, but might also be accompanied by a new set of disadvantages, including 
whether it too has transformative potential or not.  
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A second limitation associated with affirmative action is the question: to what extent 
can affirmative action be seen as a redistributive strategy, and also, whether it should 
be expected to be one in the first place?  The preambles of two key Acts, i.e. the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and the Employment Equity Act 
could assist us in this regard.132  In the first instance the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act reminds us that the vast majority of South Africans are 
currently excluded from economic participation and therefore the distribution of 
income towards such persons are unequal in comparison to those who are 
economically active.  The purpose of this Act is therefore to ―increase broad-based 
and effective participation of black people in the economy and promote a higher 
growth rate, increased employment and more equitable income distribution… so as 
to promote the economic unity of the nation, protect the common market, and 
promote equal opportunity and equal access to government services.‖133  Similarly, 
the Employment Equity Act observes the ―disparities in employment, occupation and 
income within the national labour market‖ and seeks to address these issues through 
prescribed employment practices that are intended to facilitate equal representation 
in the workforce which would ultimately empower more people financially and 
socially.134 
The unavoidable conclusion from this is therefore that Parliament itself is of the view 
that, through more equitable income distributions, affirmative action can indeed serve 
as a redistributive policy of sorts.  The question however remains whether it is 
currently a just redistributive policy?  If this is not the case, adjustments need to be 
made. 
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 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 and Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998. 
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 Preamble to Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.  (Own emphasis added). 
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The Constitutional Court has stated unequivocally that the Constitution attaches 
fundamental importance to the achievement of equality.135   This, in part, is an 
acknowledgment not only that there have been substantial barriers to the realization 
of egalitarianism in the past, but also that such barriers still exist within the underlying 
structures of society.  As a key role player in interpreting the principles and values 
enshrined in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is tasked with promoting 
equality, whether substantive equality or remedial and restitutionary equality, 
depending on the situation.136   
This chapter will give an in depth outline of the Constitution‘s equality clause and will 
thereafter discuss the two forms of equality mentioned above, namely substantive 
equality and remedial and restitutionary equality.  This chapter will also include a 
critical analysis of Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden and will conclude 
with a discussion of the dichotomy between efficiency and representation, with 
reference to the guidelines of affirmative action as set out in the relevant 
legislation.137   
                                                     
135
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 
paras 74-76 where the Court states the following that the ―achievement of equality is one of the 
fundamental goals that we have fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution. Our constitutional order is 
committed to the transformation of our society from a grossly unequal society to one 'in which there is 
equality between men and women and people of all races'.‖ 
136
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and others v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC); Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BCLR 1125 (CC); President of 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC); 
Prinisloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC); Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); 
Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North West Province) 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC); Pretoria City 
Council v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). 
137
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2.1  Section 9 and the equality tests 
 
According to President of Republic of South Africa v Hugo, ―human dignity‖ lies at the 
heart of the Constitution‘s equality guarantee.138  This entails that each person within 
the jurisdiction of South Africa is afforded an equal sense of moral worth which the 
Constitution seeks to protect.139  Section 9 is a clear reflection of South Africa‘s 
egalitarian goal, which it aims to achieve in various ways depending on the 
context.140  Various equality tests are applied by the Constitutional Court, to verify the 
validity of certain actions (public or private) or state policies.   
Van Reenen suggests that the equality clause should be given a purposive 
interpretation, thereby giving full effect to the goal, history and language of the right 
to equality.141  In the light of the current South African reality this means that this 
constitutional provision should at all times follow a standard of substantive equality 
with due regard to the rights, interests, values and (impaired) human dignity of all 
parties involved.  Equality stands as one of the most central values in any democratic 
dispensation and its importance is ―conducive to an expansive, substantive 
understanding of the right‖ to equality.142   
                                                     
138
 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC).  At par 41 Goldstone J states the following: ―At the 
heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new 
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be 
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.‖ 
139
 P De Vos ―Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court‖ (2000) THRHR 62 66.  
140
 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states: 
 ―(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to protection and benefit of the law. 
   (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
   (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
   (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in term of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
   (5) Discrimination on one of more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair.‖ 
141
 TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 151 164-165. 
142
 TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 165. 
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Section 9(1) protects everyone as being ―equal before the law‖ and having ―equal 
protection and benefit‖ of the law.  Van Reenen questions whether these two phrases 
should be read in concert or separately.143  It is suggested that a substantive 
interpretation of the right to equality should entail that the two concepts should be 
read in unison so as to give full effect to the values and principles of the 
Constitution.144  By doing so, the Constitution is animated and given a reputation as a 
living instrument that develops and strengthens as societal values and norms adapt 
to new climates.  ―Equality before the law‖ concerns a measure of procedural justice 
whereas ―equal protection and benefit of the law‖ confers on vulnerable groups and 
individuals within South Africa the necessary protection against ill-treatment and 
exploitation from controlling groups or even state action.145  Albertyn and Kentridge 
suggest that this affirmation of the right to equality also ―entails a commitment to 
redressing subordination and inequality, to making reparation and restitution.‖146  
The Constitutional Court has interpreted section 9(1) to imply a ―rationality‖ test.  This 
means that it must be determined whether there is a rational relationship between the 
―differentiation in question and the governmental purpose which is proffered to 
validate it.‖147  Put differently, it should be determined whether there is a rational 
relationship between the differentiation between groups or categories of persons (the 
chosen means), on the one hand, and the governmental goal envisaged (the chosen 
purpose) on the other.148  The Court has expressed its disinclination to endorsing a 
judicial activist role in terms of a section 9(1) analysis, particularly in cases concerned 
with redistributive programmes.149  With regards to these redistributive programmes, 
                                                     
143
 TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 154. 
144
 TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 154; C Albertyn and J Kentridge 
―Introducing the right to equality in the interim constitution‖ (1994) Vol 10 SAJHR 149 158. 
145
 TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 155-156.    
146
 C Albertyn and J Kentridge ―Introducing the right to equality in the interim constitution‖ (1994) Vol 
10 SAJHR 160. 
147
 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) par 26. 
148
 P De Vos ―Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court‖ (2000) THRHR 70. 
149
 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) par 20; Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 
(CC) par 40. 
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the Court finds it necessary to abstain from deciding on issues that ordinarily fall 
within the scope of public policy.150   
The Constitution does not specifically prohibit all forms of differentiation.151  In the 
absence of such a rational connection, the differentiation is unconstitutional.  If, 
however, the differentiation in question passes the rational connection test, it could 
still be held to constitute unfair discrimination.152   
Section 9(2) expressly authorises affirmative action.  The internal section 9(2) test, as 
illustrated below in the discussion of remedial and restitutionary equality, was applied 
by the Constitutional Court in Van Heerden.  Justice Mokgoro states the following: 
―The reason for the enactment of section 9(2) is to authorise restitutionary measures 
for the advancement of those previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.‖153  
This section authorises lawful discrimination between groups and is not an exception 
to the right to equality, but is in fact an integral part of it.  The examination of a 
measure ends as soon as it has been established that it complies with the internal 
requirements of section 9(2).154   
While section 9(2) is essentially goal orientated, section 9(3) is overwhelmingly 
group-orientated.  The relationship between sections 9(2) and 9(3) has been 
explored by several authors.155  Section 9(3) expressly prohibits direct or indirect 
unfair discrimination based on certain grounds.156  The word ―including‖ suggests that 
the grounds listed in section 9(3) are not a numerus clausus.  The Court has 
recognised that discrimination on unlisted grounds may also be unfair if the ground is 
analogous to the listed grounds.157  It is also possible for discrimination to involve 
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 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) paras 48 and 104. 
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 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC); Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
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under South Africa‘s transformative constitution‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 335 348. 
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 For further reading see S Fredman ―Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty 
to Provide‖ (2005) SAJHR 163 182-185; TP Van Reenen ―Equality, discrimination and affirmative 
action: an analysis of section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 151-
165; J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 359-366; Minister of Finance and Another 
v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BCLR 1125 (CC).  
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discrimination and affirmative action: an analysis of section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa‖ (1997) SAPL 159; I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 260-263. 
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more than one of the listed grounds at a particular time, for example, discriminating 
against black women, thereby discriminating on grounds of race and gender 
simultaneously.   The South African reality lends itself to situations such as these 
quite readily as intersectional disadvantage is a common occurrence amongst 
various groups.158   
 The differentiation between groups on one of the listed grounds in section 9(3) will 
trigger a presumption of unfair discrimination unless the responding party can prove 
the contrary.159  To determine whether a certain measure constitutes unfair 
discrimination, the Constitutional Court applied an extensive two-stage test in 
Harksen v Lane NO.160  Firstly it has to be established whether the differentiation in 
question amounts to discrimination, and secondly whether such discrimination 
amounts to unfair discrimination (as the Constitution only prohibits unfair 
discrimination and not merely discrimination as such).161   
To pass muster, measures need to meet the criteria of more stringent scrutiny (as 
compared to the section 9(1) analysis) under the ―unfair discrimination‖ assessment.  
Restitutionary measures enacted in accordance with section 9(2), however, are not 
presumptively unfair.162  I will return to this point at a further stage within the ambit of 
the Van Heerden discussion. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
constitution‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 347; P De Vos ―Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court‖ (2000) THRHR 71.  For example citizenship in the cases of 
Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education 
(North-West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC). In Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 
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discrimination‖.  In this case the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether HIV status 
constitutes an analogous ground of discrimination or whether it is synonymous with having a disability, 
which is a listed ground.  The fact that the appellant‘s dignity had been impaired by the employer‘s 
conduct was sufficient to establish unfair discrimination (par 40). 
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 On the intersectional nature of disadvantage see National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
and others v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) par 113; C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the 
challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ 
(1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 248 253; J Conaghan ―Intersectionality and UK equality initiatives‖ (2007) Vol 14 
SAJHR 317-334; S Liebenberg and B Goldblatt ―The interrelationship between equality and socio-
economic rights under South Africa‘s transformative constitution‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 347; M 
Pieterse ―Finding for the applicant? Individual equality plaintiffs and group-based disadvantage‖ (2008) 
Vol 24 SAJHR 397 406-407, 420-422; H Botha ―Equality, plurality and structural power (2009) SAJHR 
1 10. 
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 Section 9(5); I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 248. 
160
 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) par 45. 
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 For further reading see P De Vos ―Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court‖ (2000) THRHR 70-75; I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 
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From a philosophical perspective, the importance of ensuring that persons are not 
discriminated against on grounds of arbitrary characteristics is fairly obvious.  The 
reason for this, which is analogous to the rationale behind John Rawls‘s original 
position,163 is simply because individuals do not choose to be black, gay, female, a 
Tanzanian, in a wheelchair, 65 years old, or Swahili.164  These are considered to be 
arbitrary characteristics very closely associated with an individual‘s identity, yet have 
no bearing on their intelligence or capabilities to contribute in a productive manner to 
society.165  Similarly, other characteristics such as being pregnant, married, a 
transvestite, or choosing a different or new religion, do not impair one‘s ability to 
become a successful accountant, teacher or business consultant.  What all these 
traits have in common, is the fact that they are closely bound up with one‘s sense of 
human dignity.  In short, they define who we are.  In Hugo the Constitutional Court 
offered a two-fold rationale for the purpose of the prohibition of unfair discrimination.  
Firstly, the provision seeks to avoid discrimination against individuals from 
disadvantaged groups, and secondly and more importantly, to establish a society in 
which ―all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of 
their membership of [a] particular‖ group.166 
Section 9(4) allows for the horizontal application of the equality clause, whereas 
section 9(3) binds the state. Accordingly, private individuals also have the 
constitutional responsibility to promote equal treatment of all members of society and 
to prevent discrimination.  This is particularly, but not exclusively, applicable within 
the employment sphere.  The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 regulates the occurrence of unfair discrimination on a 
                                                     
163
 The idea of the ―original position‖ entails the hypothetical notion that citizens are placed under a 
―veil of ignorance‖ with regards to their own characteristics such as race, gender, religion, talents, etc 
and from this position they choose how social goods should be distributed.  By not knowing who or 
what they are, individuals are more likely to choose a more just composition of society for fear of the 
possibility that they might end up at the bottom of the hierarchy.  Chapter three will contain more 
elaborate discussions on this issue. 
164
 Many authors have disputed the existence of the ―gay gene‖ and the tests conducted in search of it. 
One of the most well-known articles in support of the difference between heterosexual and 
homosexual genes was published in 1993 in the Science magazine entitled ‗A linkage between DNA 
markers on the X chromosome and male sexual orientation‘ by DH Hamer, S Hu, VL Magnuson, N Hu 
and AM Pattatucci; also supported in JE Nel Joe Orton:  A Psychoanalytical Reading of His Published 
Plays Ph.D thesis University of Potchefstroom for CHE (1993). 
165
 Also referred to as ―mute‖ characteristics, i.e. those characteristics which are ―intimately part of the 
human personality and are generally subject to stereotyping and prejudice.‖  CRM Dlamini ―Equality or 
Justice? Section 9 of the Constitution revisited – Part II‖ (2002) Journal for Juridical Science 15 17. 
166
 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) paras 22-23. 
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horizontal and vertical scale insofar as matters do not apply to the employment arena 
in which case the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 will apply. 
 
2.2  A Substantive Concept of Equality 
 
―The purposive, contextual approach reveals that within the constitutional vision of 
democracy lies an expansive and substantive conception of equality which 
encompasses the need to remedy inequality as well as to remove discrimination, to 
give in the present that which was unjustly withheld in the past, and to restore in the 
present what was wrongly taken in the past.‖167 
It is generally accepted, also by the Constitutional Court, that section 9 seeks to 
ensure substantive, as opposed to merely formal, equality.  Equal treatment in South 
Africa in terms of formal equality will not serve the ends of justice.  The underlying 
economic and social structure of apartheid has, in many respects, survived the 
transition to democracy.  The superficial equal treatment of individuals today merely 
entrenches an already unbalanced structure.  The courts and policy-makers have 
come to realise that and have geared themselves (and their policies) towards 
achieving a more egalitarian society.  This section will outline the differences 
between formal and substantive equality.  It will also aim at identifying the role of 
substantive equality within the legal realm as well as substantiating why states 
should promote such a notion of equality.  Finally it will also outline the key 
characteristics, objectives and aims of substantive equality.   
Substantive equality is best described by distinguishing it from formal equality.  
Formal equality entails that all individuals, irrespective of origin or identity, be treated 
equally.  For example, X – who is a black woman from a socio-economically deprived 
rural settlement is equally eligible to apply for the same position as Y – a white 
middle-class man living in an affluent urban area.  When applying this form of 
equality, one sees that it does nothing to advance individuals who come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds.  It is very likely that the quality of education that X 
received did not adequately prepare her to compete on an equal footing with 
individuals such as Y.  The main problem with formal equality is that it ―presupposes 
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 C Albertyn and J Kentridge ―Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution‖ (1994) Vol 
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that all persons are equal bearers of rights within a just social order.‖168  To do so is 
highly idealistic, for there is no proof that South Africa has come even remotely close 
to establishing a just social order.  Furthermore, this approach presupposes that by 
merely eradicating discriminatory policies, and by keeping all laws and practices 
neutral and colour-blind and enforcing them as such, the necessary level of equality 
will follow.  Furthermore, Sandra Fredman similarly states that ―formal equality holds 
out as universal and neutral the characteristics of the dominant group, expecting 
conformity to the norm as the price for equal treatment.‖169  Therefore, formal equality 
negates difference because it assumes that the status quo is a neutral baseline and 
ultimately ―demands conformity as a price for equal treatment‖.170 
The value of substantive equality is centred in its capacity to transform the unequal 
structure of society.  Formal equality is per definition incapable of doing so.  Formal 
equality pays no attention to characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or socio-
economic status.   By ignoring the deep-rooted disparities created by past practices, 
the courts merely perpetuate the current inequalities that individuals experience.   
The main difference between formal and substantive equality is that the former 
entails a measure of rule equality whereas the latter is concerned with result 
equality.171  Unlike formal equality, substantive equality values and focuses on the 
differences between individuals, such as race, gender and socio-economic status, as 
these characteristics affect a person‘s ability to compete on an equal footing with 
others who have had the necessary advantages and opportunities in life.172  Albertyn 
and Goldblatt posit that substantive equality entails ―examining the context of an 
alleged rights violation and its relationship to systemic forms of domination within 
society.  It addresses structural and entrenched disadvantage at the same time as it 
aspires to maximise human development.‖173  What this means is that substantive 
equality acknowledges the fact that society is based on an unequal system, it 
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 C Albertyn and J Kentridge ―Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution‖ (1994) Vol 
10 SAJHR 152. 
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  S Fredman ―Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide‖ (2005) 
SAJHR 165-166. 
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 S Fredman ―Redistribution and recognition: reconciling inequalities‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 214 216. 
171
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 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development 
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recognises the structure for what it is and aims to identify the vulnerable groups.  
These groups are in turn dealt with in a different manner according to their 
disadvantage to ensure that they also have the opportunity to reach their fullest 
potential or, otherwise put, to ensure meaningful participation in society.174   
The core strength of substantive equality is its strong transformative potential.175  It 
has been recognised in case law and academic literature, that the South African 
constitution was created as a mechanism to bring about transformation in South 
Africa.176  This transformation entails a shift away from previous oppressive apartheid 
practices to policies aimed at creating an egalitarian society.  Substantive equality, 
then, is the framework in which this change occurs.  Albertyn lists four characteristics 
of substantive equality that contribute to its transformative capabilities.  These are the 
following: 
- An emphasis on understanding inequality within its social and historic 
context; 
- A primary concern with the impact of the alleged inequality on the 
complainant; 
- A recognition of difference as a positive feature of society; and 
- Attention to the purpose of the right and its underlying values in a manner 
that evinces a direct or indirect concern with remedying systemic 
subordination or disadvantage.177 
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 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development 
of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ (1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 254. 
175
 C Albertyn ―Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 253 
253. 
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 See Sec 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; C Albertyn and  B Goldblatt ―Facing 
the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of 
equality‖ (1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 248; C Albertyn ―Substantive Equality and Transformation in South 
Africa‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 253. 
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 C Albertyn ―Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 258.  It 
should be noted however, that the nature of disadvantage itself, is not as clear-cut or simple as it may 
seem on the surface.  The role that disadvantage plays differs in various contexts.  An often used 
example is that of the black woman.  She does not only experience disadvantage because she is a 
black, or because she is a woman.  The nature of the disadvantage that she experiences is complex 
because of the overlapping between two characteristics that are grounds for unfair discrimination.  
This situation is complicated even more once socio-economic status is added to the mix.  For further 
reading see C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the 
development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ (1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 248; S Liebenberg and 
B Goldblatt ―The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under South Africa‘s 
transformative constitution‖ (2007) Vol 23 SAJHR 335. 
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Each of the characteristics listed above is fairly complex and, for the purposes of the 
current discussion, it is unnecessary to go into further detail at this stage.  It should 
be noted, however, that substantive equality does not advocate the abstract, 
intangible enquiries found in formal notions of equality.  Substantive equality holds 
that a contextual analysis should be applied when faced with considering alleged 
discriminatory practices.178  In the light of transformative equality jurisprudence, this 
would entail ―locating the impugned act within real life conditions and understanding 
how these reinforce both disadvantage and harm.‖179   For example, denying 
permanent residents of the Republic of South Africa access to social grants, would 
amount to infringement of their right to social security, as well as the constitutional 
right to equality.180  In a previous decision, the Constitutional Court found that within 
this specific context, the decision by the state to differentiate between permanent 
residents and citizens amounted to unfair discrimination and hence words were read 
into the legislation to include permanent residents within the category of those 
entitled to social security benefits.  The reason for this is because the socio-
economic rights conferred in the Constitution by sections 26 and 27 apply to 
‗everyone‘ and therefore different sections of the state should not award socio-
economic rights selectively.  Mokgoro J held the following: 
―There can be no doubt that the applicants are part of a vulnerable group in society 
and, in the circumstances of the present case, are worthy of constitutional 
protection. We are dealing, here, with intentional, statutorily sanctioned unequal 
treatment of part of the South African community. This has a strong stigmatising 
effect.  Because both permanent residents and citizens contribute to the welfare 
system through the payment of taxes, the lack of congruence between benefits and 
burdens created by a law that denies benefits to permanent residents almost 
inevitably creates the impression that permanent residents are in some way inferior 
to citizens and less worthy of social assistance.‖181 
Substantive equality imposes a duty upon the state to supply the infrastructure for 
enforcement of remedial measures that are necessary to establish the required 
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 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt ―Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development 
of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality‖ (1998) Vol 14 SAJHR 260. 
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version of justice based on the Constitutional Court‘s jurisprudence.  The reason why 
this duty rests on the state is because of the ―group-nature‖ of inequality.  Sandra 
Fredman agrees that ―societal discrimination extends well beyond individual acts of 
prejudice.‖182  Those groups who have been oppressed based on arbitrary external 
characteristics,183 have suffered due to a system geared at marginalising them for the 
sake of the norm.  It is, therefore, not impossible to conceive that, to alleviate their 
suffering, the system itself should change.  This change can only be brought about 
by state actors for two reasons.  Firstly, because they have, in part, played a role in 
sustaining the oppressive regime in the past and, secondly, because they are in the 
―best position to bring about [the necessary] change.‖184  In the light of the positive 
duty to provide, Fredman identifies four key substantive aims: 
- Substantive equality should aim to break the cycle of disadvantage 
associated with out-groups; 
- It should promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all, thereby 
redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of 
membership of an out-group; 
- It should entail positive affirmation and celebration of identity within 
community; and 
- It should facilitate full participation in society.185  
 
Although substantive equality embodies characteristics similar to those of 
compensatory justice,186 it is more accurately defined in terms of distributive justice.  
Substantive equality places the obligation upon the state to distribute and redistribute 
social benefits and scarce resources in a just and ―equal‖ manner.187     
Recently, an important relationship has emerged between substantive equality and 
transformative constitutionalism.  In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden, Sachs J 
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states that substantive equality is rooted in a transformative constitutional 
philosophy.188  The legacy of apartheid, along with its underlying socially corrupt 
structure, will remain unless a major transformation takes place in accordance with 
the Constitution.  Klare defines transformative constitutionalism as: 
―[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive 
political developments) to transforming a country‘s political and social institutions 
and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.‖189 
In order to realise its full ‗transformative‘ potential, substantive equality should be 
―conceptually consistent.‖190  This entails that substantive equality should be 
firmly located within the social context of systemic inequalities – which in essence 
is what an adequate reading of substantive equality entails.191  How then should 
the courts go about locating the impugned acts within real life circumstances?  
Albertyn and Goldblatt have suggested a four-part contextual analysis of such an 
inquiry.192  To begin with, the court should examine the socio-economic conditions 
of the individuals in question.  Secondly, the court must identify the ―impact of the 
impugned provision on social patterns and systemic forms of disadvantage.‖193  
Once this is done, the court should then understand the multifaceted nature of 
group disadvantage by examining ―grounds of discrimination in an intersectional 
manner.‖194  Lastly, and as the above definition of transformative constitutionalism 
suggests, the court must explore the historical context of the case.195  This 
contextual application will not always be a straightforward feat; in fact, it can 
prove to be highly complex and intricate.196  The court has to interpret each case 
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within the language of the Constitution in order to ensure the transformative 
outcome.   
As in the case of South Africa, this approach is applicable to any society that 
seeks, and is committed to, ‗large-scale, egalitarian social transformation.‘197  I will 
undertake a more in depth discussion of transformative constitutionalism in my 
contextual analysis of affirmative action and the theories of justice.198 
 
2.3 Remedial and Restitutionary Equality 
 
―Like justice, equality delayed is equality denied.‖199 
The phrase remedial and restitutionary equality, though seemingly self-explanatory, 
has been used by the Court particularly in the context of affirmative action.  However, 
the Court has to date failed to give adequate content to this expression.  It is, 
therefore, unclear what the precise limits of affirmative action in terms of remedial 
and restitutionary equality should be.  The purpose of this study, consequently, 
includes giving content to remedial and restitutionary equality.  One of the first 
decisions in which the Constitutional Court referred to these two terms was in the 
judgment of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice.200  
This section will analyse the operation of the terms in the context of this case, as well 
as the adequacy of their use in this particular regard.  In the subsequent chapter, 
remedial and restitutionary equality, as well as substantive equality, will be situated 
from the vantage point of compensatory and distributive justice respectively.  The aim 
of this approach is to give narrower definitional content to these principles of equality 
by exploring the substance and limits of theories of justice to which they could be 
related.  
Earlier in the discussion it was argued that significant regard should be given to the 
justifications that accompany various versions of affirmative action.201  In terms of 
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equality, we are required to take one step backwards.  The question in this regard is 
how certain forms of equality justify and mandate affirmative action.  Thus, what are 
the inferences to be drawn from remedial and restitutionary equality regarding 
affirmative action, and how do they limit affirmative action?  Two significant cases in 
this regard are those of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another 
v Minister of Justice and others202 and Minister of Finance and Another v Van 
Heerden.203   
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, an application was brought 
requesting that the criminalisation of gay sodomy be declared unconstitutional.  The 
Constitutional Court based its decision on various principles of equality and found 
that the provisions indeed amounted to an infringement of Constitutional rights, 
including the right to privacy204 and the right to human dignity.205  More importantly, 
the provisions unfairly discriminated against a vulnerable minority group based on 
grounds listed in section 9 of the Constitution, namely sex and sexual orientation.  
Consequently, it was found that the discriminatory provisions were to be declared 
unconstitutional.  The Court recognised that this needed to be done in the light of 
substantive, and remedial and restitutionary equality, respectively.  The 
Constitutional Court found it necessary to introduce the concepts of remedial and 
restitutionary equality because it was argued that the Court‘s equality jurisprudence 
was incapable of addressing material inequality and it responded by insisting that its 
vision of equality, as informed by section 9, is both substantive and remedial.206   
                                                                                                                                                                      
this regard I am grateful for Professor Botha‘s input.  It may be that the courts perceive these notions 
to be self-explanatory.  Should this be the case, it is uncertain why they feel it necessary to give 
content to other terms such as substantive equality or affirmative action.  Secondly, have the courts 
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the terms ‗remedial and restitutionary equality‘ truly mean. 
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The Constitutional Court commenced with its discussion of remedial and 
restitutionary equality by asserting that if not expressly remedied, past injustices and 
unfair discrimination will continue to exist.207 This is followed by a logical leap in 
paragraph 61 where Justice Ackermann unequivocally states that section 9(3) of the 
Constitution recognises the need for remedial and restitutionary measures.208  
How should section 9(3) then be interpreted?  When can it be said that a provision 
encapsulates the essence of remedial and restitutionary equality?  The terms 
themselves suggest some sort of corrective procedure that needs to take place.  
Sachs J suggests that we should look towards the history of discrimination in order to 
understand its suppressive and stereotypical effects in the present.209  This would 
indicate from where the scarring originates.  In the case of the gay and lesbian 
community, it has been their invisibility that has caused the most harm to this 
vulnerable minority group.210  Because this aspect has been identified, it is possible 
to contemplate some sort of remedial strategy by, for example, declaring 
discriminatory provisions unconstitutional.211  What is somewhat surprising about this 
line of reasoning is the fact that the Court was not asked to consider section 9(2), nor 
was the case concerned with material inequality. 
In Van Heerden,212 Moseneke J associates restitutionary measures with the policy of 
affirmative action.  Accordingly, sections 9(1) and 9(2) of the Constitution should be 
read in concert to fully embrace the value of substantive equality which Moseneke J 
states is ―inclusive of measures to redress existing inequality‖ i.e. remedial and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
discrimination case does seem somewhat amiss.  It is also worth noting that in this specific matter the 
issues were also more centered around misrecognition, rather than maldistribution, as the violation 
pertaining to homosexuals traditionally does not involve a lack of appropriation of economic resources, 
but instead a denial of deserved status. 
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restitutionary equality.213  One could infer that this entails that substantive equality, on 
the one hand, and remedial and restitutionary equality on the other, are in fact not 
two different versions of equality.  The latter, it seems, is merely an essential 
component of the former.214  The decision of Mokgoro J, too, states that substantive 
equality entails that there should be some form of compensation for past injustices 
which cannot be remedied by simply abolishing discriminatory or harmful practices.215 
The Court states that taking remedial measures in the form of ―differentiation aimed 
at protecting or advancing persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination‖, is 
justified on condition that it meets the internal requirements of sec 9(2).216  This test 
entails the following:217 
- Does the measure target persons or categories of persons who 
have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination? 
- Is the measure designed to protect or advance such persons or 
categories of persons? 
- Does the measure promote the achievement of equality? 
 
The two decisions above both consider remedial and restitutionary equality as a 
worthy ideal but lack consensus with regards to the core foundation of this version of 
equality.  The first case, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, affirmed 
that remedial and restitutionary measures are strongly centred in sec 9(3) of the 
Constitution, whereas Van Heerden states that sec 9(2) supports substantive equality 
which in turn contains elements of remedial and restitutionary equality as well.  
Mokgoro J suggests, though not explicitly, that section 9(2) and 9(3) both have 
elements of remedial and restitutionary equality.  It is said, we recall, that section 9(2) 
is goal-orientated, while section 9(3) is group-orientated.218  In the light of remedial 
and restitutionary equality, when a policy, decision or piece of legislation falls within 
the ambit of section 9(2), and its goal is to advance those previously disadvantaged 
or to make up for previous harms, then it would be considered justified.  Remedial or 
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restitutionary measures which do not comply with the requirements of section 9(2), 
may nevertheless pass constitutional muster if it is found that, in view of their 
purpose and impact, they do not constitute unfair discrimination.219   
In its aim to compensate for past injustices, remedial and restitutionary measures are 
essentially backward-looking.  This corresponds with the values of compensatory 
justice which is also an overwhelmingly backward-looking theory of justice.  
Conversely, substantive equality should, therefore, be forward-looking.  It 
acknowledges that all individuals are not yet equal, and accordingly redistributive 
measures are formulated to ensure not an equal distribution of social resources, but 
a just distribution.  This corresponds with the theory of distributive justice.  A 
‗transformative equality jurisprudence‘ will entail that the application of substantive 
equality should be informed by a thorough understanding of systemic inequalities.220  
This ‗change‘ that a substantive version envisages, presupposes ―remedies aimed at 
correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework‖ and therein lies the marriage between substantive equality and remedial 
and restitutionary equality.221 
To summarise, substantive equality recognises the difference between individuals 
because it will advance the goal of creating an equal society.  In contrast, remedial 
and restitutionary equality recognises harms done in the past, in order to make up for 
past injustices, and in so doing ensure a more equal society. 
 
2.4  A critical analysis of Van Heerden 
 
Thus far mention has been made of different orientations of equality as well as of 
various sub-sections of the equality clause.  The section that follows will illustrate the 
application of different versions of equality, i.e. substantive equality and remedial and 
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restitutionary equality, as well as give a thorough outline of the equality provision of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.   
In 1994 a publicly funded Closed Pension Fund (CPF) was created for all the 
members of parliament and political office-bearers who held office before 1994.222  
This CPF had certain terms and conditions which amounted to the exclusion of new 
members of parliament.  After 1994, the advent of a new democratic era, a new 
pension fund had to be created, as instructed by the Constitution, for members of 
parliament who joined after 1994.  For various reasons this Fund only came into 
being in 1998 and provided for different categories of members that differentiated 
between those who were and those who were not members of the CPF.  Each 
member was obliged to contribute a monthly rate of one-twelfth of 7.5% of his/her 
annual pensionable income to the Fund.  However, the contributions made by the 
employers were not on the same uniform scale as the contributions by the members.  
Higher contributions were made to the retirement benefits of Category A and B 
members than to those of Category C members, who were the previous CPF 
members.  This was to operate retrospectively from April 1994 to May 1999 and 
thereafter a uniform rate was applicable to all.  The respondents argued that this 
scheme unfairly discriminated against CPF members.223 
The High Court decision preceding the Constitutional judgment relied mainly on a 
formal notion of equality and found in favour of the respondent, concluding that the 
―impugned‖ measures were ―haphazard, random and overhasty‖ as well as ―arbitrary‖ 
and therefore amounted to unfair discrimination.  Consequently, the Minister of 
Finance and the Pension Fund were granted leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court.  Moseneke J delivered the main judgment, while Mokgoro J, Ngcobo J and 
Sachs J all wrote separate judgments.   
 
Moseneke J 
Moseneke J states that the respondent‘s argument had three components.  Firstly, 
that restorative measures undertaken in terms of section 9(2) that were based on the 
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section 9(3) listed grounds are presumptively unfair.224  Therefore any affirmative 
action or remedial policy that discriminated against individuals on grounds of race for 
example, had to discharge the onus of proving that the measure was not unfairly 
discriminatory.  Secondly, they claimed that the State should at least have alleged 
that it was necessary to disfavour Category C members in order to benefit Category 
A and B members.225  The third argument was that there were several 
―jammergevalle‖ that were CPF members without generous pensions and the 
―adverse impact of the scheme on…[these members] is sufficient to render 
the…[Fund] as a whole unfairly discriminatory.‖226 
The majority judgment reminds us that the constitutionally inspired achievement of 
equality is an important foundational value and the standard to which all policies 
should be held.227  To that end, it should inform our goal of creating a ―non-racial and 
non-sexist‖ egalitarian society, as well as pioneer the ―process of reparation for past 
exclusion.‖228  A substantive notion of equality will assist in realising this ideal by 
serving a dual purpose, namely by dismantling current forms of social differentiation 
and secondly by preventing the creation of new patterns of disadvantage.229  
The notion of equality includes also standards of remedial and restitutionary 
equality.230  In particular, as stated above, substantive equality includes ―measures to 
redress existing inequality.‖231  For that reason the Court rejects the first argument 
made by the respondents, namely that there is a presumption of unfairness 
concerning Section 9(2) measures.  Policies aimed at redressing inequality can not 
be seen as an exception to the value of equality enshrined in Section 9, but are an 
integral part of it.  The only obstacle to be considered is whether the measures 
conform to the internal test set by section 9(2) (as set out above).232   
The Court clarified each of the elements of the test.  The first step of the inquiry 
involves whether the measure targets persons or categories of persons who have 
been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  It was argued that the measures in 
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question failed this test, as it also benefited individuals who had not experienced past 
disadvantage.  However, the Court stated that the question is whether the 
―overwhelming majority of [the] members of the favoured class are persons 
designated as disadvantaged by unfair exclusion.‖233  Secondly, was the measure 
designed to protect or advance such persons?  Here measures should only be 
―reasonably capable of attaining the desired outcome.‖234  Lastly, does the measure 
promote the achievement of equality?  The Court should answer this question with 
due regard to the broader society as well as the overarching goal of creating an 
egalitarian society.235  Moseneke J was satisfied that the scheme set out by the Fund 
conformed to all three requirements. 
 
Mokgoro J and Ngcobo J 
Though on the whole satisfied with the conclusions made by Moseneke J, Mokgoro  
J disagreed with the means by which it was reached.  Instead of dealing with the 
issue in question in terms of section 9(2), she states that this measure falls firmly 
within the ambit of section 9(3).  However, there remains agreement that the 
achievement of equality ―requires a democratic structure and measures that foster 
substantive equality that ―consciously and systematically obliterate[s]‖ current 
inequalities, and that it is incorrect to view section 9(2) measures as presumptively 
unfair.236   
Mokgoro J‘s distinction between section 9(2) and section 9(3) has been briefly 
mentioned above.  It was stated that section 9(2) is essentially goal-orientated and 
therefore forward-looking, while section 9(3) focuses on the complainant, the impact 
of the measure on him or her, and whether he or she has been a victim of past 
discrimination, rendering the provision backward-looking.  She states that it is 
important to make the distinction between these two provisions; specifically, it seems, 
when to consider the complainant in a particular case.  The impact that remedial 
measures have on complainants should not be given too much consideration within a 
section 9(2) inquiry.  It is inevitable that there might be some collateral damage in the 
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pursuit of an equal society, which is essentially the main aim of the measure.237  
Therefore she states that the Harksen v Lane test for unfair discrimination is not 
suited for section 9(2) because it will ―focus unduly on the position of the 
complainant…‖238  Mokgoro J also warns that section 9(2) should only be used in the 
specific circumstances for which it was intended in order to prevent measures 
passing as legitimate where they are actually unfairly discriminatory.239 
Mokgoro J was satisfied that the scheme was permissible, not in terms of the section 
9(2) analysis as applied by Moseneke J, but in terms of the section 9(3) test.  
According to her, the scheme did not pass the first step of the internal section 9(2) 
test because of how the group was defined: it included members who were not 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and should, therefore, be tested against 
section 9(3) instead.  She considered the various factors applied in Harksen v Lane 
to determine whether the discrimination in question was in fact unfair.240  These 
factors include whether the measure serves an important societal goal, the position 
of the complainants in society, and the impact on their sense of dignity.241   
The discrimination in question is on an unlisted ground, namely membership of 
parliament, but it is possible to argue that it is also based on the listed grounds of 
race and political affiliation.242  The respondents ―remain a privileged class of public 
pension beneficiaries notwithstanding the challenged remedial measures‖ and, 
therefore, there can be no valid argument that there was an adverse impact on their 
fundamental dignity.  The same cannot be said for their pockets, however!   
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Ngcobo J confirmed the importance, and the protection, of human dignity when 
considering the equality guarantee.243  Unequal treatment in itself will not amount to 
unfair discrimination (and in turn an impairment of human dignity).  In fact, equal 
treatment at all times will, is the subtle warning that Ngcobo J gives against the 
possible dangers of formal equality. To reiterate: ―This is a recognition of the fact that 
treating unequals as if they are equals may produce inequality.‖244  Having regard to 
the impact of the discrimination on the respondent, Ngcobo J also came to the 
conclusion that the scheme was not in contravention of section 9(3).245   
 
Sachs J 
The above discussion illustrates how complex the issues can be that arise from the 
equality guarantee.  To find concurrence between only four judges proves highly 
difficult, not to mention a society as a whole.  Sachs J argues in favour of a 
consolidated reading of the equality guarantee.  Sections 9(2) and 9(3) are not to 
operate separately, as the above decisions suggest, but in conjunction with one 
another.  In this view, rigid categorical reasoning may, perhaps, not suit the 
envisaged equal outcome.  What is needed instead is ―context-based proportional 
interrelationships, balanced and weighed according to the fundamental constitutional 
values called into play by the situation.‖246  The overarching goal of section 9(2) is to 
take apart the historically prejudicial infrastructure that the current society was 
founded on, and to protect individuals from experiencing discrimination based on 
―mute‖ characteristics.247   
Sachs J makes three important points relating to substantive equality, human dignity 
and the relationship between sections 9(2) and 9(3), respectively.  Firstly, he states 
that a substantive reading of equality is firmly entrenched within a transformative 
constitutional dogma that actively seeks the eradication of the above-mentioned 
discriminatory infrastructure in order to create much needed equality.  This approach 
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to equality corresponds with Fraser‘s transformative strategies and will be addressed 
at a later stage. 
Secondly, he makes an important reference to human dignity.  Not only does he refer 
to personal human dignity, but interestingly also to that of the country as a whole.  
Human dignity in this regard is particularly significant because remedial action 
authorised by the Constitution takes certain characteristics into account that are 
intrinsically connected to a person.248  These characteristics will in turn determine 
whether a person qualifies for remedial programmes or not.  However, there are 
individuals in society located within a comfortable hub created by, or at least 
endorsed by, the previous oppressive regime.  Sachs J foresees that these 
individuals will more likely be taxed (in the broader sense of the word) more heavily 
than others because of this.  Having been part of that regime has contributed to the 
decline of the country‘s reputation, and more importantly, the ―dignity [of] our country 
as a whole.‖249  Repairing the infringed dignity of previous sufferers will do much to 
repair the tainted dignity of the Republic of South Africa.  This will not only benefit 
those who were previously disadvantaged (in the short as well as the long term), but 
also those who will experience disadvantage now, though this time justifiably.   
In the third instance Sachs J suggests that the Courts should locate the equality 
analysis within the bounds of an ―egalitarian continuum‖.250  This should be done 
instead of narrowly following the tests and boundaries set between sections 9(2) and 
9(3).  This implies that it makes no difference whether the Court opts for a section 
9(2) or section 9(3) analysis, for the outcome will most likely be the same in any 
event.  If truth be told, the reading of section 9 would still have been the same, even 
if section 9(2) had not existed.251  What section 9(2) does, however, is give ―properly 
devised affirmative action programmes a clear constitutional nod.‖252  
The overlap between sections 9(2) and 9(3) lies essentially within the third leg of the 
internal section 9(2) analysis, i.e. whether the measure was designed to promote 
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equality.253  This will in turn indicate whether it can be considered unfair under 
section 9(3).254  Justice Sachs states the following:  
―Serious measures taken to destroy the caste-like character of our society and to 
enable people historically held back by patterns of subordination to break through 
into hitherto excluded terrain, clearly promote equality (section 9(2)), and are not 
unfair (section 9(3)).‖255 
Sachs J‘s judgment can be summed up as follows:  To apply the test for unfair 
discrimination in cases where remedial measures were enacted to advance persons 
who have previously experienced disadvantage, will impede the ends of justice.  Both 
tests, namely the factors identified by the Constitutional Court in establishing unfair 
discrimination under section 9(3) and the section 9(2) test aimed at promoting 
equality; focus on the position of the persons involved.  Therefore, section 9(3) 
focuses on the complainants in unfair discrimination matters, whereas section 9(2) 
focuses on the beneficiaries of affirmative action and the affirmative action strategy 
that was applied.256  The last leg of the section 9(2) analysis entails the inquiry into 
whether a measure promotes the achievement of equality.  To determine whether an 
impugned provision impairs a person‘s dignity, it has to be established whether the 
provision serves an important societal goal.  The achievement of equality is just such 
a vital societal goal. 
Academically speaking, Sachs J‘s judgment serves as an important reminder that the 
Courts should not cling to0 rigidly to categorical modes of reasoning.  They should 
bear in mind the true nature of the issues at hand and the impact on the individuals 
involved in the dispute.  Practically speaking, as enlightened as we may be, it is still 
not clear how the Courts should go about determining equality issues.  To merely 
suggest that the more nestled a particular policy is within section 9(2), the more likely 
it would pass muster under its analysis, is insufficient.  Yet in terms of embarking on 
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a similar analysis as the one in question in future, with such various considerations to 
be made, Sachs J feels that it is ―prudent to avoid categorical and definitional 
reasoning and [Courts should] instead opt for context-based proportional 
interrelationships, balanced and weighed according to the fundamental constitutional 
values called into play by the situation.‖257  What precisely these context-based 
proportional interrelationships entail, however, is unclear.  The true uncertainty in his 
judgment lies within the balance that Courts are expected to strike between the 
above mentioned context-based analysis on the one hand – and the due restraint 
expected of them on the other.  If the Courts are instructed to be ―reluctant to 
interfere with [affirmative action] measures‖ and should only interfere when a 
―measure at issue is manifestly overbalanced‖, how are they expected to function 
effectively?  Sachs J‘s judgment, therefore, provides very little guidance to the 
legislature, the executive and future courts as to the constitutional limits of affirmative 
action measures, apart from cautioning judges to show restraint. 
What this case clearly illustrates is that South Africa‘s equality jurisprudence is far 
from being fully developed.  This is why I believe it necessary to turn to other 
disciplines such as political philosophy, to enhance not only much needed certainty 
on how to deal with such issues, but also the potential of reaching valuable societal 
goals. 
 
2.5 Other relevant cases   
 
The Constitutional Court is not the only organ that has been given the duty of 
interpreting section 9 and other equality and affirmative action provisions.  For further 
interpretations of equality, it is necessary to turn to other equality-based decisions.  
Two noteworthy cases in this regard are Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Gordon v Department of Health.258  In Stoman, a white policeman applied to be 
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promoted to the position of superintendent.  Shortly thereafter he was informed that 
he made the ―short list‖ of candidates that were being considered for the post. He 
managed to achieve the highest percentage mark of all the candidates.  The fourth 
respondent, a black man, achieved the highest mark of all the black individuals who 
took part.  Upon consideration it was decided that the black man should receive the 
promotion.  In court the applicant argued that there had been a breach of section 9(3) 
of the Constitution and that the respondents had discriminated unfairly against him 
on grounds of race.  As stated above, whenever a section 9(3) inquiry is launched, 
any discrimination on one of the listed grounds is presumed to be unfair and the 
burden of proof shifts to the respondents to show that the said discrimination was in 
fact fair.  To do so, the respondents maintained that the appointment of the black 
candidate (who scored less than the white candidate) was made due to their 
Constitutional obligation in terms of section 9(2) and the Employment Equity Act 
pertaining to affirmative action measures.   
 Van der Westhuizen J once again confirmed that the principles in the Constitution 
are based on substantive equality.  This notion of equality entails that distinguishing 
between persons who come from previously discriminatory backgrounds and those 
who do not does not amount to unfair discrimination.259  The court, in its 
determination of unfairness, turned to section 9(2) and its underlying structure.  In 
particular the court elaborated on the meaning of the phrase: ―measures designed to 
protect and advance persons‖.260  Actions or decisions taken by employers in 
particular will not comply with the requirement of section 9(2) if they are ―haphazard, 
random and overhasty.‖261  The tug of war in this instance originated from the 
required rational connection between the measures taken and the aims they are 
designed to achieve.262   
Specific consideration should be given to this, especially in the case of the public 
service that is required by law to be broadly representative and also efficient.  In a 
previous case it was stated that ―a broadly representative public administration 
can…not be promoted at the expense of an efficient administration.‖263  The Stoman 
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case is a suitable example of the tension that exists between representivity on the 
one hand and efficiency on the other, when trying to achieve the societal goal of 
equality.  It also illustrates that those pivotal inquiries as the one in question, can only 
be approached in a case-by-case manner.  In casu, the police service came under 
consideration.  Judge Van der Westhuizen stated that the representivity of the police 
service was integrally connected to the efficiency thereof because it ―could hardly be 
efficient [in the long run] if its composition is not at all representative of the population 
or community it is supposed to serve.‖264  The careful consideration given to the vital 
role that representivity plays in support of efficiency-arguments, shows that these two 
ideals are not to be held as separate and competing principles, but interdependent, 
especially in the light of South Africa‘s history of unfair discrimination.265   
It is particularly interesting and striking that the courts have to date only dealt with or 
applied the Van Heerden decision in a very limited fashion.  This may be ascribed to 
the fact that the three readings of Moseneke J, Mokgoro J and Sachs J, as set out 
above, are so diverse, that the courts have decided to deal with equality as they see 
fit instead.  One of the decisions in which Van Heerden did surface, was that of 
Gordon v Department of Health.266  The facts of the case are as follows:  Mr Gordon 
applied for the post of Deputy Director of Administration as advertised by the 
Department of Health.  When the matter occurred in 1996, Mr Gordon had been 
working for the respondent since 1967.  Working his way up in the ranks, he finally 
filled the position of Assistant Director in 1992.  Mr Gordon was not successful in his 
application for the aforementioned post as the respondent hired a black individual -
who had only been in the post of Administration Officer at the time -  instead, despite 
the fact that the selection panel had recommended Mr Gordon.  This was done, 
allegedly, to abide by the ―constitutional imperative to promote representivity in the 
public service.‖267  Mr Gordon consequently approached the CCMA and the Labour 
Court for adequate relief.  After being unsuccessful in the Labour Appeal Court, the 
matter was referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal.   
In casu, the Court discussed the matter of joinder of the black individual to the case 
in detail.  This is not relevant for the purposes of the current discussion.  What is of 
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importance here was the claim made by the appellant.  It was his contention that the 
respondent had committed an unfair labour practice as envisaged by item 2(1)(a) of 
Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) by unfairly discriminating against him 
on grounds of race.268  He also stated that the respondent could not justify this action 
by relying on any ―rational policy, plan or programme‖ because there was none to 
speak of.269  The Department of Health responded by stating that the black individual 
was ―obviously disadvantaged by past unfair discrimination‖ and therefore his 
appointment promotes the achievement of equality as envisaged by the 
Constitution.270  Had this been the case, a matter of judicial deference would kick in.  
Consequently, the Court had to determine whether the actions taken in this particular 
matter were ―employment policies and practices‖ in terms of Item 2(2)(b) of the LRA 
or whether they were ―measures designed to achieve equality‖ in terms of Section 8 
of the Interim Constitution.271   
Mlambo J, with reference to Van Heerden, stated that substantive equality broadly 
involves the justified unequal treatment of individuals.272  The Court needed to 
establish whether there had been a rational connection between the actions taken 
(the appointment of the black individual) and the objective sought (achieving 
equality).  With reference to Van Heerden, the Court once again consolidated the 
position that measures taken need merely be ―reasonably capable of attaining the 
desired outcome.‖273  In the present matter, ―properly formulated programmes‖ are 
more likely to reach the outcomes sought than ―ad hoc arrangement[s]‖.274  The 
Court held that the respondents‘ actions entailed the latter and did not form part of 
any affirmative action plan as the respondents had alleged.275  The only connection 
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between the decision to appoint the black individual instead of Mr Gordon and the 
Constitutional imperative of equality was on the ground of race.276  No evidence of 
the likelihood of this doing anything to ensure representivity within the different levels 
of the Department of Health was brought before the Court.277  The equality clause 
entails that measures taken in terms of section 9(2) of the Constitution (or 8(3) of the 
Interim Constitution), should be properly considered.  In casu they were found to be 
inherently arbitrary and, therefore, unfair as contemplated by Item 2(1)(a) LRA.278  In 
short, the appointment made was neither a ―measure‖ in terms of Section 8 of the 
Interim Constitution nor a ―practice‖ in terms of Item 2(2)(b) LRA.279 
From the discussions above, it is apparent that there is no fixed interpretation of 
equality or affirmative action as of yet.  The scope of affirmative action seems to 
develop with each new case that presents itself.  These notions are very much alive 
and constantly evolving within the multicultural South African society.  Judicial 
decision-making is often informed not only by the political and social context, but also 
by a variety of ideologies.  Conflicting views exist on the nature, justifications and 
limits of affirmative action.  These views draw upon different visions of equality and 
justice.  The imprecise use of key terms further adds to the confusion.  Against this 
background, I will turn to consider theories of compensatory and distributive justice in 
the next chapter.  It is hoped that an analysis of these two broad justifications of 
affirmative action will contribute to greater conceptual clarity, and help to make sense 
of the elusive meaning of section 9(2). 
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Justice and equality as overarching ideals cannot function separately.  An egalitarian 
society is more likely to be a just society than a state characterised by gross 
inequality.  Similarly, there is no justice in a state where discriminatory policies 
predefine social groups.  Therefore, the apartheid regime was by implication a 
system run on flawed principles of justice.  Justice entails that fairness take 
precedence.  Given the current unbalanced state of affairs in South Africa, what 
would fairness entail?  Deep rooted rifts, not only between groups but also emotional 
fractures, have torn the fabric of society.  The term justice, as it is used in this 
discussion, is to be understood as an order of fairness in a democratic society.  It 
implies a sought after state of affairs in which past (and current) inequalities are fully 
eliminated and rectified to such a degree that all members of society can truly be said 
to be equal in the egalitarian sense of the word.  It also means that the policies on 
which laws and practices are based, are completely fair and void of any malpractice.  
In this regard, justice, to Paul, means upholding the inherent human rights afforded to 
all human beings, including the right to life, liberty, property and human dignity.280  In 
my opinion, this will not only entail that all institutionalised operations be fair and 
equal, but it is vital that private relations between members of society, too, are not 
tainted by prejudice and abhorrence. 
Compensatory justice and redistributive goals are frequently used as justifications for 
affirmative action.  The aim of this chapter is to outline the differences between 
compensatory and distributive justice, or more specifically, John Rawls‘s difference 
principle. As a theory of justice, compensatory justice acknowledges the injustices 
committed in the past, and aims to restore justice.  Conversely, the difference 
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principle focuses on the current unequal distribution of social goods and endorses a 
more just allocation of resources.  In philosophical terms, justice is considered to be 
a fundamental component of society that has been lost due to various reasons.  In 
the South African example, the subversion of justice was due to oppressive apartheid 
policies imposed in the past and this aberration needs to be corrected.  How one 
should go about doing so depends on which theory of justice one applies.  This 
chapter will examine these two theories of justice, in the context of the South African 
affirmative action debate.  
 
3.1  Compensatory Justice 
 
―Institutionalised injustice demands institutionalised compensation‖281 
The overarching rationale behind compensatory justice is that justice is restored by 
the correcting of past wrongs.282  The purpose of this section is to analyse what this 
entails.  The following issues will support this query: What is compensatory justice? Is 
it forward looking or backward looking? Who should be compensated and who is 
responsible for doing so?  
Compensatory justice, or the mode of restoring justice so to speak, differs markedly 
from distributive justice, though the redistribution of social goods is inevitable in both 
cases.  Aristotle, too, distinguished between compensatory and distributive justice.283  
The difference between the two will be illustrated at length in this chapter. 
Compensatory justice, with its focus on repairing and ―making up for…‖ is an ideal 
vehicle for restoring justice once it is lost or required.  According to Taylor, 
compensatory justice functions under the following conditions:    
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 PW Taylor ―Reverse discrimination and compensatory justice‖ (1973) Analysis 177 182. 
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 For a brief outline of the rationale and theory behind compensatory justice, see C Mbazira 
―‗Appropriate, Just And Equitable Relief‘ In Socio-Economic Rights Litigation: The Tension Between 
Corrective And Distributive Forms Of Justice‖ (2008) SALJ  Vol 125 Is 1 71 72-75. 
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 In Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to compensatory justice as rectificatory justice.  Authors 
have since criticised Aristotle‘s conception of compensatory (rectificatory) justice of being incomplete. 
See, for example, H Khatchadourian ―Compensation and reparation as forms of compensatory justice‖ 
(2006) Metaphilosophy 429-448; EF Paul ―Set-asides, reparations, and compensatory justice‖ in JW 
Chapman (ed) Compensatory Justice: Nomos XXXIII (1991) 97-139. What is remarkable about the 
theory of compensatory justice is that it was conceptualised long before modern civilisation.  The 
Nichomachean Ethics was first published in 350 BC, and yet, more than 2 millennia later, mankind still 
hasn‘t diverged from discriminatory treatment of its fellow man. 
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―[I]f there has been an established social practice (as distinct from an individual‘s 
action) of treating any member of a certain class of persons in a certain way on the 
ground that they have characteristic C and if this practice has involved the doing of 
an injustice to C-persons, then the principle of compensatory justice requires that C-
persons as such be compensated in some way.‖284 
All that needs to be added to this definition is a classification of the group or entity 
that is to be responsible for making the said compensation.  For instance, should the 
state be held accountable, or should the burden of reparations fall on the specific 
group of perpetrators accused of harming the victims?  Depending on the harm in 
question, this exercise can be a considerable thorny issue.  I will elaborate on this 
point in further detail below. 
Compensatory justice can be divided into four main principles: 
1:  Compensatory justice is essentially backward looking; 
2:  Compensatory justice considers the injury in question i.e. as experienced by the 
victims and as inflicted by the perpetrator; 
3:  Compensatory justice treats all parties as equals and, therefore, all rights must be 
respected; and, 
4:  Compensation entails bringing the victim to the condition he would have been in 
had the damage never occurred.285 
 
Several authors have confirmed that compensatory justice is a backward-looking 
theory.286  Paul states that this criterion consists of a three-part analysis.  The first 
part is referred to as the ―act(s) requirement‖; secondly, there is the matter of 
identifying the victim and the perpetrator; and, in the third instance, the act should 
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have amounted to a violation of a fundamental human right.287  The acts in question 
refer to governmental acts for the purposes of the current discussion, and not 
individual acts.288  An obvious example of such a governmental action is the 
implementation of legislation that is discriminatory in terms of race or culture, i.e. 
legislation that differentiates between different groups, causing some to feel inferior 
to others.  The first and third legs of this inquiry are fairly uncomplicated.  Resolving 
the issue of victim and perpetrator, however, is not.   
Compensatory justice aims at returning victims to, or placing them in, a position 
where all are equal before the law.  This should occur at the hands of the aggressors 
or perpetrators, as it is due to their actions that the victims had experienced 
suppression in the first place.  In a typical example, such as the apartheid era, the 
victims were, for the most part, the black community of South Africa, and the 
perpetrator was the government (and therefore the state) who acted as an extension 
of the will of the white group.289  Today, South Africa is predominantly governed by 
black people.290  Is it still reasonable to expect the government to compensate 
victims when the government is run by the group being compensated?291    Or should 
it be absolved of any responsibilities as a result and should the white group be held 
solely responsible for the injustices of the past?  Furthermore, can it be fair to 
compensate victims today, when many of those who have truly suffered have already 
died?  To answer this last question, Lötter convincingly argues that because of the 
group, and perpetual nature of the injustices committed, current members of a 
previously victimised group also deserve compensation – if it is established that 
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 EF Paul ―Set-asides, reparations, and compensatory justice‖ in JW Chapman (ed) Compensatory 
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 It is necessary to clarify at this stage that the current discussion is mainly concerned with 
compensatory justice on a societal scale.  In terms of compensatory justice on a smaller level, state 
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Mbazira ―‗Appropriate, Just And Equitable Relief‘ In Socio-Economic Rights Litigation: The Tension 
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―Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups‖ (2002) Vol 10 No 4 The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 392 394-396. 
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 The terms ‗government‘ and ‗state‘ are used interchangeably in this context.  As the government is 
the most prominent representative of the state, its actions are equated to those of the state. See HPP 
Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 83 93, for 
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 Since the election of a democratic government in 1994. 
291
 Taylor argues that it is, in fact, society as a whole that is responsible towards those who were 
discriminated against – a view confirmed by Lötter, who states that compensating victims of the past 
should be viewed in the same light as any publicly funded good or service. PW Taylor ―Reverse 
discrimination and compensatory justice‖ (1973) Analysis 178; HPP Lötter ―Compensating for 
impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 93.  These issues will be addressed 
during a discussion of compensatory justice in relation to affirmative action. 
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compensation is to be made.292  As will be explained below, the injustices that set 
compensatory justice into motion, so to speak, are usually of such a magnitude that 
they affect generation upon generation.   
That being said, let‘s return to the issue of compensatory justice‘s backward-looking 
nature. Taylor illustrates the essence of a backward-looking theory in concise 
terms.293  To summarise: those responsible for making reparations at t2 (the present 
state) should look to t1 (a point in time in the past) to determine the necessary 
compensation.294  It is, therefore, logical to infer that compensatory justice is not in 
essence a theory directed at a specific outcome, though coincidentally a more even 
distribution of resources could occur, but a theory largely aimed at repairing the 
injustices of the (often distant) past.   
 The second criterion for compensatory justice, as outlined by Paul, is that it 
concentrates on the injuries suffered by the victims and inflicted by the perpetrators.  
The injustices committed by perpetrators should at least meet certain criteria.  Lötter 
explains that the effects that major injustices have on groups should serve as an 
indicator of whether those acts can be deemed to be compensable or not.295  Quite 
often, groups are subjected to a multitude of traumatic experiences as a 
consequence of large-scale rights violations.  These include the following: 
―[L]oss of life, serious bodily injuries, deep emotional scars, damage to property or 
loss thereof, destruction of interpersonal or communal relationships, and loss of 
opportunities for personal and communal development and growth.‖296 
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 HPP Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 92. 
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The relevance of these ―traumatic experiences‖ in these cases is that the debilitating 
effects do not end when the injurious act ceases.297  This could certainly be the case 
in socio-economic terms, meaning that large groups still live in ―traps of poverty‖ and 
without the capacity to improve their day-to-day lives without assistance.298  On the 
other hand, the argument for compensatory justice is also strengthened when group 
remembrance still bears passionate feelings of rage and resentment.299  The stronger 
the current effects due to past injuries, the stronger the case will be for compensatory 
justice.300   
The third criterion for compensatory justice, i.e. that all parties should be treated as 
equals, simply implies that the rights of all the parties involved should be 
respected.301  Lastly, the fourth criterion explains the position to which victims are to 
be restored.  According to Paul, this is the position which victims would have been in 
―had the injurious event never occurred.‖302  This she acknowledges to be somewhat 
complicated, and arguably even pointless.  The example used in her discussion is 
that of the corrective justice needed after the American slave trade era.  Restoring 
such individuals to the positions they would have occupied had it not been for the 
injustices committed against them, would entail placing them in circumstances much 
worse than the reality they currently occupy.303  Furthermore, accurate estimations of 
these positions are undoubtedly near impossible to make.304  I find it difficult to 
conceive that the requirements of compensatory justice could be as callous and 
consequently untenable.   
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Though the ultimate goal of compensatory justice is to restore equality, it (perhaps 
even more importantly) also includes restoring moral equality between the different 
parties involved.305  The restoration of feelings of dignity and equal worth cannot be 
likened to the settling of monetary debts.306  Gaus states that ―no mere redistribution 
of resources, no matter how generous, can restore moral equality between victim and 
aggressor.‖307  Something much deeper and more meaningful is required. 
To make the last criterion appear as at least vaguely realistic, a more compassionate 
compromise is needed.  Placing victims in the positions in life that they would have 
been in, but for the major injustice that occurred, would have to suggest transferring 
them to a state of equal moral worth in relation to the rest of the members of society.  
Once this is done, ―they are to be treated like everyone else.‖308  When it is 
established that the aggressors are to be held accountable, reparations should be 
made in the following way: in terms of the victims themselves, the aggressors are 
expected to make a commitment to restore and correct their injuries, and in terms of 
society as a whole, aggressors bear the responsibility to ―equalize the relationship 
between victim and perpetrator.‖309  A vital component of the latter of the two 
obligations, is that the repayment in question should also include some form of 
admission of the role they played in the misfortune and suffering of the victims as an 
act of contrition, a form of apology if you will.   
The theory of compensatory justice can be criticised for its limited capacity in truly 
restoring equality on a practical level.  Matters of levelling the moral equality between 
members of society are far easier debated in theory than deciphered in practice.  
Furthermore, determining which injustices deserve compensation, and which don‘t, is 
a convoluted issue.  Lötter states that when determining which injustices are to be 
corrected, one should look to those cases that still have persisting effects in the 
present and whose victims are ―clearly defined and describable.‖310  Therefore, those 
living in poverty as a result of the apartheid regime, the major injustice in this case, 
                                                     
305
 G Gaus ―Does compensation restore equality?‖ in JW Chapman (ed) Compensatory Justice: 
Nomos XXXIII (1991) 73. 
306
 G Gaus ―Does compensation restore equality?‖ in JW Chapman (ed) Compensatory Justice: 
Nomos XXXIII (1991) 72. 
307
 G Gaus ―Does compensation restore equality?‖ in JW Chapman (ed) Compensatory Justice: 
Nomos XXXIII (1991) 73. 
308
 PW Taylor ―Reverse discrimination and compensatory justice‖ (1973) Analysis 180. 
309
 HPP Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 95. 
310
 HPP Lötter ―Compensating for impoverishing injustices of the distant past‖ (2005) Politikon 88. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
deserve compensation, and conversely, those who would have been living in poverty 
in any event, don‘t.   
When does the responsibility of others to restore an individual‘s social stance end, 
and the individual‘s own responsibility to become an ―agent of [his] own healing and 
recovery‖ begin?311 To determine this, Lötter states that one should ―take into 
account [amongst other things] the scope and consequences of the trauma caused 
by the injustice, the physical, mental, and social recourses available to the victims 
before the event, and the extent of the damage to these resources.‖312  Also 
important is the view taken of the causes of inequality. What some would ascribe to 
the neutral workings of the market or to individual merit and choice, others would see 
as directly linked to systemic disadvantage and lasting structural inequality that were 
either caused by the discriminatory practices of the past or were exacerbated by it. 
These factors weigh heavily on considerations of whether reparations are due or not.  
In the South African context, it seems particularly important to stress the structural 
nature of disadvantage – or else a too thin conception of compensatory justice may 
result. 
 
3.2 Compensatory Justice and Affirmative Action 
 
The era of apartheid had effectively compelled South Africa to create sustainable 
industries at a time when sanctions prevented standard trade agreements with other 
self-sufficient nations.  Primary industries such as the mining industry, mineral 
exploration and agriculture flourished due to South Africa‘s inability to trade and 
import products that it needed.  This, in turn, created job opportunities that had not 
previously existed, specifically for non-professional black individuals.  What this 
points to is that apartheid did not only leave a legacy of suffering and suppression in 
its wake, although the poverty created by apartheid in particularly rural areas cannot 
be overstated.  Had this been the case, the argument for compensatory justice would 
not have been as complicated (though complicated nonetheless).    
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The biggest setback to the application of compensatory justice to the present 
affirmative action scheme, is establishing a causal connection - first between the true 
perpetrators and victims of apartheid, and secondly between the past victims of 
apartheid and present beneficiaries of affirmative action.313  Very often, the person 
harmed most by apartheid benefits the least from affirmative action and vice versa.314   
Some commentators are of the view that compensation should not occur in general, 
but compensation should be made by the aggressor, though this point of view is not 
shared by all.315  More compatible with the South African affirmative action policy, is 
the view that compensatory ―burdens‖ should be shared by society as a whole.316  
This will not only act as a more feasible solution, but it would also eliminate the 
stigma surrounding white citizens as the evil perpetrators of apartheid.317  South 
Africa has already made a positive step towards reconciling victims and perpetrators 
by establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  In terms of 
compensatory justice, the TRC serves a two-fold purpose: it is the ideal platform for 
(true) scar-baring victims of racial discrimination to voice their grievances against the 
actual individuals and institutions responsible for the injustices committed against 
them.  Secondly, it compels apartheid decision-makers to take ownership of the 
decisions they had made in the past and to face the consequences.318  The apartheid 
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regime did not only cause economic damage, but more importantly, it produced 
profound emotional damage and marred the fundamental right to dignity owed to all 
human beings.  A backward-looking theory of justice is well-suited to address the 
present day grief that victimised groups still continue to experience. 
Also, the plurality of past wrongs created an array of current day disadvantages.  Not 
only did it cultivate racial discrimination, but it also caused other forms of 
disadvantage, based on gender, class and other attributes.  Disadvantages in South 
Africa today are intertwined within the realms of immutable characteristics and 
therefore entail complex measures to separate and address each issue.  At times, it 
may not even be possible to do so individually. 
Another theory of justice that aims at establishing a more just order is distributive 
justice, or more specifically, John Rawls‘s Difference Principle. 
 
3.3  Distributive Justice 
 
―Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought‖
319
 
The ethos of distributive justice is not so much a singular theory of justice as it is a 
collective noun for various theories concerned with how material and non-material 
goods should be distributed in society.  The primary philosopher in this field has been 
John Rawls. While many other theorists have since written on the subject - some in 
agreement and others holding opposite viewpoints - most use his theory of justice as 
starting-point.  These philosophers include Ferdinand Hayek, Michael Walzer, Robert 
Nozick, Martha Nussbaum, Brian Barry, and Nancy Fraser.  As it is nigh impossible 
incorporating all these divergent theories at this point in time and adequately 
discussing each, it is my aim, instead, to examine the primary theorist of distributive 
justice, John Rawls, and his difference principle.  This section will commence with an 
introduction of Rawls‘s theory of justice and an outline of his two principles of 
democratic equality.  The first principle is the equal liberty principle, and the second 
consists of the fair equality of opportunity and difference principle.  After examining 
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the difference principle in more detail, a discussion will follow on how it applies to 
affirmative action.   
In terms of Rawls‘s theory of justice, society consists of a ―fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons.‖320  The basic equality afforded to each individual, 
is what Rawls strives to realise.  This idea is embedded in the notion that when 
excluding all arbitrary characteristics, such as race, gender, and culture, all people 
are considered to be (equal) moral individuals, which is why Rawls places emphasis 
on the basic aspects of being human.  The theory entails that there is a long line of 
contingencies that were unforeseen - amongst others, family life and gender, which 
are social and genetic factors and should therefore play no role in a person‘s future 
role in society - that brought each person to where he or she is today.  Given this 
reality, Rawls, ever the contractarian, expects members of society to enter into an 
agreement by agreeing on certain ―fair terms of social cooperation‖.321  The 
contracting parties are expected to be rational individuals acting in their self-interest 
who have more or less the same needs and interests.  The conditions under which 
the social contract is agreed upon should also be void of ―threats of force and 
coercion, deception and fraud‖, and no parties should be in possession of any ―unfair 
bargaining advantages‖.322   
The position from which parties enter into this agreement is referred to as the veil of 
ignorance.323  In order to have a viable social contract that benefits all the parties 
involved, i.e. society, parties should be ―removed from and not distorted by the 
particular features and circumstances of the existing basic structure‖, and therefore 
parties should not know the social positions they are to receive, or any of their 
personal characteristics, once exiting the contract.324  When acting under the veil of 
ignorance parties tend to exclude irrelevant considerations from the equation 
because they are unforeseen and not in their control.  The reason for this is because 
                                                     
320
 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 14. 
321
 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 15. 
322
 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 15. 
323
 Rawls acknowledges that the original position, from which the parties enter into the social contract 
under the veil of ignorance, is an abstract notion.  The reason for this is because it is both hypothetical 
and nonhistorical.  Rawls explains: ―(i) It is hypothetical, since we ask what the parties…could, or 
would, agree to, not what they have agreed to. (ii) It is nonhistorical, since we do not suppose the 
agreement has ever or indeed ever could actually be entered into.  And even if it could, that would 
make no difference.‖ Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 16-17. 
324
 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 15.  The characteristics that individuals are 
oblivious to when debating the terms of the contract also include personal traits such as natural 
talents, intelligence and physical strength.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
each person‘s conception of the good is tied to his position, and one can only have a 
proper conception of the good when not knowing one‘s position in society.  Rawls 
explains that ―[c]ontingent historical advantages and accidental influences from the 
past should not affect an agreement on principles that are to regulate the basic 
structure from the present to the future.‖325   
Rawls believes that his two principles of justice can be regarded as a starting point 
for the debates that are to follow when the best possible societal dispensation is 
decided.  These principles of justice determine the just terms of cooperation between 
rational, free and equal citizens who act in self-interest and operate according to a 
lexical priority.  As stated above, the first principle of justice is the equal liberty 
principle which entails that ―each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.‖326  This principle 
has to be satisfied before moving on to the second principle.  Rawls‘s second 
principle of justice is subdivided into two sections, i.e. the fair equality of opportunity 
and difference principle.  This principle holds that ―social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone‘s 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.‖327  Fair equality of 
opportunity (as opposed to formal equality of opportunity) entails that those 
individuals with ―the same native talent and the same ambition have the same 
chances for competitive success.‖328  The principle of fair equality of opportunity has 
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Social Justice (2004) 66).  Individuals who were born with similar abilities along with the motivational 
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(eds) Social Justice (2004) 66. 
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strict lexical priority over the difference principle, as does the first principle of justice 
over the second.329 
The difference principle is concerned with how (public) social institutions that 
determine the ―basic structure‖ of society should distribute social goods amongst 
different members of society.  This applies to the ―design of organizations that make 
use of differences in authority and responsibility.‖330  It also entails the ―division of 
advantages from social cooperation.‖331  Rawls uses an index of primary goods to 
quantify the various levels of inequality, social and economic, present in a particular 
distributive system.332  This index comprises the following headings: basic rights and 
liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; income and wealth; 
and the social bases of self-respect.333  The primary goods issued to or afforded to 
each individual should at least enable him or her to be an active and constructive 
member of society.334  From this one can derive that individuals become eligible for 
acquiring social goods depending on their social position in society.  Rawls 
distinguishes between more advantaged and the least advantaged individuals.335  
Advantaged members are those who were born into a particular higher class than 
others or have been endowed with greater natural talents.  Rawls states that 
although we do not necessarily deserve these standings (and talents), we still have a 
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 R Arneson ―Justice after Rawls‖ in JS Dryzek, B Honig and A Phillips The Oxford Handbook of 
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other gains. 
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 J Rawls ―On justice as fairness‖ in M Clayton and A Williams (ed) Social Justice 2004 60. 
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 J Rawls Theory of Justice (1971) 7-8. 
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 N Daniels ―Democratic equality: Rawls‘s complex egalitarianism‖ in S Freeman (ed) The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2003) 242. 
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 N Daniels ―Democratic equality: Rawls‘s complex egalitarianism‖ in S Freeman (ed) The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2003) 242; J Rawls Political Liberalism (2005) 181. 
334
 Rawls also requires that all individuals be rational and reasonable (J Rawls Theory of Justice 
(1971) 19).  This is of particular importance under the veil of ignorance, for those that do not possess 
these qualities will not choose a system of distribution that can be considered to be just.  Such 
individuals are more likely to take into consideration aspects that are morally irrelevant and 
inappropriate to the conception of a just society.  See N Daniels ―Democratic equality: Rawls‘s 
complex egalitarianism‖ in S Freeman (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2003) 243. 
335
 For a discussion on the classification and clarification of the ―least advantaged representative 
person‖ in society, see WE Schaller ―Rawls, the difference principle, and economic inequality‖ (1998) 
79 Pacific Philosophical Quaterly 368-391.  In this article Schaller accepts that Rawls‘s difference 
principle is open to criticisms such as creating work disincentives by allowing individuals to enter the 
least advantaged class by their own doing, yet the difference principle lends itself to other applications 
so as to overcome such prospective problems (and criticisms). To similar criticisms Sandel adds that 
society does in fact provide incentives for the exercise of natural talents ―rather than have them lie 
dormant.‖ M Sandel Liberalism and the limits of justice (1998) 71. 
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right to them.336  Just as social goods are to be seen as public commodities, or 
rather, a ―collective asset‖, individual talents should similarly be seen.337  As 
unappealing, and even repulsive, as this concept might appear, it allows members to 
use such talents – both for themselves and to the benefit of those who were not 
fortunate enough to be in the same position.338  Furthermore, once those who have 
been fortunate enough to possess greater positions or talents than the rest use these 
capacities to the benefit of society, they are considered  to be entitled to and 
deserving of these advantages, thereby giving them a ―claim to their better 
condition‖.339  In this way, society rewards members who keep to the terms of the 
original agreement. 
The difference principle dictates that a society can only be just when a particular 
distributive model places the worst off members of society in the best possible 
position.340  This does not necessarily hold that there should be an absolute equal 
distribution of assets.  In fact, Rawls allows for, and even advocates, certain kinds of 
economic inequalities, such as the unequal distribution of wealth and income, when it 
is advantageous to all.  What this translates to in terms of a particular distributive 
pattern is that it has to be considered reasonable when a representative individual 
―prefer[s] his prospects with the inequality to his prospects without it.‖341  Society is 
expected to strive for equality as far as possible, unless inequality places everybody 
in a better off position.  The position of the least advantaged person will only improve 
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 Therefore, along with many considerations accepted to be morally irrelevant, such as race, sex and 
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 J Rawls Theory of Justice (1971) 179.  Talents are viewed as accidents of nature and therefore 
―the contingencies of social circumstance must be nullified.‖ DL Phillips ―The equality debate: what 
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 I think what Rawls implies with social and economic inequalities being reasonable and being 
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about the consequences of certain distributions, we are still expected, however, to be reasonable (and 
therefore as wise as possible) when determining and planning the distributions that are to apply. 
341
 J Rawls ―On justice as fairness‖ in M Clayton and A Williams (eds) Social Justice (2004) 62.  To 
this Rawls also adds the following: ―One is not allowed to justify differences in income or in positions of 
authority and responsibility on the ground that the disadvantages of those in one position are 
outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another.‖  In Rawls‘s theory of justice there is no 
room for the concept of ―taking one for the team‖.  All distributions should only be in the interest of the 
greater good, but not at the cost of the expectations of any individuals, no matter how few. 
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when those with exceptional talents accept the ―restrictions on the degree to which 
they can benefit from their natural endowments.‖342     
Similarly, the difference principle allows all members of society to ―share in the 
benefits of the distribution of natural talents and abilities…in order to alleviate as far 
as possible the arbitrary handicaps resulting from our initial starting places in 
society.‖343  
In a society functioning on a set of rules determined by the difference principle, the 
Rawlsian version of equality is referred to as democratic equality.  This determines 
that the representative position from which a society is judged to be just (or not), is 
that of the least advantaged position.  Therefore, maximising the standing of the 
worst off person, or improving the expectations for, or aspirations to, social and 
economic primary goods of the least advantaged group as far as possible, creates a 
more just society.344   
Though many have praised Rawls‘s theories of justice, the past 30 years have also 
seen many challengers to the difference principle, including Robert Nozick, Ronald 
Dworkin and Amartya Sen, to name but a few.345  Yet many of these criticisms seem 
to stem from the particular notion of (distributive) justice which each critic 
endorses.346  For instance, those who support strict egalitarianism are opposed to 
any forms of inequality, whether to the benefit of the least advantaged or not.347  
Strict egalitarians believe that material benefits should be distributed evenly in 
society. To have the difference principle guiding these distributions, resulting in 
economic inequalities on every level, would be contrary to the strict egalitarian vision.  
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
 
Utilitarian philosophers, on the other hand, simply profess that the difference principle 
does not maximise utility.348  Utilitarians are predominantly concerned with the well-
being and happiness of mankind in general and would allow for certain inequalities 
as long as they serve the happiness of all.  Rawls, on the other hand, specifically 
advocates that inequalities are only permissible insofar as they are to the benefit of 
all, especially the least advantaged members of society and that any other 
infringements will be unacceptable if they do not satisfy both the first and second 
principles of justice.  Therefore, unlike utilitarian theories Rawls has strict 
qualifications for the subordination of individual rights.349   
Libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, assert that the just acquisition of holdings 
entitles individuals to the rightful ownership of their material (and non-material) 
belongings – without there being any particular distributive pattern.350  Social goods 
and services are not to be redistributed to the least advantaged members of society, 
via affirmative action benefits, ―redistributive taxation to the poor‖ or otherwise.351  
Such acts are considered immoral.352  One of the largest discrepancies present in the 
debate between the difference principle and the libertarian theory of justice is the 
treatment of individuals.  In the libertarian view, the difference principle allows people 
to be treated as a means to an end - the end being, in this case, to create a fair and 
just society.353  The libertarian version of justice, instead, treats individuals as ends in 
themselves.354  The best illustration for these statements is the case of talents.  
Nozick‘s theory allows individuals full ownership of their talents and creations without 
having any responsibility towards society in support of those who are not as talented.  
As stated above, under the difference principle, once a person has discharged his 
duty towards society to share his good fortune with the least advantaged members of 
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society, he can at most be considered to be entitled to his talents, but never the true 
owner.  Libertarians can be criticised for their disregard of the vast inequality of 
resources.  In supporting a laissez faire free market system, libertarians assume that 
once individuals are allowed to trade and operate freely, a fair distribution of 
resources would occur.  Not only does this falsely presume that everyone has equal 
opportunities and equal access to resources, but it also presupposes that the market 
is neutral.  Rawls‘s theory of justice, on the other hand, advocates the idea of a ―well-
ordered society‖ where the rules of engagement are based on mutually accepted 
principles of justice.355 
Lastly, other theorists supporting desert-based principles and resource-based 
principles, for instance, all vow that their dogmas are superior to the difference 
principle.  It is not necessary at this point to expand on all the possible theories of 
distributive justice and their individual criticisms of the difference principle 
respectively.356 
 
3.4  The difference principle and affirmative action 
 
The South African affirmative action policy lends itself to be suitably interpreted and 
justified in terms of the difference principle.  Moreover, an original position 
assessment would invariably lead to the most advantageous distributive system to 
affirmative action targets and, therefore, the least advantaged South Africans.  The 
reason is simply because this is such a large group that the likelihood of the person 
behind the veil of ignorance becoming one of these members is an inescapable 
possibility.  The difference principle, correctly applied, would allow the least 
advantaged to have higher expectations of achieving their life goals and economic 
independence, as would the principle of fair equality of opportunity.357   
As stated before, inequalities in economic and social positions are only justified 
under the difference principle when they serve the interests of everyone, especially 
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the least advantaged.  One may therefore argue that affirmative action does exactly 
this as the diversity it brings to all spheres of interaction, including education and 
employment, is a clear goal of affirmative action and contributes to a richer and more 
vibrant society.  As a distributional regime, affirmative action is justified under the 
difference principle as it allows the more advantaged members of society to share 
the fruits of their talents, as referred to above, with those less fortunate in various 
ways, for example, taxation revenue can be used to fund skills development 
programmes and more subsidies and bursaries can be made available to fund 
tertiary education for those unable to afford it.  However, the question is whether all 
of this goes too far when extra funding is required to make up for the potential loss of 
efficiency when preferential employment occurs? 
The difference principle would encourage the redistributive taxations present in South 
African economic policies so that the revenue generated from the natural talents of 
fortunate individuals will be geared towards overall societal upliftment, especially of 
the least advantaged.  So, too, would the priority of improving the education system, 
making it more accessible to all, be an important distributive principle.  The difference 
principle ensures that the educational needs of all individuals are addressed.  A 
trickle down effect would inevitably lead to a situation where a racially and culturally 
diverse group of individuals can compete equally for career opportunities.  This stage 
would, unfortunately, not be reached as soon as many would hope, but the long term 
consequences of this endeavour is a just society with fewer economic inequalities.  
Ultimately, the ―previously disadvantaged group will be able to take [its rightful] place 
as equal participants in all spheres of life.‖358 
What the difference principle would take issue with is the definition of the least 
advantaged group.  It is an undisputed fact that the majority of black people make up 
the larger group of the least advantaged members of society.  However, to limit the 
benefits of any distributive pattern to these members alone so as to exclude another 
group or other individuals similarly economically disadvantaged would not satisfy the 
equal liberty principle.359  This implies that the benefits of affirmative action should 
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not be withheld from other underprivileged groups, such as women or poor whites.  
The aim of the difference principle is essentially to improve the expectations of the 
least advantaged members of society, i.e. expectations to achieve their life goals and 
economic independence, for example. This group is socially diverse and includes 
white individuals, even though they are clearly in the minority.   
Furthermore, not only does affirmative action as implemented in South Africa breach 
the equal liberty principle which is lexically prior to the second principle of justice, but 
it is also contrary to the equal opportunity principle because of the minimising of the 
expectations of white individuals to pursue certain career and educational 
opportunities, for example enrolment at medical universities.360  What is required is 
not a formal notion of equality of opportunity, but fair equality of opportunity.  This 
principle is not satisfied under the current distributional regime as the socio-
economically disadvantaged black people have no equal opportunities to adequate 
educational facilities and opportunities, as do many other members of society.  This, 
Rawls would state, is unacceptable and unjust.  However, it is also possible to argue 
that affirmative action in general, far from violating equality of opportunity, merely 
attempts to equalise everyone‘s life chances.  
Under a just distributive model, groups that have been impaired due to past 
discrimination have a claim to certain distributive benefits – not based on the 
discrimination as such, but because of the social and economic benefits they would 
have had access to ―under fair conditions‖.361  What distinguishes the difference 
principle from compensatory justice, is its forward-looking approach.  Whereas 
compensatory justice would aim at redressing the hurtful occurrences of the past, the 
difference principle looks to the current or prevailing order as is and determines a just 
distributive model accordingly.  This effectively eliminates the problem of accurately 
identifying and locating the true victims of discrimination.362   
The object of this chapter was to discuss two selected theories of justice and to a 
limited extent how they are to be applied to South Africa.  The following chapter will 
be a contextual analysis of the forward and backward-looking justifications of 
                                                     
360
 See for example Solidariteit obo RM Barnard v South African Police Service (Case No JS455/07) 
where a white individual was refused an employment opportunity whilst no other individuals were 
otherwise employed in the vacant position which was consequently left unfilled. 
361
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 96. 
362
 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 96. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
affirmative action by evaluating the inter-connectivity between substantive equality 
and remedial and restitutionary equality on the one hand, and compensatory justice 
and the difference principle on the other. 
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 4.1  General observations 
 
A number of justifications for affirmative action have been advanced. These 
justifications can be classified along different axes. These include: whether they are 
forward-looking or backward-looking; whether they draw on compensatory or 
distributive theories of justice; and whether they fit best with substantive or remedial 
(also known as restitutionary) conceptions of equality. The above concepts have 
been introduced in the previous two chapters. In this chapter, I am interested in the 
intersections and overlaps between these different forms of justification. As will be 
argued below, compensatory theories of justice overlap significantly with backward-
looking justifications of affirmative action and with remedial or restitutionary 
conceptions of equality. Conversely, the Rawlsian difference principle (as one of the 
most prominent theories of distributive justice) has an affinity with forward-looking 
justifications of affirmative action and with a substantive understanding of equality. 
These justifications of affirmative action will be considered, while bearing in mind the 
different criticisms of current affirmative action policies. Affirmative action has been 
criticised inter alia for being elitist, promoting tokenism, creating feelings of inferiority 
among beneficiaries, entrenching race consciousness and giving rise to increased 
racial animosity. In view of these criticisms, it will be asked which of the justifications 
under consideration provides us with the best possible understanding of the 
possibilities and limits of affirmative action. Put differently, the focus will be on the 
theoretical tools that would best enable us to imagine the transformation of legal, 
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political and economic institutions in view of the Constitution‘s egalitarian 
commitments. Since these questions cannot simply be answered in the abstract, the 
possibility needs to be kept open that the question of which theory of equality and 
justice provides the best justification for affirmative action, is itself context-bound. For 
this reason, different forms of disadvantage (eg disadvantage based on race, gender 
and disability) will be considered. 
 
4.2  Compensatory justice and remedial and restitutionary equality 
 
If we should assess affirmative action in terms of compensatory justice, it would be 
appropriate to do so with the end goal of attaining remedial and restitutionary 
equality.  The aim would be to remedy such disadvantage by placing victims of past 
discrimination in the position they would have been in had such discrimination not 
occurred. However, critical questions need to be raised about the correlation 
between the harm caused by discriminatory laws and policies and the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action measures. Does affirmative action truly benefit those 
disadvantaged by past discrimination, or do its benefits accrue only to a tiny – and 
possibly already privileged – subset of the previously disadvantaged?   
Dupper postulates three refutable arguments in defence of the backward-looking 
approach.363  Firstly, ―[e]very member of the deprived groups has in fact suffered 
from the effects of past discrimination and similarly every member of a non-deprived 
group has benefited (at least indirectly) from the effects of past discrimination.‖364  
This argument alludes to the involvement of the whole society in the effects of past 
discriminatory practices.  All the members of victimised groups are taken to have 
been handicapped in some way due to the injustices endured by their predecessors, 
whether it be directly (for example, not being allowed to acquire property or compete 
for qualified positions) or indirectly (for example, suffering from a ―lack of self-
confidence or lack of self-respect‖).365   Conversely, those who were not at the 
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receiving end of mass oppressive policies did, and still do, benefit from them.366  
Jarvis Thompson states that the jobs that white males claim they are entitled to, do 
not in fact belong to them in the first place, but to the community.367  Unfortunately, 
white males are those who will carry the highest burden of society‘s reparatory load 
unless it could be shown that there is another way in which reparations could be 
made with similar consequences.368  Dupper rebuts this reasoning by proposing a 
two-fold inquiry.  In the first instance, he questions the appropriateness of taxing the 
identified group with ―society‘s amends-making‖ duty and, secondly, in the light of the 
approbation of preferential treatment based on previous injustices, asks ―why should 
not other victims of injustice also receive special treatment?‖369   
Preferential treatment per se is justified because black people in particular were 
denied ―full membership in the community.‖370  The problem, however, is that there is 
a glaring discrepancy between the percentage of previously disadvantaged 
individuals and white males.  According to Statistics South Africa, it was estimated in 
2008 that black people (male and female) between the ages of 20 years and 55 
years comprised 36,3% of the South African population.371  The population of white 
males between the same ages is considerably less and only represents 2,2% of the 
population.372  It is grossly unfair to expect such a meagre-sized group to single-
handedly carry the colossal restitutionary load.  Even if we denied all 1 092 900 white 
males between the above mentioned ages any jobs (and distributed them amongst 
black people), notwithstanding the possibility that this number may be considerably 
less because not all of them are currently employed, 16 578 000 black people‘s lives 
would remain unchanged. 
The second question relating to the groups of victims and perpetrators, relates to the 
nature of the injustices that deserve compensation.  This issue can only be 
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addressed by awarding reparations to groups by virtue of their status as victims of 
injustice and not because of their membership of a particular race or gender.373  
Proponents of the classic notion of affirmative action would most likely not endorse 
this argument because it would expand the size of the group of victims and, 
therefore, include individuals who are not traditionally categorized as previously 
disadvantaged but who have nonetheless still experienced unjustified hardship in the 
past. 
The second backward-looking argument Dupper addresses is that ―[t]hose who are to 
be compensated are not individual victims at all but rather the groups to which they 
belong.‖374  According to this notion, those who receive preferential appointments 
need not have been subjected to discriminatory practices, for when employed, they 
are representatives of their groups and not merely individuals.  The group-v-
individual aspect of compensation has received some recognition by the courts but, 
to my knowledge, one of the most convincing counter-arguments is highlighted by 
Dupper.  He draws attention to the inconsistency between the compensation made to 
groups and the ―distribution of that compensation to individual members.‖375  If we 
should once again return to the above mentioned figures it is clear that the black 
individuals receiving the jobs of 2,2% of the population consisting of white males, will 
not in fact be those who are desperately in need of societal assistance, but most 
probably the black higher or middle-class who have already become self-realised and 
economically independent members of society.   
Thirdly, Dupper questions the statement that ―[o]nly those group members who have 
actually suffered from past discrimination should be given preference in terms of 
affirmative action.‖376  This statement is directed at the over-inclusive consequences 
caused by the second backward-looking argument.377  Nevertheless, because of 
what Dupper calls ―a very high correlation between being [black]…and being a victim‖ 
this claim is easily disputed.378   
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What we are left with is the following:  there is a considerable correlation between 
being black and being a member of a group that deserves compensation based on 
previous discriminatory practices, but even if we deduce that this means that black 
people per se are entitled to reparatory measures, there is no guarantee that they will 
in fact receive what they are rightfully entitled to.  As stated before, it is more likely 
that an educated black person, of whom there are admittedly still too few, will receive 
a bursary for tertiary education or a government tender than the black individual still 
confined to an existence of perpetual manual labour.  If any justification for 
affirmative action is to be based on compensatory justice, it will be necessary to 
show that it is possible to overcome this problem. 
Justifications for affirmative action, based on backward-looking compensatory 
arguments, also face the following obstacles:  Firstly, if the goal is to unite a divided 
society, there is the possibility that the amplification of compensatory justice could 
result in the opposite.  If a duty of reparations is forced on certain groups only for the 
reason that they are ordered to make amends, and not that it is in the greater 
interests of society and the future of society to do so, it is not inconceivable that such 
policies would encounter more hostility than support.379  Secondly, in a more practical 
sense, the reparations made in the form of preferential measures are limited.380  As 
also stated previously, one of the purposes of compensatory justice is to restore the 
victim of injustice to the position they would have been in had the injustice not 
occurred.  In order to do this, the court needs to establish a causal connection 
between the wrong committed and the injury done to the victim.381   The ―restoration‖ 
of victims and the verification of a causal connection are both challenging elements 
of such an inquiry.382  Thirdly, compensatory justice will only focus on the victims of 
apartheid and, again, this will not assist in achieving the objective of uniting 
                                                     
379
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 C Mbazira ―‘Appropriate, just and equitable relief‘ in socio-economic rights litigation: the tension 
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society.383  This relates to the fourth issue, which is that the difficulties that society 
faces today are founded on such a multitude of sources that relying solely on 
compensatory measures to mend the deep-rooted structural rifts is simplistic to say 
the least.  Policies of redress based on compensatory justice and aimed at remedial 
and restitutionary equality are what Fraser refers to as affirmative strategies.  This 
can be compared to a metaphorical band aid being plastered on the victims of 
injustice in order to ―correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements‖ without 
treating the cause of the infection or the reason for the misalignment of social 
structures.384  Practically speaking, this means that if race-based affirmative action is 
applied under the guise of compensatory justice by means of preferential 
appointments only, without addressing the root causes of inequality and deprivation 
such as an inadequate education or poor socio-economic resources, no real 
advancement will occur. 
It could however be argued that backward-looking justifications of affirmative action 
that are based on compensatory justice capture something important about the ills of 
past discrimination, which would be lost if we were simply to focus on future 
distributions of social goods. That is that apartheid did not only rest on a skewed 
distribution of wealth and economic opportunities, but that it also denied the basic 
human dignity of members of disadvantaged groups. Or to use Nancy Fraser‘s 
terminology, the ills of apartheid consisted as much in status as in class harms, or in 
misrecognition as in maldistribution. A backward-looking justification of racially based 
affirmative action that is grounded in compensatory justice could, arguably, play an 
important symbolic role by recognising the stigmatisation and prejudice caused to 
black people under colonialism and apartheid. Even if it is true that affirmative action 
benefits cannot reach those most disadvantaged under apartheid, they can 
nevertheless serve to redress the moral and psychological harm caused by the past 
treatment of black people as inferior and incapable of performing managerial roles. 
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Without wishing to deny the symbolic value of such forms of redress, it is 
nevertheless necessary to examine the downside of this argument more closely. In 
the absence of a more sustained attempt to transform the underlying structures of the 
economy, attempts to undo the moral and psychological harm caused by apartheid 
through affirmative action appointments may in fact have the opposite effect, by 
labelling the class of beneficiaries as incompetent, ―deficient and insatiable‖.385 
Moreover, because they rest on an affirmative strategy, they may have the 
unintended effect of forcing individuals into a system of collective identities without 
any room to establish themselves as separate individuals, fearing that to do 
otherwise will be disloyal.   
In short, affirmative action policies based on compensatory justice are unsuitable ―to 
address all current legal problems.‖386  This is not to say that compensatory justice 
and measures aimed at creating remedial and restitutionary equality are redundant.  
It is merely important to accept that the goals of affirmative action which are based 
on the elimination of discrimination, the redress of past wrongs and the creation of an 
egalitarian society, will not be reached when this course is pursued.  These 
objectives require the necessary transformative strategies that are capable of 
addressing the current root causes of inequality and deprivation.  The following 
section will address this matter in further detail. 
 
4.3  The difference principle and substantive equality 
 
One way to serve the endeavour towards an equal society is to apply the difference 
principle as a measure of justice in order to support substantive equality.  The value 
of affirmative action policies lies within the purpose that they serve in society and the 
positive outcomes that can be expected from them, i.e. greater representivity in the 
workplace and a more equal society in which all members are able to attain full self-
realisation.  Justifying affirmative action in terms of this theory of justice means that 
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now, more than ever, affirmative action policies should be acceptable in theory and in 
practice, based on a reasoned and reasonable conceptualisation of justice.387   
Another advantage that the forward-looking perspective holds is that there is no 
longer the necessity to establish a causal connection between harms committed in 
the past and the inequality experienced today.388  Instead, this theory of distributive 
justice looks at present day inequalities and structures remedies accordingly, in order 
to create a more equal dispensation of social goods and resources.389   
The difference principle may be used as a redistributive tool to determine who is 
eligible to receive certain goods.  As was stated before, the difference principle 
enhances the future career and life expectations of those who are least advantaged 
in society.390  Under such terms, people who, as a result of past discrimination, are 
not capable of reaching their full potential, are entitled to social resources that would 
enable them to compete on fair terms with other members of society.  Social 
institutions are currently arranged in such a way that one‘s position at birth is a strong 
indicator of the probable life expectations that one might have.   In other words, a 
black woman born in a township will most likely receive poor education and a 
minimum wage for the rest of her life.  Similarly, a white female born in a middle-class 
suburb will most likely attend educationally competent schools and is more likely to 
attain tertiary education than the black woman previously mentioned.  This will 
enable her to hold a stronger position in society and afford her greater opportunity for 
participation in society.  Rawlsian fairness dictates that social institutions should be 
aligned in such a way as to counteract the ―natural lottery‖ so as to enable everyone 
to attain self-realisation.  Van Wyk states that the ―fact that a person is born into a 
poor rural black family is simply a fact; however, the fact that legal institutions attach 
the consequences of inferior education to the circumstances of his or her birth is 
unjust.‖391   
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It is possible to argue that an indirect consequence of the current race-based 
affirmative action policy is the detriment caused to, amongst others, poor whites.392  
This includes making it harder for them to seek employment as well as to retain their 
employment.  Conversely, since the abolition of discriminatory practices in 1994, the 
class of economically affluent black people has grown considerably.  Broader societal 
interests come into play when redistributive policies are applied.393  The difference 
principle allows for redistribution on the basis that discriminatory practices in the past 
had caused groups to experience several stumbling blocks in life - but this 
redistribution may not be to the detriment of other members of society who also find 
themselves in the lowest socio-economic classes.394  Therefore, if affirmative action 
is sanctioned as a redistributive policy, resources may not be redistributed in such a 
way as to further disadvantage other groups not classified as ―affirmative action 
beneficiaries‖ but who nonetheless are still economically worse off.  As Schaller 
states: ―[n]othing is gained by increasing the number of people who are unable to be 
self-supporting.‖395  In fact, the strength of this forward-looking approach lies in the 
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―community-wide implications‖ that it holds.396 Poverty-stricken communities, 
regardless of race, should benefit. 
Theories of distributive justice support a commitment to substantive equality because 
of the emphasis both place on structural change.  The strength of substantive 
equality lies in its flexibility and multi-dimensional approach to issues of equality.  
Amongst its many different dimensions, substantive equality also has a redistributive 
dimension.397  It is not content simply to extend equal treatment to all, but seeks to 
redress material disadvantage and systemic inequality. From the perspective of a 
substantive understanding of equality, the aim of adopting measures so as to 
promote the achievement of equality indicates an acknowledgment that deep rooted 
inequalities still exist and that their eradication is an ongoing process.  Systemic 
inequalities, in this case, can only be challenged once the ―underlying social and 
economic conditions that create[d] and reinforce these inequalities‖ are fully 
understood.398  The aim is, of course, to change the social institutions that perpetuate 
unequal distributions ―rather than expecting the individual to conform.‖399 Here it is 
worth recalling, once again, Fraser‘s distinction between transformative and 
affirmative strategies. Unlike affirmative strategies, which seek to make surface 
reallocations to redress the effects of existing inequalities, transformative strategies 
effectively address the ―underlying generative framework‖ which caused the 
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inequalities in the first place.400  Substantive equality cannot be a viable ideal without 
any ―transformatory change‖.401   
 It would be exceptionally naïve to believe that society can reach equilibrium in terms 
of an absolute equal distribution of resources; full participation by all citizens in civil 
society; or complete eradication of differences in status.  But that is not what is 
argued for here.  As a redistributive policy based on the difference principle, 
affirmative action is required not to exacerbate current day inequalities, and to 
regulate the just redistribution of societal resources to the benefit of the least 
advantaged members.  In other words, equality and justice are often elusive ideals 
which cannot be accomplished overnight, but require ongoing transformation.  This 
transformation, guided by the difference principle, therefore needs to be grounded in 
transformative policies, as opposed to affirmative policies that address the 
unfavourable symptoms of social arrangements without curing the diseased cesspool 
that is the underlying social structure.402 
In the remainder of this section, I will consider whether and to what extent a 
substantive understanding of equality, married to the difference principle, can assist 
us in conceiving of such an ongoing transformation of social relations and distributive 
patterns. Referring to the notion of transformative constitutionalism, Justice Langa 
states the following: 
―Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates a 
space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of 
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being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which 
change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant.‖403   
It is possible for critics on the left to argue that the difference principle amounts to 
little more than a justification of the welfare state, in which superficial reallocations 
are made to the poor without truly transforming the underlying economic 
structures.  However, it will be argued that the difference principle does, in fact, have 
the ability to do much more; i.e. have a more trenchant and lasting impact.  Firstly, 
with the requirement that the products of natural talents be shared by all and 
therefore redistributed to those not fortunate enough to have received such talents 
initially, a general sense of community is fostered.  This means that through 
redistributive taxation or career development and vocational training programmes, 
upper classes redistribute a portion of their ―good fortune‖ to those in need and 
accept their responsibility to utilise its products in the interests of all.  
Secondly, the redistribution of basic goods to those who all agree are most in need 
expands the class of self-sufficient citizens.404  Being self-sufficient in the sense of 
having all one's needs met, allows one to focus more intently on general needs and 
enhances participatory parity within society.  Coined by Fraser, this term refers to the 
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alignment of social institutions so as to facilitate full peer-orientated interaction 
between all individuals regardless of race, class, gender, sexuality etc.405  As a 
redistributive mechanism, the general policy of affirmative action should, therefore, 
be geared towards the full emancipation of everyone, especially disadvantaged 
citizens.  Participatory parity not only requires the (re)distributional regime to enable 
and support individual independence, but it also requires that ―institutionalized 
patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal 
opportunity for achieving social esteem.‖406  The latter condition aims to address the 
status order of society that is so easily tainted once a particular group become the 
target of serious prejudice or stigmatisation.  This would then also prevent them from 
attaining full independence as well as the confidence to self-acknowledge their 
rightful place as equal participants in civil society.  The dualist approach therefore 
reminds us that strategies that reform and compensate members of society for the 
natural uneven outcomes of the market should nevertheless address both aspects of 
redistribution and recognition. This means that the devaluation - even denigration - of 
specific groups or the devaluation of concomitant characteristics of specific groups is 
unjust.  Any actions, social institutions, social norms or otherwise that ―deny some 
people the status of full partners in interaction‖ must be eliminated or excised.407  
The third potential societal change that the difference principle could enable is a 
direct consequence of the second.  A stronger civil society is created by the 
emancipation of more individuals, which in turn strengthens civil institutions that can 
demand a more responsive government.  Government structures can, then, no 
longer deny the necessary structural changes that improve society on all the vital 
levels. 
The difference principle should be able to endorse affirmative action as a 
redistributive and remedial measure.408  The difference principle allows inequalities to 
exist in society if they are to the advantage of the least fortunate in society.  
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Otherwise put, affirmative action, seen as a policy aimed at creating an equal society, 
inevitably leads to temporary inequality by favouring certain groups.  The inequality 
created should be to the advantage of the lower classes (whether previously 
disadvantaged or not) and should not be to the detriment of higher classes either, 
although the term ―detriment‖ does not necessarily refer to economic disadvantages, 
as some allowances could be considered to be a fair price to pay to be a member of 
a peaceful egalitarian society.   
 
4.4  Contextual analysis of theories of justice and equality: gender and 
disability 
 
Due to shifting patterns of inequality and disadvantage, different considerations might 
apply in different contexts.  Consequently, different conceptions of equality and 
theories of justice may be better attuned to some contexts than to others.  So far, the 
basic distinctions between backward-looking and forward-looking justifications of 
affirmative action, compensatory and distributive theories of justice, substantive and 
remedial equality, recognition and redistribution and affirmative and transformative 
strategies have been dissected, juxtaposed and related to each other in an attempt to 
theorise the possibilities and limits of affirmative action. In this section I will reapply 
the above analysis in order to gain an extended perspective on matters pertaining to 
gender and disability discrimination, as well as the concomitant actions necessary to 
correct these harms for the purposes of bringing about transformation.  Therefore, 
these two issues will be viewed in the light of forward-looking and backward-looking 
justifications for correcting of the harms; compensatory and distributive justice; and, 
whether the aim is to advance substantive or remedial and restitutionary equality.  
This analysis will be largely guided by Fraser‘s differentiation between redistributive 
and recognition-based strategies. 
Although various forms of discrimination are pooled together into section 9(3) of the 
Constitution, stating that ―[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth‖, different grounds of 
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discrimination often involve different power dynamics and forms of disadvantage. In 
an article advocating a complex understanding of equality, Botha states that such an 
understanding recognizes ―that different forms of discrimination may require different 
types of analysis.‖409  For this reason, the bases for compensation are dissimilar and 
require that the harm faced by the victimized group be scrutinised in detail so as to 
afford the said group the full deliverance they deserve.   
 
4.4.1  Gender 
 
Gender inequality and gender discrimination differs from racial discrimination as 
group solidarity is less entrenched in the former case.  This is not to say that there 
are not any cohesive civil society establishments which advocate the rights of 
women, for example, but it merely means that in comparison to black civil society 
movements, gender is less unifying.410  This could possibly be ascribed to the fact 
that South Africa has had less of an arduous journey when it comes to gender 
discrimination than compared to the formally established racially discriminatory 
apartheid regime.  Yet nevertheless gender discrimination, though not as overt as 
other forms of discrimination, still remains.  It lurks in the sub-spheres and 
peripherals and on face value does not seem to threaten the current social order.  
Disguised as traditional social institutions, gender discrimination manifests itself 
through the inability of women to achieve full participatory parity due to the 
entrenched practices of the underlying generative structure.  As Botha states, 
―gender inequality feeds on a rich diet of [cultural] misrecognition and maldistribution, 
of sexual prejudice and female poverty, of status- and class-based distinctions.‖411     
In the South African context there are several examples of social practices, economic 
structures and cultural traditions that have contributed to the material and cultural 
oppression of women.  Historically women, and particularly black women, were 
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denied certain political rights during the apartheid era.412  These rights included the 
right to vote and the right to land ownership.413  As opposed to statutory law, 
customary law as implemented and enforced by traditional African cultures 
prescribed its own limitations to the ability of women to participate and express 
themselves economically and politically.  For instance, under customary law any 
economic earnings, whether earned by the husband or the wife was legally the 
property of the husband and he alone ―had [the] sole capacity to perform juridical 
acts in respect of this property.‖414  Also, customary law of succession dictated that 
women were not allowed to inherit from their deceased husbands and any remaining 
family property was to be bequeathed to the next male heir.   
Upon the advent of the new democratic era, efforts in the form of equality legislation 
were made to change the lopsided relationship between men and women.  However, 
the goals have not at all times been realised due to an array of factors which range 
from traditional leaders‘ reluctance to accept and therefore disperse the 
implementation of western statutory law as it might undermine and diminish their 
authority within traditional communities.415  A major impediment to the 
comprehensive implementation and enforcement of new statutory regulations that 
would provide economic and political protection to women, who were as a matter of 
course subjected to customary law, was the ―inaccessibility of the new law‖.416  Not 
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only did it become costly to enforce their equal rights, but it became an arduous 
geographic feat to access these rights in the first place.417 
Other factors that perpetuate traditional and contemporary forms of disadvantage for 
women include domestic violence;418 the effects of HIV/AIDS on women; 
unemployment and lower earning capacity; as well as the changes in family 
structures.   This last factor relates to two forms of migration.  Firstly, husbands leave 
their rural homes and families in search of urban employment and thereby leave their 
wives to care for the children.  She often faces hardships due to her weaker 
economic position having to compete for ―social and economic benefits‖ with an 
urban wife the husband has decided to acquire.419  Secondly, female headed 
households, meaning households that do not have dominant husbands or male 
figures, whether because of divorce, death or otherwise, are often also 
disadvantaged by the migration of the mother in search of urban employment, 
leaving the grandparents to raise her children.  These factors play an important part 
in the feminization of poverty.420 
Given our history of patriarchy and sexism, a compensatory approach has some 
intuitive appeal. At the same time, however, many of the same problems identified 
above in relation to race also feature here. For example, there is the danger of 
affirming reified social understandings of gender differences. Moreover, those most in 
need are unlikely to benefit: unless attempts at compensation focus more on 
gender‘s  intersections with race, class, the rural/urban divide, disability, marital 
status etc, such measures are likely to benefit only those that are already privileged. 
In addition, since gender is so pervasive and gender discrimination is often subtle, it 
is very difficult to gauge in what position women would have been in the absence of 
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gender discrimination.  A substantive reading of equality is more capable of realising 
the full emancipation of women than would purely remedial and restitutionary 
equality.  One could argue that substantive equality is less inclined to be overly 
victim-focused and strives toward an egalitarian outcome.  However, current 
structural changes need to be addressed.  A complex notion of equality voiced in the 
language of Fraser‘s two-dimensional approach would inform us that addressing 
gender inequality would require both redistributive and recognition-based 
initiatives.421  Equality in this respect firstly requires addressing material 
disadvantage that manifests as a result of the societal distributional system and 
secondly requires that we should address the ―failure to recognise the equal dignity 
and worth‖ of women in particular.422   
In the first instance, redistributive issues which manifest as material disadvantage are 
created and exacerbated by inequalities in the labour force.  A predominantly 
capitalist economic system tends to favour male-dominated structures.423  Gender 
divisions are also present within and between formal and informal labour sectors.424  
This results in ―gender-based exploitation, economic marginalization, and 
deprivation.‖425 
Gender divisions, like racial divisions, create and sustain a class-like structure which 
helps perpetuate the marginalization and exploitation of the least advantaged. At the 
same time, recognition-based inequalities manifest in the arena of status and culture 
by endorsing androcentrism as the price for mutual acceptance.426  This means that 
―traits associated with masculinity‖ are favoured above qualities traditionally 
associated with the feminine.427 
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The duality of the issues of maldistribution and misrecognition created by 
inequalities, particularly racial and sexuality-based inequalities are generally 
addressed by following either affirmative or transformative strategies, as mentioned 
above. With regards to gender discrimination, it seems that affirmative strategies on 
their own would not suffice as superficial redistributions, for instance maternity leave 
benefits, would do little or nothing to subvert gender inequalities which are deeply 
entrenched in distributive patterns and cultural value systems.  Instead, 
transformative strategies ―aim to destabilize invidious status distinctions‖.428  The only 
question that stands, however, is whether the theories of justice presented in the 
previous chapter have the ability to bring about this form of transformation.  
I will argue that forward-looking approaches are better equipped to address gender 
inequalities.  Reasons why backward-looking, and therefore compensatory 
arguments, would not suffice include the impracticality of identifying the specific past 
wrong or social practice that needs to be corrected.  Unlike laws that expressly 
prohibit same-sex marriages, and therefore infringe upon one‘s right to choose one‘s 
sexuality and still enjoy the same liberties as heterosexual people, gender inequality 
is far more systemic in nature as its effects seeps through all aspects of social 
interaction.  Although women have made major achievements in the political sphere 
(especially in South Africa – as will be illustrated below), social and economic 
benefits are still withheld to a certain extent.  In the social context, preconceptions of 
the women‘s role to bear and raise children are still very active within this society, 
which inhibits the conceptualisation and achievement of life aspirations.  Similarly, 
these aspirations might include career advancements which would provide financial 
independence.  Discrimination based on sexual orientation, on the other hand, is 
predominantly a matter to be rectified by strategies based on recognition.  
Systemically, homosexuals face fewer obstacles as ―homosexuals are distributed 
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throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive 
position  in  the division of labor, and do not constitute an exploited class.‖429  
Compensatory justice also requires that victims be brought to a position had the 
injury never occurred.  Patriarchal norms are so deeply entrenched and historical 
traditions of male dominancy have become so generally accepted and typical that 
imagining a world where this had never occurred is virtually impossible.  Therefore, 
instead of looking to specific past wrongs that had occurred to the general female 
populace, equality is more likely to be attained if the underlying structures that 
perpetuate and regenerate gender disadvantage are scrutinised and reformed.  
Focusing on individual victims and individual perpetrators also runs the risk of the 
reification of gender identities that once again become the systemic ulcers that breed 
gender inequalities. 
Distributive justice, according to the difference principle, would entail that we 
reconsider and compare the life chances and opportunities accruing to women and 
men from childhood.  This does not only include their education but also the way in 
which they are brought up and what they are taught in terms of peer interaction.  The 
reason is that these crucial developmental stages ultimately determine our chances 
and interactions later in life.  The difference principle states that basic societal goods 
are to be distributed in such a way that they are to the advantage of the least 
advantaged members of society, even if this means that certain inequalities occur.  
Thus, ensuring that members from both genders receive equal opportunities would 
be to the benefit of all.  This participatory parity of both genders enriches society on 
various levels.  For example, it is more probable that society would function on 
optimal levels if more members of society are constructively involved in civil society, 
the employment sphere, the political arena, sporting activities, cultural activities, and 
academia.   
Rawls himself does not identify the least advantaged class in society according to 
gender, but limits this class to only encompass those with the least income and 
wealth.  Nonetheless feminist accounts of distributive justice like that of Okin illustrate 
how the Rawlsian principles of justice can be applied in the quest for gender 
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equality.430  For example, basic goods that are to be available to the free and equal 
citizens within society include the ―liberty of free choice of occupation‖.431  Okin states 
that within the current gender structured society both sexes are compromised in this 
regard as both face an uphill battle realising this liberty which leads to ―asymmetric 
economic‖ dependency upon men, although men do receive some relief in the long 
run.432  In our current discussion Rawls‘s theory therefore dictates that the link 
between traditional gender roles and sex be broken.  The full freedom to pursue 
one‘s occupation of choice can only be realised if the necessary reforms have been 
made.  Okin states the following in this regard: 
―These conditions are far more likely to be met in a society that does not assign 
family responsibilities in a way that makes women into a marginal sector of the 
paid work force and renders likely their economic dependence upon men. Rawls‘s 
principles of justice then would seem to require a radical rethinking not only of the 
division of labor within families but also of all the nonfamily institutions that assume 
it.‖433 
Furthermore, not only should these gender roles be restructured for occupational 
freedoms, but also for the sake of political freedoms.434  The Rawlsian ―principle of 
(equal) participation‖ applies to all members of society capable of political interaction, 
whether it be voting during public elections, or actively participating in the electoral 
process by representing the interests of a nominated group.435  Okin explains how 
the latter part of this liberty has been a stumbling block for women in past times due 
to its time consuming nature.436  In a society where women are expected to marry 
and bear children, their political ambitions are often neglected.  Fortunately, great 
strides have been made in South Africa as figures show that gender representation in 
the political sphere has increased significantly.  Figures show that by 2009, 43% of 
all Members of Parliament were female and 42% of the provincial seats were held by 
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women.437  Nonetheless, existing and future political inequalities are only permissible 
in the event that they are capable of justification under the difference principle.438  In 
other words, any political inequalities must be arranged in such a way that everyone 
benefits from it. 
Lastly, the Rawlsian principles of justice advocate that self-respect should be 
considered the most important primary good.439  As rational human beings, no 
individuals would opt for a dispensation under the veil of ignorance that would place 
them in a position where they would have a deficient sense of own value or do not 
have the ―confidence in [their] ability, so far as it is within [their] power, to fulfill [their] 
intentions.‖440  Accordingly, what would be necessary then is for all institutions to be 
gender neutral in their interactions with men and women.  This includes the family 
structure, the political structure (as was mentioned above), religious institutions, and 
various other civil institutions that regulate mutual interaction. 
Certain issues however are harder to address.  For example, if the difference 
principle allows for certain economic inequalities that are to the benefit of the society 
as a whole, the situation might arise where everyone might not agree about what is 
best.  There will consequently be certain dominant cultural assumptions that assume 
that having a ―traditional‖ society is more optimal, namely, letting women be more 
involved in raising their children due to their nurturing nature, regardless of the 
economic servitude this places upon them.  Such assumptions should constantly be 
questioned and debated and if necessary transformed for society to evolve into a 
fully egalitarian state.  Fraser recommends the following: 441 
―Unlike such approaches, the account proposed here is deontological and 
nonsectarian. Embracing the spirit of ―subjective freedom‖ that is the hallmark of 
modernity, it accepts that it is up to individuals  and  groups to define for  themselves 
what counts as a good life and to devise for themselves an approach to pursuing it, 
within limits that ensure a like liberty for others.  Thus, the account proposed here 
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does not appeal to a conception of self-realization or the good.  It appeals, rather, to 
a conception of justice that can be accepted by those with divergent conceptions of 
the good.‖ 
 
4.4.2  Disability 
 
As an outcome of systemic inequalities, disability discrimination is often overlooked in 
the overall mission towards transformation as it is quite readily subsumed within a 
larger pool of grounds of discrimination.   It should be borne in mind however that this 
form of discrimination has a certain level of uniqueness that does not warrant this 
diminution.  Disability discrimination derives its inimitability from several factors.   
As a minority, the disabled are often marginalised.442  Their interests are easily 
neglected as they are not a strong political constituency which would otherwise have 
enabled them to campaign for their just deserts.443  The disabled are often the target 
of general ―negative societal attitudes‖ which render them powerless towards full 
achievement of equal rights.444  The demeaning treatment of the disabled includes 
―imposed charity, social welfare and undue paternalism‖.445  Like race and gender 
discrimination, the disabled are also historically disadvantaged; they are not 
proportionately represented in the workforce; and, they are in some cases under-
remunerated compared to their able bodied counterparts.446  The uniqueness of 
disability discrimination is centred upon the basis of societal biases.  The belief that 
women or black people are incapable of performing highly skilled or technical labour, 
for example, is clearly unfounded.  In the case of the disabled individual‘s inability to 
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perform certain tasks, this is only true to the extent that their immediate environments 
are not equipped for, and do not accommodate, their specific skills or capabilities.447   
As a social construct, disability inequalities are to be understood as the interplay 
between personal experiences and societal factors that mutually ―reinforce and 
perpetuate the subordination of people with disabilities.‖448  Conversely, the legal 
construction of disability relates to the functional implications of the disability as such.  
Therefore, according to the Employment Equity Act, the disabled are defined as 
“people who have a long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment which 
substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in, employment.‖449  
In this case, the disability is brought directly in line with one‘s ability or inability to 
perform certain tasks, and not necessarily with the role that social structures play in 
exacerbating the effects of that disability.  Whether an individual can be considered 
to be disabled is also context-dependent.  Ngwena informs us that if not properly 
defined ―disability has the potential to include an extraordinarily wide range of people 
who at some stage in their life experience physical or mental restrictions that are 
regarded to be a departure from the ‗norm‘…‖450   
Disability discrimination‘s exclusive status is based on the fact that compared to 
racial and gender discrimination, very little transformation has taken place.451  
Centred upon the creation of equality, affirmative action should aim to firstly, bring 
awareness to the plight of the disabled, as it has done in the case of race especially, 
and secondly, should provide the means toward transforming social structures in 
order to provide the necessary accommodation for the disabled.  Lastly, the effects of 
the affirmative action course chosen should not exacerbate the stigmatisation and 
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social exclusion that already shadows this vulnerable group, especially when the 
stigma and social exclusion has very real socio-economic consequences.   
The inequalities that are referred to in this regard manifest in a multitude of ways.  
People with disabilities are denied access to various constitutionally protected rights, 
including ―civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and developmental rights.‖452  
Large-scale unemployment rates amongst the disabled can be ascribed to the 
inability of most educational institutions, including those that provide vocational 
training, to accommodate the disabled.453  Accommodation in this sense refers not 
only to the facilitation of special measures and equipment that would allow the 
disabled individual to perform the same tasks as able-bodied individuals, but also a 
sense of common understanding amongst able-bodied individuals that negates 
biases and negative assumptions about the disabled.454   
As opposed to racial groups or gender groups, the principal form of discrimination 
faced by the disabled is the failure to accommodate them within various 
environments.  For this reason a substantive form of equality demands that a case-
sensitive approach be taken that would counteract the notion that individual-based 
difference is to be dealt with by the individual alone.  In this regard Ngwena states 
that: 
―[substantive equality] treats existing institutional arrangements, including workplace 
arrangements, as possible sources of the problem of difference, especially where 
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the arrangements confirm the distribution of power in ways that are detrimental to 
the vulnerable and the disadvantaged.‖455 
The pursuit of remedial and restitutionary equality can be helpful in repairing the 
dignity-based infringements committed against the disabled.  Whether or not it is 
capable of transformative potential is uncertain. 
As an essentially backward-looking theory, compensatory justice in this instance 
would require that we examine past social practices that are relevant in the case of 
disabled persons.  The question to be asked is:  were there any social practices that 
targeted disabled individuals precisely because they were disabled?  A surface 
analysis indicates that no particular anti-disabled legislation or government-driven 
initiative was lodged for the disabled.  However, if one accepts that there continue to 
be rigid social structures that deter full participation of all individuals that are still 
untransformed and persist in serving as obstacles to entering the workforce, or many 
forms of involvement in social activities, it becomes apparent that some form of 
compensation is required.  In this instance, the perpetrators are not particular groups 
but society as a whole as the disabled are not only hindered in their pursuit of 
careers, but are also often thwarted in their efforts to attain adequate (affordable) 
education and vocational training, or to participate in recreational activities.   
What needs to be done to correct this injustice is to place such individuals in a 
position they would have been in had it not been for these injustices.  To do so 
society needs to be educated on the needs of the disabled, while constantly being 
mindful of not perpetuating social exclusion.  In a sense, society should be reminded 
of the common humanity it shares with the disabled, as well as the basic needs that 
all individuals have, which chiefly include pursuing an education and a career of 
one‘s choice without being denied to do so by factors beyond one‘s control or 
abilities. 
It is arguably easier to conceive of what the situation would have been had the 
disadvantages related to the treatment of disabled people not occurred, than, for 
example, imagining what reality would have looked like now had racial discrimination 
or gender discrimination not occurred, as these forms of discrimination had such far-
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reaching consequences due to the size of the group discriminated against and are 
more discernible than the discrimination against the disabled.  In the case of disabled 
individuals, what is needed most is enabling access to the level of schooling that is 
preferred and being able to apply the knowledge gained in an accommodating 
environment.  Thus, compensatory justice requires us to activate this accommodation 
and provide the necessary assistance that would allow the disabled to participate at 
will.  Being able to predict more accurately what life would have been like had 
disability discrimination never occurred is what makes compensatory justice a viable 
agenda in this case.   
The difference principle, on the other hand, requires that social institutions operate in 
such a way as to not further disadvantage those who are already the most 
disadvantaged.  Or rather, social institutions should be arranged in such a way that 
they are to the advantage of everyone, especially the least advantaged.  Social 
institutions, therefore, need to be transformed to grant the disabled the necessary 
accommodation and understanding in order for them to derive the most benefit.  A 
converse arrangement, such as the one we arguably have now, would inevitably 
deny the disabled any form of expectation for the better.  As mentioned above, the 
current affirmative action strategy is limited in its ability to enable full transformation 
that would grant the disabled a voice.  Usually, only those who are least disabled 
apply for employment as various obstacles hinder the disabled in their pursuit of a 
career, including (but not limited to) transport issues and the infrastructure at the 
particular employment area.  The difference principle dictates that such structures be 
re-analysed and re-evaluated so that the group of individuals who benefit from 
preferential treatment reserved for disabled individuals consists of a larger number of 
people.  On the one hand, current affirmative action measures reach only those who 
are less disabled, and in the absence of any real attempts to transform the workplace 
and to accommodate disabled people, are likely to result in the stigmatization of the 
group. If, however, this results in real efforts to adapt the workplace to the needs of 
disabled people, it could result in further-reaching processes of transformation which 
could perhaps start to filter down to other disabled people.  
Redistributive strategies are centred upon a distribution of social resources that is 
based on notions of equality, dignity and democracy.  Cognisance must be taken of 
outcomes of certain distributional patterns that not only exacerbate economic 
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inequalities, but also perpetuate social disorder and stereotypes.  These patterns of 
misrecognition are in turn corrected when the necessary focus is placed on the 
creation of a ―difference-friendly world‖ that does not require ―assimilation to the 
majority or dominant cultural norms‖ in order to be treated as an equal.456  This is 
particularly relevant with regard to disabled individuals as able-bodiedness is 
generally the gateway towards an occupation.  It can be argued that affirmative 
action currently only addresses the redistributive spectrum of the redistribution-
recognition schema, although not fully in the capacity of a transformative strategy.  
This affirmative strategy, then, provides preferential treatment to the disabled as 
beneficiaries of affirmative action, but denies them the needed dignity-based 
considerations.  The reason for this is because disabled individuals generally do not 
seek acclaim and admiration.  They do however have the need to be able to 
participate in everyday life without unnecessary obstacles, such as being marked as 
being ―inherently deficient and insatiable‖ which is often the consequences of 
affirmative redistributions.457  Fraser states that the ―net effect [of affirmative 
redistributions] is to add the insult of disrespect to the injury of deprivation.‖458   
The Employment Equity Act has attempted to prevent this from happening by 
requiring employers to ―identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair 
discrimination, which adversely affect people from designated groups‖ and the 
―making [of] reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in order 
to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented in the 
workforce of a designated employer.‖459  Unfortunately this legislation is yet to see 
complete animation.  An affirmative action programme that merely provides entrance 
into the workforce but that fails to accommodate the needs of the disabled is obsolete 
as it does not give genuine content to the preferential treatment provided for in 
affirmative action legislation.  It is uncertain whether the current affirmative action 
policy as it pertains to the disabled is capable of being transformative in the long run.  
Precarious surface reallocations would only cause more harm than good by 
reinforcing negative preconceptions about disabled individuals.  However, if coupled 
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with broader transformative strategies that relate to the treatment and appreciation of 
the disabled, affirmative action might have the chance of achieving the status of a 
transformative strategy in the long run.   
Affirmative action as it is structured in South Africa has a further limitation which 
relates to the size of the vulnerable group that qualifies for preferential treatment.  As 
was mentioned above, working environments are yet to be fully accommodating of 
disabled individuals and therefore the only individuals who stand to gain from 
preferential treatment reserved for disabled are those who are the least disabled, i.e. 
those who come closest to being able-bodied. 
As a minority with weak group solidarity, it is particularly hard for disabled individuals 
to enforce/demand their equal rights.  Therefore, just as it is necessary to protect the 
rights of the poor, women or black people, without causing further stigmatisation, the 
onus is placed upon both the state and the greater society to campaign for the rights 
of the disabled with them.  This is done not because they are to be considered weak, 
but because a social, economic and political structure has been created and 
enforced by these actors that has served as an impediment toward the emancipation 
of the disabled.  Ultimately there is a need to transform underlying structures, both 
economically and culturally, rather than simply affirming them through slightly more 
inclusive measures. 
 
4.5  Provisional final thoughts 
 
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate how different axes of analysis from various 
theoretical backgrounds can be applied to different forms of disadvantage.  In this 
case, these theoretical and philosophical tools were used to illustrate that the 
different harms caused by racial, gender and disability discrimination should be 
approached in such a way that cognisance is taken of the particular evils that need to 
be addressed.  Race, gender and disability are also what were earlier referred to as 
two-dimensionally subordinated groups that feature both disadvantages related to 
recognition as well as redistribution.460  Fraser reminds us however that on these 
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axes it is possible for a specific group to have more recognition than redistribution 
struggles, or vice versa.  Discrepancies related to gender are typically loaded toward 
redistributive issues rather than recognition, although the latter is still firmly present 
and needs to be addressed.  Economic consequences of the way in which society 
values and favours masculine attributes are detrimental to the development of 
women and influence, if not predetermine, their life choices.  In terms of disability-
related deficiencies, the weight of the axes turns more readily toward issues of 
misrecognition.  Without the transformation of cultural understandings of the 
capabilities of the disabled, it will be harder to address the unequal distribution of 
economic opportunities available to the disabled.  A dignity-based approach to the 
treatment of people with disabilities needs to be developed that would be more 
capable of accommodating members of this group into all different levels of 
interaction, be it social, political or economic. 
The following chapter will present further suggestions of affirmative action 
programmes that could possibly address issues of recognition and redistribution 
more pertinently than the current race-based affirmative action programme. 
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5.1  Introduction 
Class-based affirmative action has the potential of being instrumental in the South 
African endeavour of transformative constitutionalism - its mission being not merely 
to doctor the symptoms, but to cure the degenerative disease that is the current 
underlying structure which strengthens mutually enforcing relationships of 
dependence without creating structures which encourage independence.  If properly 
composed, class-based affirmative action, as a transformative strategy, can thwart 
the systemic racism and systemic classism so prevalent in society.   
In the past few years, academic and non-academic authors have questioned the 
definition of the group of people who are to benefit from affirmative action.  It is 
argued that the focus should shift from race to the individual‘s socio-economic 
position in society.461  Class-based affirmative action quintessentially juxtaposes 
―those born with unearned economic advantage…against those born into unearned 
economic disadvantage.‖462  This approach could remedy the problems of under-
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inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness associated with race-based affirmative action.  
Rather than simply equating race with socio-economic class, it would focus on the 
actual material deprivation and real-life contexts of individuals.  In this respect, it 
resonates closely with the idea of substantive equality.463  
The aim of this chapter is to examine the potential of a class-based approach to 
address the current problems of race-based affirmative action.  It will commence with 
a brief outline of the disadvantages of race-based affirmative action and will then 
investigate to what extent a class-based affirmative action policy is able to overcome 
them.  I will briefly discuss the justifications, goals and advantages of a class-based 
affirmative action policy, as well as some practical considerations for the definition of 
the class of beneficiaries.  This will be followed by the expected limits of such a 
system.  The chapter concludes with an inquiry into possible alternative approaches 
to the defined class of beneficiaries so as to adequately bring congruence to the aim 
of affirmative action and its consequences.   
 
5.2  Problems with race-based affirmative action 
 
Chapter one set out the main problems associated with affirmative action, most of 
which are the result of an (arguably) ill-defined group of beneficiaries.  To briefly 
recap, the problems are as follows: 
The first issue identified was that affirmative action beneficiaries are stigmatised by 
preferential treatment.464  This in turn has been said to foster feelings of inferiority 
and a lowering of self-esteem, as well as animosity and resentment from opposing 
groups who seem unconvinced that the appointees are capable to perform the 
allocated tasks.465  This leads us to the second unintended outcome of the race-
based policy, which is the perpetuation of racial division and racial identities as this 
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 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 352; W Feinberg ―Affirmative action and 
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further sensitises society to the issue of race.466  Habib and Bentley state that this 
has also ―inhibited the emergence of conditions for the realisation of a cosmopolitan 
citizenship.‖467  What this line of reasoning also refers to is the fact that there are 
certain consequences to the usage of race as method of differentiation.  According to 
the social sciences, race is the means through which we perceive ourselves and 
fellow human beings, as well as being a discourse that assists us in making sense of 
the relationships we form with others.468  For the most part, its social construction 
remains hidden from the physical world and its existence is largely accepted as a 
given reality, although some cameo appearances are made in the advancement of a 
non-racial ideal.  However, race isn‘t merely a matter of pigmentation as it is socially 
constructed and is alive in as much as society values it and uses it to construct and 
understand its reality.  The problem with a fortified racial ideology is that it cements 
us within a specified racial order which ―excludes or suppresses alternatives, other 
questions that could be raised of the existing order, other visions of the society and 
its future, other ways of understanding or structuring social relations, other policy 
proposals.‖469  We are therefore warned when using ―apartheid‘s racial grid in the 
pursuit of redress‖.470  Given our history, it has become exceedingly difficult to 
differentiate between race consciousness, and racial stereotypes and race biases.  
This is not to mean that race as an indicator of disadvantage should be ignored 
completely, for to do so could perpetuate existing inequalities associated with race 
because the various racial groups as they stand today came to be as a result of ―the 
original unjust practice of racial discrimination‖ during the apartheid regime.471 
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Other problems that have been identified in previous chapters include reduced 
efficiency; innocent victims; a fear of entrenchment of the policy; increased 
emigration; and infringement upon the freedom of the individual.472  The unfortunate 
result of many of these problems is that there are inevitable resultant ―sub-problems‖.  
It has, for instance, been asserted that affirmative action policies have ―negatively 
affected the growth potential of the economy.‖473   
Rabe also mentions that affirmative action has benefited and harmed the wrong 
people.474  This in part refers to the fortification of the black elite and upper-middle 
classes, or as Terblanche refers to them, the aspirant African petit bourgeois.475  One 
of the reasons for this, as stated by McGregor, is because the ―Employment Equity 
Act does not recognise that members of the designated groups were not equally 
affected and disadvantaged by apartheid and patriarchy.‖476  The level of 
disadvantage that affirmative action should address is the inability of our policies to 
grant societal members, citizens and non-citizens alike, the prospects of participating 
on equal footing with each other.  By default this would entail increased representivity 
of black individuals in the upper levels of society, but when this occurs at the 
expense of and perpetuates the suffering of the least advantaged, it becomes a 
matter of urgency to re-evaluate and reformulate the policy in order to be to the 
benefit of all.   
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Lastly, the policy has also been accused of widening the gap between rich and poor, 
not only inter-racially but intra-racially.477  Beset with censure coming from critics, 
race-based affirmative action is possibly not the most suited answer to the 
inequalities faced by South Africa today.  One way in which to achieve the goals of 
affirmative action without catering to its disadvantages, is to implement a class-based 
preferential policy.478  The following section will, in its analysis of a class-based 
system, hopefully suggest a policy more capable of achieving true equality. 
 
5.3  Class-based affirmative action 
 
The inquiry into class-based affirmative action will be framed, in part, by Nancy 
Fraser‘s analysis of the relationship between class and status harms, or rather, 
between maldistribution and misrecognition.479  It will also draw upon a second 
distinction introduced by Fraser, namely the distinction between affirmative and 
transformative strategies.  While affirmative strategies aim to redress disadvantage 
without addressing its root cause, transformative strategies seek to transform the 
―underlying generative framework‖ which caused the inequalities in the first place.  It 
could possibly be argued that class-based affirmative action would be more deeply 
transformative as it is directly concerned with material deprivation and could have the 
effect of transforming, rather than affirming, reified racial identities.480 
The following section will commence with a discussion of certain theoretical aspects 
of recognition and redistribution associated with issues of affirmative action, and in 
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particular race-based and class-based affirmative action.  Thereafter a discussion of 
a broad framework for a class-based affirmative action policy will follow which will 
include the goals and possible strengths of a policy of this nature. 
 
5.3.1  Theoretical aspects of recognition and redistribution 
 
To understand what class-based affirmative action would entail one should start with 
what is to be understood by ―class‖.   Far from being diminished to a Marxist 
coordinate of a group‘s relation to the means of production, class-studies have 
developed into a complex map of social relationships.481  Class issues are 
confounded by the various levels of disadvantage present in society – which do not 
always derive from the economy.  Kahlenberg uses the example of a ―child of a 
middle-income steel worker ... [being] more advantaged than the child of a single-
parent bank teller.‖482  This illustrates that a middle class existence does not 
necessarily equip one with all the opportunities needed to succeed.   
Nonetheless the philosophers and economists of old have provided valuable insights 
into an understanding of this subject.  Marx provides a constructive account of how to 
differentiate between classes:  ―[I]n so far as millions of families live under economic 
conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their 
culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the 
latter, they form a class.‖483  More recent literature describes class as  ―an individual‘s 
position with respect to the central economic and cultural institutions of society and, 
in turn, relates that position to the social resources available to the individual.‖484   
Perhaps the most useful adaptation of class for the current purposes can be found in 
the literature of Weber.  His congruous writings on classes and status groups are 
similar to the distinction made by Fraser between class and status orders in society.  
Weber describes a class as follows: 
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―[A] number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life 
chances, in so far as … this component is represented exclusively by economic 
interest in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and…is 
represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets.‖485 
Status groups, on the other hand, are defined by the extent of their social honour and 
can be identified by the specific style of life that they occupy.486  
For Fraser, the class order is related to socio-economic disadvantage and the 
exploitation associated with it.  The remedies necessary to counter this ―requires 
restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution of benefits and 
burdens.‖487  Conversely, the status order concerns itself with issues of recognition 
and its injustices are rooted in ―society‘s institutionalized patterns of cultural value.‖488  
Misrecognition is therefore corrected by recognition.  I will return to this point in due 
course. 
Central to this chapter is the fact that one cannot adequately address economic 
redistributive issues which stem from previous racial discrimination, without 
addressing the concomitant recognition and status issues as well.  The denial of the 
recognition of black groups and black individuality as valued societal assets is 
equally destructive of the ability to realise their full potential as is the lack of 
economic resources.  Therefore, any affirmative action policy, whether class-based 
or race-based, should be crafted in such manner as to take heed of the easily 
obscured obstacles that impede participation and healthy competition.   
Class-based affirmative action lends itself to easier justification than race based 
policies.  To avoid any ―inherently unfair‖ attacks from critics, this policy must prove 
its worth in terms of utilitarian values and fairness.489  This means that in view of the 
apparent failure of race-based affirmative action, a class-based affirmative action 
policy must show that it is firstly to the benefit of all members of society, and 
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secondly, that it operates in the name of justice.490  Not only was this an excessive 
abuse of the policy, but it has also exacerbated the effects of poverty in South Africa 
by not focusing on those most in need.491 
One of the most primary justifications for class-based affirmative action is that it 
―directly compensates those who have had to overcome financial obstacles‖.492  This 
attractive feature nullifies the fear of entrenching an affluent elite class of black 
people while also exerting its energy into the lower classes of society.493  
Furthermore, Kahlenberg posits that this policy has the advantage of being morally, 
politically and legally justifiable.494  Firstly, from a moral perspective, those who 
benefit from a class-based policy would be justly entitled to it as they would have 
needed it most.  In this way it ―indirectly [compensates] for past discrimination...‖495  
With regard to the previous apartheid regime and its extreme racial discrimination, 
class-based affirmative action with a group of beneficiaries defined in terms of socio-
economic status will be able to improve on addressing discrimination as 
―socioeconomic attainment or lack thereof, is the by-product of that discrimination.‖496 
Furthermore, class-based affirmative action provides a stronger case for equality of 
opportunity.497  The aim of this is ―to perfect the meritocracy rather than subvert it.‖498  
This is compatible with the value of substantive equality as it subverts the social 
barriers constructed in the institutional framework that selectively impede on some 
and benefit others.  As Kleven states with reference to systemic disadvantage, 
―opportunities to succeed in life are unequally distributed along class and racial lines, 
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and [if not remedied]... society‘s institutions produce and perpetuate this class/race 
hierarchy.‖499  What this translates to is that depending on which class or race one 
belongs to, opportunities are largely predetermined.  But with this knowledge, it is 
possible to identify the structures within this underlying framework that enable this 
deprivation and to remedy this injustice.500    
Secondly, a class-based policy can be justified from a political perspective as it 
directs its benefits to a class of individuals who would more likely be considered to be 
deserving of affirmative action benefits or a boost in socio-economic resources, than 
say a wealthy black individual who attended private schools.  This is significant 
because the race-based policy currently applied in South Africa does not have the 
same support and provides for far fewer chances of racial integration.  To prevent the 
ideal of egalitarianism from merely being a pie in the sky dream, policies should be 
fashioned to be ―politically productive‖ so that they do not entrench racial 
segregation.501  Lastly, class-based preferences are legally viable because they 
provide a less objectionable method to attain racial diversity.502   
As noted in previous chapters, the Constitutional Court has made it clear that it 
interprets section 9 of the Constitution in the language of substantive equality.  
Consequently this entails an intricate level of analysis when dealing with issues of 
equality due to its multidimensional nature.  Substantive equality is sensitive to the 
distributive-based socio-economic issues in society, as well as the status-based 
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recognition issues within society.503  This two-tiered investigation does not happen 
separately but simultaneously.  Issues of recognition cannot be remedied in isolation 
because ―[s]tatus-based inequalities both cause and are reinforced by socio-
economic disadvantage.‖504  Similarly, one should be mindful when implementing 
new redistributive policies as these run the danger of perpetuating status-based 
inequalities.505  Fraser therefore surmises that inequalities such as these are of a 
multi-dimensional nature.  She illustrates this point by stating that the injustices that 
are rooted in gender inequalities can simultaneously cover the recognition and 
redistributive spheres but that ―neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the 
other … [and] both are primary and co-original.‖506  For example, women face various 
obstacles maintaining economic independence in ―higher-paid, male-dominated 
manufacturing and professional occupations‖, especially in professions which are 
traditionally male orientated such as engineering or even medicine.507  Likewise, the 
status-based misrecognition related to gender debases femininity to the realm of the 
negative by dissociating it with the ―strong‖ ―male‖ norm.  For example, statements 
such as ―you throw like a girl‖ or ―stop acting like a girl‖ are intended to liken the acts 
of the respondent with a pitiful state by comparing such actions with those of 
generally known female behaviour.  This androcentric reality creates the situation 
where women are expected to ―man up‖ in order to be respected in everyday life, and 
especially in professional occupations.  To do otherwise might entail facing various 
gender-based injustices, such as: 
 ―sexual assault and domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning 
stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday 
life; exclusion or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and 
denial of the full rights and equal protections of citizenship.‖508      
 
                                                     
503
 See S Fredman ―Providing equality: substantive equality and the positive duty to provide‖ (2005) 
SAJHR 163-190; S Fredman ―Redistribution and recognition: reconciling inequalities‖ (2007) 23 
SAJHR 215-234. 
504
 S Fredman ―Redistribution and recognition: reconciling inequalities‖ (2007) 23 SAJHR 215 225. 
505
 S Fredman ―Redistribution and recognition: reconciling inequalities‖ (2007) 23 SAJHR 225. 
506
 N Fraser ―Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and participation‖ in 
N Fraser and A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 19. 
507
 N Fraser ―Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and participation‖ in 
N Fraser and A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 20. 
508
 N Fraser ―Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and participation‖ in 
N Fraser and A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 21. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
Substantive equality could be better suited to a class-based affirmative action policy 
than a race-based policy because in this framework it is more likely to reach its aim of 
―break[ing] the cycle of disadvantage associated with membership of status-groups‖ 
because reparations made by using race as the sole criteria are likely to reinforce 
racial biases and inequalities rather than negate the differences between various 
races.509  Within the context of this chapter, it refers to the attached burdens of a 
structure based on systemic-racism.  The interrelationship between systemic-
classism and systemic-racism on the one hand and redistribution and recognition on 
the other can be explained as follows:  Whereas systemic-classism and systemic-
racism (synonymous to class and status issues) are the indicators of an ill-functioning 
political structure, proper application of redistribution and recognition are needed as 
radical transformative strategies used to guide its reform.  Systemic-classism and 
systemic-racism can be defined as ―the arrangement of society‘s institutions so as to 
deny equal opportunity to succeed in life on account of class status or ethnicity.‖510   
 
Fraser‘s two-dimensional approach, addressing recognition and redistribution issues 
concurrently, corresponds with Feinberg‘s strategy of simultaneity.511  With the aim of 
increasing representation of all groups in different spheres of society, the strategy 
advocates a concerted effort of creating employment and educational opportunities 
while simultaneously advancing motivation.512  The interplay between opportunities 
and motivation entails that the more opportunities a group is given, the more 
motivation they will have to strive for more.513  Feinberg states the following:  
―Simultaneity says that certain kinds of roadblocks are rooted deep in historical and 
cultural practices and that special attempts must be made to remove them.  It is a 
way to break those instances of underrepresentation that are the result of 
systematic and enforced past discrimination that have resulted in present cultural 
formations that continue to discriminate and reinforce reduced social standing.‖514 
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Without a class-based affirmative action policy it is unlikely that the current race-
based policy will have the ability to address the roadblocks referred to above, which 
is the entrenched systemic-classism and systemic-racism so prevalent in society.515 
 
Currently race-based affirmative action measures address status and class 
disadvantage by ―attaching socio-economic benefits to those disadvantaged by 
status‖ i.e. race.516  Therefore, race-based affirmative action measures provide key 
educational and employment opportunities to those previously disadvantaged by 
virtue of their race.  Within the realm of recognition, role models facilitate status 
elevation by ―piercing stereotypes and giving [excluded groups] the self confidence to 
move into non-traditional positions.‖517  Cultural groups that were previously 
relegated to performing menial functions such as mining or domestic employment are 
now in a position where preferential treatment could ensure that they ascend to 
higher employment positions.  Fredman warns, however, that there are a number of 
risks associated with addressing disadvantage in this way.  Firstly, race-based 
affirmative action policies run the risk of perpetuating the already destructive 
stereotypes associated with certain status groups.518  For example, when 
appointments are made that lead to a drop in the current state of efficiency in the 
given employment sphere, it damages (or possibly reinforces) the overall perception 
of the group that was benefitted.  Secondly, as race-based measures benefit 
members of certain status groups, we are likely to assume that the same members of 
those groups would continually benefit.  This would render the policy over- and 
under-inclusive as a small group of individuals would dominate the playing field so to 
speak, whereas a large portion of the previously disadvantaged group would not 
have access to the same benefits.519  Without any special limitations that would 
prevent this situation, this would inevitably continue.  Thirdly, race-based affirmative 
action policies can too readily be consigned with the status of ―affirmative strategies‖, 
as opposed to a more desired strategy with transformative potential, due to its 
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inability to expedite actual structural change instead of mere surface reallocations 
within visible areas.520 
 
Class-based affirmative action, on the other hand, grants socio-economic benefits to 
the socio-economically marginalised.  This means that issues of redistribution are 
addressed with a clear redistributive agenda.  But that is not where the exercise 
ends.  Due to the high correlation between class and status subordination in present 
day South Africa, this strategy will also have obvious status benefits.  Issues of 
misrecognition are therefore addressed in a very similar manner as would race-
based affirmative action, the caveat being that those benefitting are in fact previously 
disadvantaged, whether as a result of the past discriminatory regime, or for pure 
socio-economic reasons.  However, the latter would be the case in far fewer 
instances.  Redistributive issues would correspondingly be addressed because 
measures are aimed at breaking the class barriers within society and in so doing act 
as transformative strategies that can overcome structural inequality. 
 
5.3.2. Broad framework for a class-based affirmative action policy 
 
The goals of a carefully planned class-based affirmative action policy are diverse.  In 
the first instance it is to improve on all the shortcomings of race-based affirmative 
action and not merely to perpetuate its stereotypes and burdens.  Class-based 
affirmative action should be used as a transformative mechanism in the light of 
substantive equality and section 9 of the Constitution.  Areas where this has an effect 
for example include legislation; constitutional amendments and constitutional 
reinterpretations.521  However, policy-makers should be wary when allocating roles 
and resources to various groups.  The point of departure should be that the goal is 
not to entrench racial stereotypes but to allow individuals within groups to choose 
their own distinct identities.  To date the categories of beneficiaries identified within 
the Employment Equity Act have done nothing but to undermine ―national unity and 
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social integration and cohesion‖.522  This does not mean that all forms of organised 
group identities are wrong, only that it is wrong insofar as the differentiation between 
groups amounts to a form of hierarchy.  Secondly, organised group identities are also 
damaging when negative stereotypes are associated with individual groups.  
Alexander notes that ―[t]he basic issue that we must grapple with is the optimal 
relationship between our national (South African) identity and all manner of sub-
national identities.‖523  Furthermore, just as individual group identities are neither 
favourable nor unfavourable, so too is the dominant identity of a society open to 
scrutiny.  The principle of recognition rejects any policy that requires an individual to 
―conform to the dominant norm.‖524  Fredman values the notion of individual identities 
as it ―enriches and strengthens community ties.‖525  Individual identities should 
therefore be endorsed for as long as the practice serves as a way to promote 
participatory parity and allows the individual to become a member of society through 
individual expression.   
 
Unlike class-based policies in the United States, a South African class-based 
affirmative action policy will face fewer criticisms with regards to the size of the group 
receiving benefits.  A number of studies in the United States have found that a class-
based affirmative action policy would neither suit the aims of affirmative action, nor 
would it result in adequate representation of other races and cultures.526  This is 
purely for the reason that the majority of individuals in the United States are white 
and therefore there are a larger number of white individuals (than Black, Latino or 
Hispanic people for example) facing poor socio-economic conditions.  South Africa, 
on the other hand, has the (dis)advantage of having a strong correlation between 
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race and people with low socio-economic status.527  In 2008, 18 673 551 of the 19 
633 316 people living in relative poverty were black, which makes up a total of 95% 
of all the poverty-stricken individuals in South Africa at that time.528  A class-based 
affirmative action policy will therefore have a majority of black beneficiaries.  With 
such a large portion of people being disadvantaged, it is essential to tailor any state 
policy to their needs.   
 
There are a range of advantages related to class-based affirmative action.  These 
include the following:  to start with, it is a more suitable vehicle to provide equality of 
opportunity.529  The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, it will affect a larger portion of 
the black group in South Africa as most of them are predominantly economically 
disadvantaged and secondly, it will also benefit a smaller portion of white, coloured 
and Indian members of society.530  In this way the policy ―creates natural, color-blind 
integration‖ while at the same time compensating victims for previous discriminatory 
harms and this results in the perception that there are no real innocent victims 
because the sacrifices made are clearly to the benefit of all members of society.531  
As this policy lends itself to easier acceptance by all members of society, and not 
only that of the beneficiaries, it avoids the ―legal and moral barriers‖ that currently 
surround affirmative action.532   
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Lastly, a class-based affirmative action policy also has the advantage of not 
perpetuating racial stereotypes due to the focus on socio-economic disadvantage 
instead of race.533  
 
There are various ways in which to construct a class-based affirmative action policy.  
The individual terms and conditions of such a policy should ideally be determined 
democratically.  This chapter will, however, aim to provide a broad framework.  
Kleven notes that any ―fundamental systemic reform‖ requires the presence of three 
pivotal factors.534  These are:  
1)  ―a critical historic moment that calls for reform; 
2) a reform program that develops as the historic moment unfolds; and 
3) a mass movement of some type that mobilizes people to struggle for 
reform.‖535  
 
When applied to the South African example it is unclear what would constitute a 
―critical historic moment‖.  Although many South Africans are dissatisfied with their 
socio-economic conditions, they nevertheless still have greater representivity within 
government than before the democratic era.  However, this does not mean that their 
government is as responsive to their needs as it should be.  The ―reform program‖ in 
question, namely class-based affirmative action, will only occur if and when the 
majority of the working class recognise the need for reform.  Alexander agrees that in 
the South African example, black people have the ―civic power to insist on new ways 
of sharing whatever revenue the state can raise from the productive activities of all 
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the citizens of the country…‖536  The allure of major representation in government, 
compared to the highly undemocratic apartheid regime, might last longer than is 
healthy.  In the meantime, public services are not what they should be.  Whatever we 
decide a reform program to look like, it is vital that it be capable of addressing 
maldistribution and misrecognition simultaneously as we have noted the stark 
overlap between race and class.537   
 
There are various ways in which a class-based system can be implemented.  For 
example, the policy can operate on a plus system where the level of one‘s socio-
economic disadvantage is quantitatively measured according to certain parameters, 
or, the policy can make use of a set-aside program that allocates a fixed number of 
positions to disadvantaged persons and thereby ensuring their representation.538  
Cimino warns that regardless of how the policy is structured, it must not merely 
operate as a ―subterfuge‖ for the individuals who oppose affirmative action.539  
Instead, it should be ―motivated purely by socio-economic concerns.‖540 
 
Kahlenberg, one of the leading class-based affirmative action supporters, states that 
there are three important considerations when deciding on a class-based policy.  
Firstly, all decisions must be based on widening equality of opportunity.541  Not only 
will this confer greater legitimacy and acceptability to the system, but it will also 
increase the pool of beneficiaries.  Secondly, the system must be capable of efficient 
administration.542  Having a structure that is overly complicated will merely 
exasperate officials and policy-makers will be forced to resort back to the familiar 
race-based policy.  Affirmative action operates in various spheres, such as 
education, employment and public procurement.  The optimal state of affairs will be if 
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a policy can be constructed in such a way that it be able to function on all levels.  
Kahlenberg‘s third consideration is that the policy should be able to function within a 
republican form of government.543  In the South African case this means that it should 
be a democratically decided sound policy that can be adopted into constitutionally 
compatible legislation.   
 
Defining the beneficiaries is not as simple as it might seem from the above 
discussion.  There are various indicators of poverty that can be considered when 
drafting the policy.  It is important, however, that the indicators chosen be relevant to 
the goals of affirmative action.  In the previous chapters it was stated that the main 
goals of affirmative action are primarily to compensate victims for previous 
discriminatory practices and secondly to use a remedial policy to facilitate the 
creation of an egalitarian society grounded in democratic ideals.  One might want to 
consider an array of factors such as language; geographic location or household 
income which are likely to be indicators of disadvantage based on previous 
discriminatory practices.  It is important, however, that there be a connection 
between the indicators of disadvantage and the affirmative action goals.  
According to Kahlenberg‘s sophisticated definition for socio-economic class, one 
should factor in the following variables: income;544 education; wealth; schooling 
opportunities; neighbourhood influences;545 and family structure, which includes 
parental education, parental occupation and family income.546  Using these 
multidimensional variables in a calculated system could possibly address the 
recognition and redistribution aspects of status harms and economic disadvantage.  
Sander warns that in the absence of a verification program, individuals might be likely 
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 RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of Legal 
Education 472 476-478.  Sander lists three advantages of taking an applicant‘s neighbourhood 
background into account.  Firstly, it has as much legitimacy in terms of disadvantage as does ―family 
hardships‖, secondly, participants have in the past more readily disclosed information of this nature 
and it is therefore a practical measure.  Lastly, this category is partial to groups who are largely 
underrepresented when selection processes favour academic excellence. 
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 R Kahlenberg ―Class-based Affirmative Action‖ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1078-1083; EM 
Bernal, AF Cabrera and PT Terenzini ―Class-based affirmative action policies: a viable alternative to 
race-based programs?‖ (1999) Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the 
Study of Higher Education 9.  Certain datasets also indicate that one should consider items in the 
home to determine socio-economic status. 
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to circumvent the policy measures in order to gain preference.547  Punitive measures 
should therefore be implemented should this occur. 
 
This thought experiment has so far illustrated that class-based affirmative action has 
the potential to address the current pitfalls of race-based affirmative action.  
Unfortunately, any ―prodigious‖ solution invariably has its drawbacks.  
 
5.4  Limits/critique of class-based affirmative action 
 
Several foreseen and unforeseen problems occur as soon as one considers the 
implementation of class-based affirmative action.  Malamud explicitly rejects this 
policy on several grounds.  Firstly, her principle of the return of the repressed states 
that some variables, such as social capital, that inevitably influence our level of 
economic disadvantage are harder to measure than purely simple indicators (for 
example family income).548   Therefore the group of people identified as economically 
disadvantaged is not a true representation of reality.549   
The second critique, entitled the principle of the top of the bottom and the principle of 
the close swap entails that there is a virtual exchange of ranking where individuals 
who were previously in the lowest ranking of a privileged class are now ranked at the 
top of the most disadvantaged class which deems them fit as class-based affirmative 
beneficiaries.550  This cosmetic disadvantage allows them to benefit from affirmative 
action policies where they previously, under a race-based affirmative action scheme, 
would not have.551  As Malamud states, ―affirmative action programs tend to benefit 
the best-off among those who have been deemed sufficiently disadvantaged to be 
                                                     
547
 RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of Legal 
Education 481. 
548
 DC Malamud ―Assessing class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 Journal of Legal Education 
452 457-458; 460. 
549
 RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of Legal 
Education 499-500.  Sander explains that the group of class-based affirmative action beneficiaries will 
be ―atypical of the group‖ and they will receive a disproportionate share of the benefits at the expense 
of those who are more deserving. 
550
 DC Malamud ―Assessing class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 Journal of Legal Education 
458; RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of 
Legal Education 500-501. 
551
 RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of Legal 
Education 500. 
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eligible for affirmative action.‖552  This critique would not hold much standing as race-
based policies are generally critiqued for having a similar effect where the most 
affluent individuals of the identified racial groups are generally the beneficiaries. 
Another very serious consideration is whether class-based affirmative action is 
capable of benefitting the individuals living in very serious poverty-stricken 
conditions.553  A certain level of qualification is generally  needed when applying for 
educational or occupational opportunities and the reality in South Africa is that such a 
large portion of the ―least advantaged‖ group are so far behind that they would not 
meet the mandatory requirements.  This once again has a very real effect on the 
stigma attached to group membership.   Should the standards be lowered, they 
would inevitably ―question their own abilities, much the same way that racial 
minorities supposedly question themselves.‖554  Inasmuch as socio-economic status 
is not as palpable a variant as race, beneficiaries should not experience as much 
external stigma as with race-based policies.  This, however, will not necessarily be 
the case in South Africa as there is a very clear and marked correlation between race 
and socio-economic standing and, therefore, one can expect the contemporary 
external stigma of the current race-based policy to persist.555 
One major obstacle for class-based affirmative action comes into play when defining 
the range for socio-economic disadvantage.  The aim of this project is not to explore 
this in too much detail.  Suffice it to say that the chosen method of defining the class 
of beneficiaries will determine whether the policy receives public support or not.  As 
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 DC Malamud ―Assessing class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 Journal of Legal Education 
458. 
553
 RH Sander ―Experimenting with class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 No 4 Journal of Legal 
Education 501. 
554
 T Yin ―A carbolic smoke ball for the nineties: class-based affirmative action‖ (1997-1998) 31 Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review 254-255. 
555
 For Malamud it is a misconception that there is such a clear correlation between race and socio-
economic status.  This is an understandable observation in the American context for two given 
reasons.  Firstly, due to a majority of the American population being white, the majority of the ―lower 
class‖ consists of white people and not the more disadvantaged racial minorities.  Secondly, having 
been disadvantaged by not only poverty, but race too, the ―bottom of the bottom are thus likely to be 
underrepresented as beneficiaries of poverty-based affirmative action in comparison with their 
proportion among the poor.‖  DC Malamud ―Assessing class-based affirmative action‖ (1997) Vol 47 
Journal of Legal Education 465.  This is a very real concern as it has been empirically proven that 
policies aimed at individuals from low socio-economic backgrounds will benefit fewer black (students) 
than race-based policies.  Bernal et al agrees that due to this lack of correlation between race and 
socio-economic status, class-based affirmative action is unlikely to produce the racial diversity it seeks 
to achieve.  EM Bernal, AF Cabrera and PT Terenzini ―Class-based affirmative action policies: a viable 
alternative to race-based programs?‖ (1999) Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Association for the Study of Higher Education 14. 
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stated by Weiss, the implementation of class-based affirmative action will be 
challenging if ―alternative definitions of disadvantage result in very different pools of 
eligible applicants.‖556 
 
5.5  Possible alternatives? 
 
Given that no clear research has been done on a fitting class-based affirmative 
action strategy for the South African reality, it might prove valuable to consider other 
alternatives.  One of these, albeit similarly unexplored in this field, is Sen‘s Capability 
Approach.  The reason why this approach is chosen lies in its ability to be applied to 
individual circumstances, depending on the society in question.  Different societies 
have different levels of inequalities and solutions should be sought accordingly. 
Largely influenced by Rawls, the capability approach holds that institutional support 
and social policies, as well as the ―evaluation of well-being, inequality, poverty, and 
justice‖ should be orientated in such a way that individuals have the ability to live the 
life and reach the goals they seek to achieve.557  As stated by Clark, ―neither 
opulence...nor utility...constitute or adequately represent human well-being and 
deprivation‖, which makes it clear that one‘s achieved happiness does not depend 
explicitly on monetary valuations, but on the freedoms available in attaining this state, 
if so chosen.558  Sen‘s theory consists of various elements, which include 
                                                     
556
 JA Weiss ―Race-based versus class-based affirmative action in college admissions‖ (1998) Vol 17 
No 1 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 94 103.  See also DC Malamud ―Class-based 
affirmative action: lessons and caveats‖ (1996) Vol 74 Texas Law Review 1847 1860-1895 on the 
difficulties of measuring economic inequality.     
557
 DA Clark ―The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances‖ (2005) 
Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper 32 
http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-032.pdf (accessed 7 April 2010) 1 2; I 
Robeyns ―Is Nancy Fraser‘s critique of theories of distributive justice justified?‖ (2003) 10(4) 
Constellations 538 543.  However, Sen‘s capability approach also explicitly distances itself from 
Rawlsian literature, contending that primary goods are not to be the principal index for measuring 
equality.  Rather, primary goods should be considered as ―merely means to other things, in particular 
freedom.‖ A reading of the capability approach would illustrate that justice, then, should be judged in 
the light of the ―opportunity to fulfil ends and the substantive freedom to achieve those reasoned 
ends.‖ A Sen The idea of justice (2009) 234. 
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In illustration of this point, research has shown that the Ndebele group, who attained an education 
rank of 14 of a possible 15, and an income rank of 12, scored a surprising rank of 6 out of 15 in terms 
of subjective well-being.  This is surely due to an array of factors, but implicit to these findings is that 
there is not necessarily a direct correlation between one‘s overall level of happiness and well-being on 
the one hand, and one‘s wealth and educational attainment on the other.  DF Neff ―Subjective well-
being, poverty and ethnicity in South Africa: insights from an exploratory analysis‖ (2007) 80 Social 
Indicators Research 330. 
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functionings and capabilities. In general the functionings refer to one‘s ―beings and 
doings‖, which in essence, collectively, refer to our achieved states of being, for 
example, being healthy or well-educated.559  They are the product of our efforts when 
available commodities are utilized to produce valuable outcomes.560  Capabilities, in 
turn, refer to one‘s ability to attain the functionings he or she values most and can, 
therefore, be referred to as a ―potential functioning‖.561  Sen states that a person can 
only achieve certain functionings if he or she has the necessary capability set which 
he acquires by ―applying all the feasible utilisations to all attainable commodity 
bundles.‖562  Capabilities are, therefore, the real opportunities one has to develop into 
the person one has the potential to become.563  Furthermore, the corollary to this 
informational focus for the very real options available is that we are able to identify 
the societal barriers that prevent individuals from obtaining even greater 
achievements.564  Indeed, Sen states that the capability approach indicates the 
―central relevance of the inequality of capabilities in the assessment of social 
disparities.‖565 
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 A Sen ―Justice: Means versus Freedoms‖ (1990) Vol 19 No 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 111 
113; DF Neff ―Subjective well-being, poverty and ethnicity in South Africa: insights from an exploratory 
analysis‖ (2007) 80 Social Indicators Research 318; I Robeyns ―Is Nancy Fraser‘s critique of theories 
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association, the free choice of occupation, and a variety of economic and social rights.‖   
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 DA Clark ―The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances‖ (2005) 
Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper 32 
http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-032.pdf (accessed 7 April 2010) 4. 
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http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-032.pdf (accessed 7 April 2010) 4; I Robeyns 
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DF Neff ―Subjective well-being, poverty and ethnicity in South Africa: insights from an exploratory 
analysis‖ (2007) 80 Social Indicators Research 318. 
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 A Sen The idea of justice (2009) 233; A Sen ―Justice: Means versus Freedoms‖ (1990) Vol 19 No 2 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 114; DA Clark ―The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and 
Recent Advances‖ (2005) Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper 32 
http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-032.pdf (accessed 7 April 2010) 4. 
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 A focal point of the capability approach is that human beings have the capacity to choose valuable 
capabilities themselves.  This in turn lends itself to transferring the responsibility to individuals to 
account for their actions and the choices that they have made.  Sen states that this accountability 
allows for deontological demands which allow for certain duties toward society.  A Sen The idea of 
justice (2009) 18-19. 
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 A Sen The idea of justice (2009) 232-233; MC Nussbaum ―Capabilities as fundamental 
entitlements‖ in A Kaufman (ed) Capabilities equality: basic issues and problems (2006) 44. 
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 A Sen The idea of justice (2009) 232.  For a summary on the criticisms against the capability 
approach, see DA Clark ―The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances‖ 
(2005) Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper 32 
http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-032.pdf (accessed 7 April 2010) 1 5-6. 
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Robeyns indicates that there are certain conversion factors that facilitate the 
conversion of commodities and resources into functionings.566  These are personal, 
social and environmental conversion factors.  Personal conversion factors refer to 
matters relating to the individual him/herself, such as gender, adaptability, personal 
health and intelligence.  Social conversion factors are those forces that the individual 
cannot (necessarily) change but still affect how he/she makes life choices.  Examples 
are the legal institution, social practices and norms and gender or race hierarchies.  
Lastly, environmental factors should not be left out of the equation as elements such 
as ―climate, infrastructure, institutions, [and] public goods‖ also have the potential to 
either facilitate or hinder human functionings.567   
The capability approach, too, can be contrasted with formal equality as it does not 
advocate the equal treatment of all individuals in a like manner.  Instead, it 
acknowledges that individuals have different needs and various circumstances and, 
therefore, it would take different measures for individuals to attain the same level of 
personal satisfaction.568  Thus, the aim is to ―equalize the capability each has to 
enjoy valuable activities and states of being‖ and not merely to ensure that there is 
an equal distribution of monetary assets.569   
The process of choosing which capabilities to expand and which to limit, depends on 
the needs of the individuals and society in question.  One possibility is to identify a 
list of capabilities through a process of public deliberation.  Individuals themselves 
are in the best position possible to identify the capabilities necessary to fulfil their 
sought after functionings.570  A formal process, such as participatory democracy, 
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Constellations 544. 
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Nussbaum differs in her application of the capabilities approach in that she clearly advocates a list of 
―central human capabilities‖, whereas Sen confers the deliberation on valuable capabilities onto the 
group or society in question.  The list is as follows: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and political and 
material control over one‘s environment.  MC Nussbaum ―Capabilities as fundamental entitlements‖ in 
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might be required to facilitate this activity.571  An ideal outcome of this process would 
not only depend on the quantity of opportunities supplied, but also on their quality.572  
In practice, one would start by viewing the available capability set.  In this sense it 
would become clear what role public institutions and social norms play when it comes 
to the opportunities individuals have.573  The aim of this exercise is to strive to 
expand the capabilities of all without limiting some of the existing capabilities in the 
process.574  Practically speaking, the appropriate decision-maker in this scenario is 
the state (the entity that has a positive duty to ensure a fair and reasonable capability 
set), and, therefore, it has a ―strong duty to guarantee the social basis of each 
person‘s basic human capabilities based on a principle of each person as an end.‖575  
Similar to the Rawlsian difference principle that allows for selected restrictions – 
should they be to the advantage of society as a whole – the capability approach, too, 
confers on the state the opportunity to limit certain freedoms if it is beneficial to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances‖ (2005) Global Poverty 
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Capabilities equality: basic issues and problems (2006) 49-50. 
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expansion of all human capabilities.576  Failure to do so in the first place denies all 
members of society the right to the capabilities required to achieve valued 
functionings, and secondly, it impoverishes society of the lack of full participation by 
all its members.577   
A valuable aspect of the capability approach is its compatibility with Fraser‘s theory 
on recognition and redistribution.578  The deconstruction of the referent, i.e. prevailing 
dictates or ideologies that inhibit freedom of choice is tantamount to Fraser‘s 
transformative strategies that ―aim to correct unjust outcomes...by restructuring the 
underlying generative framework.‖579  Both also advocate the importance of societal 
involvement in the decision-making process.  In the case of the capability approach, 
it is imperative that not only government elites make the decisions, but that especially 
those who are affected by the outcomes play a role in the selection of vital 
capabilities.  For Fraser, this function is served by her emphasis on participatory 
parity.580   
Robeyns argues, however, that there are four key differences between Sen‘s 
capability approach and Fraser‘s participatory parity.  In short, these are the 
following: Firstly, the capability approach is able to incorporate more issues of 
recognition by allowing certain actions that are not only functional but also serve an 
intrinsic purpose.581  She uses the example of children in the Netherlands that are not 
allowed to take the names of both their parents.  In this case the capability approach 
would, out of respect to both parent and child, allow the sought choices to be made.  
Secondly, it appears that participatory parity is simply limited to those individuals who 
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 S Liebenberg ―The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights‖ (2005) Vol 21 
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are capable of making informed decisions and can function on equal footing with 
others as peers.  Conversely, the capability approach does not ascribe to this 
―reliance on normality‖ and is geared toward enlarging the capabilities of all members 
of society, including children and the disabled.582  The third difference refers to the 
―genuine and intrinsic reasons for redistribution and recognition.‖583  In some cases 
political participation is far less of an ideal than is the mere capability to have basic 
needs such as health and rest met.  In the last instance, Robeyns states that the 
capability approach can be applied to a broader range of issues which are not only 
limited to questions of justice.  For Robeyns it is unclear whether participatory parity 
has the capacity to be applied to such an array of normative issues as the capability 
approach.584  
The operationalisation of the capability approach has seen many interesting 
developments.  This has chiefly occurred in the development of the Human 
Development Index (HDI) as part of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Report of 1990.585  The focus in human development 
is on expanding the opportunities, in particular those of poor and developing 
countries.  The Report identifies three key choices that it aims to expand, namely ―a 
long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed 
for a decent standard of living.‖586  Of the 182 listed countries, South Africa is 
currently ranked at number 129, with Namibia and Botswana ranking slightly higher.  
The second application of the capability approach, the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1), 
applies the criteria used in the HDI to measure the poverty rates according to 
predetermined thresholds.  According to the last recorded data, South Africa is 
ranked at 85th place of a possible 135 countries.  These unfortunate statistics are a 
clear indication that a lot of work still needs to be done in order to achieve a working 
capability set. 
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Should the capability approach be applied to affirmative action in South Africa, one 
might speculate that this would be preceded by an in-depth analysis of the current 
opportunities and choices that members of this society currently have.  In some 
cases, adequate education and basic levels of healthcare are not viable options at 
present.  Clark‘s research in South Africa established that when asked about their 
most basic desires, most participants vied for the following list: ―jobs, housing, 
education, income, family and friends, religion, health, food, good clothes, 
recreations and relaxation, safety and economic security.‖587  What this seems to 
indicate is that the need of developing countries to attain a basic level of adequate 
survival for its members is experienced as more pressing than seeking justice and 
procedural fairness.  The capability approach can, therefore, be used to realise social 
justice if it is aimed at addressing the large degrees of deprivation and suffering, 
instead of acquiring adequate levels of representation.  The latter of course, which is 
currently being strived for in South Africa, has to date not addressed the necessary 
lacking capabilities of South African residents, the effects of which are obvious when 
one witnesses the appalling living conditions in large numbers of townships.  In this 
respect, Nussbaum states the following: 
―[M]aking capabilities the goal entails promoting for all citizens a greater measure of 
material equality than exists in most societies, since we are unlikely to get all 
citizens above a minimum threshold of capability for truly human functioning without 
some redistributive policies.‖588 
By focusing on the needs, this respect-based approach will also inevitably benefit the 
majority of black people in South Africa.  Poverty and deprivation in South Africa 
have reached such levels of magnitude that whichever approach is chosen, it needs 
to be understood that there is no other alternative but to direct it to the most destitute. 
The capabilities approach can facilitate a process of reasoned policy-making or 
resource allocation by placing the focus on those resources that are most needed to 
enlarge the capability sets of everyone, especially those most deprived of access to 
equal opportunities.  If decided that redistributive policies need to be enacted, which 
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is already the case, the capabilities approach can be applied to the policy of 
affirmative action with a primary focus on the groups disadvantaged by apartheid 
who, as it so happens, are also the largest group of disadvantaged people.  With the 
focus being more on the material needs of the beneficiaries of affirmative action than 
on numerical representation in different spheres of government; employment and 
education, the beneficiaries should in time acquire the necessary means to 
participate on equal footing in all the spheres mentioned due to their application of 
the newly acquired capability sets with far fewer foreseeable reductions in efficiency.   
 
5.6 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has shown that a class-based affirmative action policy is better 
equipped to address the destructive consequences of apartheid.  Unfortunately, as 
was stated above, it is unclear whether this policy is capable of reaching the most 
deprived individuals in society.  Research is yet to show that a class-based 
affirmative action policy can, and will, be to the benefit of all, and not only those who 
have merely managed to scramble their way to the top ranks of the lowest classes. 
Where class-based affirmative action has to date mostly featured in selected United 
States college admission policies, the capability approach has managed to be 
actively implemented into human development research.  In this, the focus has 
shifted from purely income-based assessments to actual measurements of human 
life on a multi-dimensional scale, including dimensions such as education, healthcare 
and personal security.  Even if it is not applied as an alternative to affirmative action 
policies, South Africa would nevertheless benefit by implementing this approach in 
some shape or form in poverty relief programs.  In conclusion, affirmative action 
should rather be viewed as a change of mind-set rather than a set of mandatory 
provisions that regulate not only our day-to-day lives, but also our future.  Having a 
shared, common, goal is clearly what this country needs.    In other words, statutory 
provisions notwithstanding, affirmative action as a strategy can only succeed if the 
whole nation buys into the underlying principles. 
The next chapter will draw on the theory provided in preceding chapters in an attempt 
to clarify the affirmative action routes taken in India, Malaysia, and Brazil 
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respectively.  Each has been chosen for particular reasons and for the valuable 
lessons that they can provide.   
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Figure 1: 
 
The following is a schematic representation of the operationalization of the capability 
approach: 589 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
589
 I Robeyns ―Is Nancy Fraser‘s critique of theories of distributive justice justified?‖ (2003) Vol 10(4) 
Constellations 544. 
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Various affirmative action policies enforced worldwide share certain similarities to the 
course South Africa has chosen to take.  This chapter will explore the affirmative 
action policies of Malaysia, Brazil and India respectively.  Malaysia was chosen as an 
important case study because, just as in South Africa, the defined group of 
beneficiaries comprise the majority of the citizens.  As in the case of South Africa, 
Malaysian affirmative action is aimed at ―returning people who had been excluded 
from the political dispensation to their legitimate position.‖590  There are, however, 
stark differences in the ways in which each nation chose to implement the program 
which will be discussed at length.  This chapter will also explore the Brazilian 
application of affirmative action due to its race-based approach.  In doing so, it 
should become apparent whether the problems faced in South Africa are unique to 
South Africa, or rather a general symptom of a race-based policy.  Finally, India was 
chosen as a unique example of a class- or caste-based system.  A thorough study of 
its policy could bear valuable fruit (in terms of lessons and warnings) if South Africa 
should ever decide to introduce similar methods of addressing inequality.591  Specific 
attention will be paid to the legal and historical justifications for this policy, with 
particular reference to the beneficiaries.   
                                                     
590
 D Herman The Naked Emperor (2007) 25. 
591
 Affirmative action in India is ―aimed at addressing the hierarchical differences in the caste system.‖ 
D Herman The Naked Emperor (2007) 55. 
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The main elements of each affirmative action policy to be highlighted during each 
analysis are the following:  Who is receiving preferential treatment and why?  In 
which spheres do these policies operate?  Are the policies formally enacted, and if 
so, where?  Are there any timelines given for the duration of the policy and was it 
intended to be terminated after the said period elapsed?  This chapter will conclude 
with a few remarks on the relevance of the case studies to South Africa. 
 
6.1 Malaysia’s New Economic Policy 
 
The Malaysian and South African historical milieu have a common colonial and multi-
racial thread.592  British colonial rule had not seen to it that various structures, 
especially economic, be set up in order to ensure ethnic integration.593  This, 
                                                     
592
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 15. 
Malaysia primarily consists of three dominant ethnic groups.  These are the Malays, who are also 
known as the Bumiputras, meaning ―sons of the soil‖, as well as the Chinese and the Indians, who are 
collectively known as ―non-Bumiputras‖.  The terminology Bumiputras does not only refer to the Malay 
population, but also to all the smaller indigenous groups of Malaysia, although the Malay segment of 
this group is by far the largest proportion.  In this chapter the terms ―Bumiputra‖ and ―Malays‖ are used 
interchangeably.   
593
 J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 6 20-21.  Although it needs to be 
added that colonialists did in fact allow for partial preferential treatment of local Malays in certain 
spheres: ―allocation of land; admission to the public service; permits for the operation of certain 
businesses; and bursaries and scholarships for higher education.‖  See also E Phillips ―Positive 
Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in WG Hart (ed) Discrimination: 
the Limits of Law (1990) 345; LH Guan ―Affirmative action in Malaysia‖ (2005) Southeast Asian Affairs 
211 212.  Furthermore, Article 153 of the 1957 Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, especially 
Articles 153(1) and (2), authorises the use of preferential measures to safeguard the economic 
position of the Malays.  This section was initially intended to be a temporary measure to promote the 
interests of the native Malays and would therefore have been repealed 15 years later.  The 1969 riots 
however proved that racial tensions were still prevalent and therefore Article 153 is now permanent.  E 
Phillips ―Positive Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in Hart W G 
(ed) Discrimination: the Limits of Law (1990) 348.  The relevant sections for current purposes state the 
following:  
153 (1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the Supreme Malaysian 
Head of State) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States 
of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article.  
153(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions of Article 40 
and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this 
Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special 
provision of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure 
the reservation for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such 
proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public 
service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training 
privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any 
permit or licence for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, 
subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits and licences.  
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supported by the affirmation/endorsement of laissez-faire capitalism, made it possible 
for Chinese and Indians, citizens and non-citizens alike, to prosper economically, 
predominantly due to overall Malayan inexperience and lack of education in 
economically profitable spheres.  Malaysia finally gained independence in 1957 and 
for an extensive period since had experienced rapid economic growth.594  The 
National Alliance government, which had during this period come into power, relied 
primarily on this economic growth to smooth over the very noticeable 
disproportionate distribution of social and economic resources.595 
The Malaysian affirmative action policy, primarily known as the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was born from the 1969 riots which came as a result of large-scale Malay 
discontent due to economic suppression and political unrest.596  The local Malays 
had mostly been confined to the rural spheres of society for various reasons 
including out of their own volition.  The Chinese and Indians who came to settle had 
been largely prosperous in lucrative financial and economic activities and were 
therefore in a more advantaged position.  
The state realised that in order to harmonise the interests of the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians, it would need to take a more interventionist approach.597  The NEP was 
introduced in the Second Malaysia Plan 1971 - 1975 which stated the following:598 
―The Second Malaysia Plan represents a new strategy in which national priorities 
are re-ordered and efforts intensified to deal with the economic and social problems 
                                                     
594
 T Sowell Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study (2004) 58; FW De Klerk 
Foundation ―Affirmative action in Malaysia‖ (2004) Study by the FW de Klerk Foundation 
https://www.givengain.com/cause_data/images/2137/Study_Malaysia_AA_C.pdf (accessed 16 July 
2009) 1 1.  Although Article 8 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia of 1957 also establishes the right 
to equality (as in the case of section 9 of the South African Constitution), it nevertheless clearly states 
in Article 8(5)(c) that this does not negate ―any provision for the protection, wellbeing or advancement 
of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the reservation 
to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the public service‖.  In other words, 
just as section 9(2) of the South African Constitution is not an exception to the right of equality, but an 
integral part of it, so too does Article 8(5)(c) clearly express a defense of preferential measures. 
595
 FW De Klerk Foundation ―Affirmative action in Malaysia‖ (2004) Study by the FW de Klerk 
Foundation https://www.givengain.com/cause_data/images/2137/Study_Malaysia_AA_C.pdf 
(accessed 16 July 2009) 1. Economic growth occurred predominantly as a result of the expansion of 
the rubber and tin industries. 
596
 E Phillips ―Positive Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in Hart W 
G (ed) Discrimination: the Limits of Law (1990) 350.  For a brief summary of the factors that gave rise 
to the 1969 riots see J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 21-22.   
597
 J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 22. 
598
 RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 235 
239. 
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confronting the country.  Economic policies and development will be considered in 
their relationship to social development in general and the over-riding need for 
national unity in particular.  The strategy takes full recognition of these problems and 
needs in a multi-racial society.  It incorporates policies and measures to eradicate 
poverty through raising income levels and generating new employment 
opportunities, and to restructure Malaysian society to correct racial economic 
imbalance.‖599 
The NEP had the principal objective of creating ―national unity through greater 
emphasis on social integration and more equitable distribution of income and 
opportunities.‖600 The two prongs set out in the Second Malaysia Plan 1971 - 1975 
deemed fit to achieve this were the following:  firstly to reduce the instance of poverty 
of all Malaysians, and secondly, in a more redistributive sense, to correct structural 
economic inequalities by reducing and eliminating the identification of race with 
economic function.601  Similar to the Rawlsian difference principle, this was to occur 
without detriment to any of the existing groups.602  In other words, Malaysia aimed to 
address its ―deep-seated structural problems‖ with a policy which was premised on a 
rapidly growing economy which was understood to support its redistributive 
policies.603  Economic growth was used as an aid to address interethnic inequality as 
well as by supplying the government with the necessary resources to fund affirmative 
action endeavours.604  The ultimate goal was to ensure that the Malays, or 
Bumiputras, would have 30% of the corporate ownership by 1990.605  It was believed 
that poverty had a distinctive racial and geographical character.   
                                                     
599
 Second Malaysia Plan 1971 – 1975 ―Chapter I: The New Development Strategy‖ Kuala Lumpur 
(1971) 2. 
600
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 25; HK 
Leong ―Dynamics of policy-making in Malaysia: the formulation of the New Economic Policy and the 
National Development Policy‖ (1992) Vol 14 No 2 Asian Journal of Public Administration 204 210. 
601
 Second Malaysia Plan 1971 – 1975 ―Chapter I: The New Development Strategy‖ (1971) Kuala 
Lumpur 2.  For a comprehensive account of the two prongs see I Emsley The Malaysian Experience 
of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 27-49; FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in 
Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ (1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 189 
201-204; RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 
239-240. 
602
 Federal Constitution of Malaysia Article 153(8); RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic 
Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 235 240. 
603
 J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 21. 
604
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 83. 
605
 J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 22; T Sowell Affirmative Action 
Around the World: An Empirical Study (2004) 61; I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative 
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The NEP had a fairly smooth initiation into the Malaysian political arena.  Several 
Chinese bureaucrats were involved in the drafting process and were mandated to 
look out for the interests of their Chinese counterparts.606  Other mechanisms used to 
pre-empt any opposition were intimidation ploys that the past riots would be repeated 
if national unity was not achieved.607  The state also appealed to the financially stable 
Chinese and Indians to recognise the imbalanced economic circumstances of the 
majority of Malays.608  The ―carrot and stick‖ metaphor is quite suitable in this 
scenario as the Chinese and Indians were invited to join the coalition government as 
an incentive to share political power.609  Furthermore the state created the 
Rukunegara ideology in an attempt to consolidate national unity and to support the 
NEP.610  As was stated earlier, the NEP operated successfully in a strong and 
healthy economy, but during times of economic recession, the government prevented 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 51; HK Leong ―Dynamics of policy-making in Malaysia: the 
formulation of the New Economic Policy and the National Development Policy‖ (1992) Vol 14 No 2 
Asian Journal of Public Administration 206, 211; FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To 
Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ (1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 201; E Phillips 
―Positive Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in WG Hart (ed) 
Discrimination: the Limits of Law (1990) 351; AS Murphy ―Affirmative action in a deeply divided 
society: lessons for South Africa from Malaysia‘s successful redistribution policies‖ (2005) Proceedings 
of the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, University 
of California, Los Angeles, USA http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40408_index.html (accessed 16 
August 2010) 1 14.  Before this clear target was set the Malays owned no more than 2% of Malaysia‘s 
corporate equity.   
606
 A clear distinction between the Malaysian and South African affirmative action policies is the quid 
pro quo bargain that was reached between the Malays and the non-Malays.  The latter agreed to the 
induction of Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia as they were promised citizenship 
―based on the principle of jus soli if they did.  D Sabbagh ―Elements toward a comparative analysis of 
affirmative action policies‖ (2004) Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/6/3/pages59633/p59633-1.php 
(13 July 2009) 1 4. White South Africans, on the other hand, did not have this or any similar incentive 
other than that it was the right thing to do. 
607
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 207. 
608
 Emsley states that in 1973 ―78 per cent of all poor were Bumiputra.‖ I Emsley The Malaysian 
Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 26. 
609
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 214-215. 
610
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 214-215; I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative 
Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 20.  The Rukunegara ―declares the national objectives and 
values and the fundamental principles to guide the citizens and the nation, has evolved from close 
consultation and deliberation in the National Consultative Council and represents a national 
consensus and commitment to the task of creating a united, socially just, economically equitable and 
progressive Malaysian nation.‖ Second Malaysia Plan 1971 – 1975 ―Chapter I: The New Development 
Strategy‖ (1971) Kuala Lumpur 2-3. 
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uprisings by the Chinese and the Indians by ―relax[ing] the ethnic equity requirements 
of the Industrial Coordination Act.‖611      
Great care was taken to ensure the longevity of the NEP.  Amongst others, the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act was implemented in 1971 to outlaw any discussions or 
debates on ―sensitive‖ issues regarding the government‘s preferential policies.612  
Following this, the 1948 Sedition Act was amended to stipulate that questioning of 
any of the preferential policies will be considered an offence and is punishable by 
law.613  The Bumiputra acquisition of 30% equity was also facilitated by the Industrial 
Co-ordination Act of 1975.  Unlike BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) in South 
Africa, this legislation only focused on certain emerging industries and imposed a 
30% Bumiputra equity share of all outputs.614 
The NEP was designed to grant Malays preferential treatment in various spheres, 
including education, government employment and the private sector by means of 
quotas and special assistance.615   In practice, the NEP entailed the following: 
―modernization of rural life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the 
creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all 
levels of operations.‖616  Further transformation occurred by means of the National 
Language Act of 1967 which established Bahasa Malaysia as the national language.  
Consequently a timeline was given for the restructuring of the educational sector so 
                                                     
611
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 216. 
612
 E Phillips E ―Positive Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in WG 
Hart (ed) Discrimination: the Limits of Law (1990) 351. 
613
 Sedition Act of 1948 section 3(1)(f); Fan Yew Teng v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 235; I Emsley 
The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 20; J Castle 
―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malaysia‖ 
(1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 23; E Phillips ―Positive Discrimination in 
Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom‖ in WG Hart (ed) Discrimination: the Limits of Law 
(1990) 350-352. 
614
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 51-52.  
Duties of compliance with the Industrial Co-ordination Act were however relaxed when it was shown 
that their equities and value of fixed assets were below certain levels (which were later increased as a 
result of economic growth), as well as in cases of export-based industries. 
615
 T Sowell Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study (2004) 61; J Castle ―Affirmative 
action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 
South African Journal of Labour Relations 22; D Sabbagh ―Elements toward a comparative analysis of 
affirmative action policies‖ (2004) Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/6/3/pages59633/p59633-1.php 
(13 July 2009) 6; AS Murphy ―Affirmative action in a deeply divided society: lessons for South Africa 
from Malaysia‘s successful redistribution policies‖ (2005) Proceedings of the 2005 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, University of California, Los Angeles, USA 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40408_index.html (accessed 16 August 2010) 14. 
616
 RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 239. 
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that within a prescribed period all education was to be converted to the Malay 
medium instead of English.617  Major efforts were also made to enable Malays who 
were predominantly settled in the rural areas to migrate to the urban areas where 
they would be better placed to benefit economically.618  Due to the interplay between 
race and geographical location, it was believed that a superficial upsurge of rural 
incomes would not only be costly, but would also not comply with the ideal of 
eliminating the identification of race with economic function.  Instead, a more 
transformative approach was followed by restructuring the composition of society so 
that the increase of income, i.e. the eradication of poverty, would in effect be a 
product of this transformation.619  Achieving this end was no menial task as it entailed 
major ―investment in Bumiputra human capital by a programme of education and 
training‖, as well as the creation of job opportunities for the educated and trained 
Malays in the urban areas.620       
Of all the efforts made, education was key to ―modernise society, to equalise 
opportunities for all and to promote national unity.‖621  In fact, the role that education 
came to play in elevating Malay participation in commercial enterprises cannot be 
overstated.  As in South Africa, many Malays in rural areas had limited access to 
adequate educational facilities that would have advanced their opportunities in life 
and would have enabled them to compete on equal footing with the Chinese and the 
Indians.622  In order to overcome this, the Malaysian government significantly 
increased public expenditure on education and instituted racial quotas in tertiary 
                                                     
617
 D Sabbagh ―Elements toward a comparative analysis of affirmative action policies‖ (2004) Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/6/3/pages59633/p59633-1.php 
(13 July 2009) 6. 
618
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 37.  In 
fact, it was thought that urbanisation would allow rural Malays access to improved healthcare and 
education, a wider variety of employment opportunities and finally a ―flexible hierarchy in which those 
of talent may ascend.‖  I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South 
Africa (1996) 48. 
619
 According to Emsley the following actions were taken in order to address the undertaking of the 
eradication of poverty: increasing rural productivity; upgrading education and health in rural areas; 
restructuring the agriculture industry; and rapid economic growth. I Emsley The Malaysian Experience 
of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 26-35. 
620
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 37. 
621
 J Castle ―Affirmative action in three developing countries: lessons from Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Malaysia‖ (1995) Vol 19 South African Journal of Labour Relations 23. 
622
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 38.  
Primary, secondary and tertiary educational facilities were developed and improved for the Malays.  In 
terms of tertiary opportunities, special technical colleges were instituted primarily to upgrade the 
Malay‘s technological and scientific knowledge-base.   
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institutions to increase the racial representations of Malays.623  This was made 
possible by the growing economy.624  Underlying structures were further transformed 
by the substitution of the standard English language as medium of instruction for 
indigenous Bahasa Malaysia.625  Many of these efforts did not come without 
unfortunate consequences.  Malaysia experienced its own ―brain drain‖ during the 
periods of transformation, but unlike the South African example, this blow was 
softened by the return of most Chinese and Indian graduates after receiving tertiary 
education elsewhere.626 
It was clear that most Malays did not have the necessary training to compete on 
equal footing with their Chinese and Indian counterparts, and therefore special 
agencies were set up to function in the interest of individuals by acquiring existing 
shares and businesses.627  These institutions were used as a means to achieve the 
desired quotas and goals of the NEP and would do so until Malays are qualified and 
experienced enough to take over the business ventures and shares.628  These 
agencies offered the following support to Malays: ―training and education, including 
scholarships; managerial and technical advice; credit facilities; establishment of 
commercial, industrial transportation…provision of commercial premises, hotels and 
offices for Malays [and entering] into joint ventures with domestic investors.‖629  
What sets the Malaysian affirmative action apart from many international 
counterparts, but which relates it to South African affirmative action, is that it confers 
preferential treatment to the majority of the members of society.  In the Malaysian 
                                                     
623
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 39-40.  
However, some of these measures were later relaxed as it produced an over-representation of Malays 
which caused racial resentment. 
624
 Malaysia was in such a fortunate position in terms of added resources due to the growing 
economy, that it had an approximate ―sevenfold increase in real resource flows over the 1970-85 
period.‖ I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 39. 
625
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 40. 
626
 I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 41-42. 
627
 FH Abdullah ―Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty‖ 
(1997) Vol XV No 2 Ethnic Studies Report 203; RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic 
Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 243-250; I Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative 
Action: Lessons for South Africa (1996) 56.  These agencies were the following: The National Trading 
Corporation (PERNAS), the Council of Trust for Indigenous People (MARA), State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs), Urban Development Authority (UDA), Federal Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (FAMA), and the National Equity Corporation (PNB). 
628
 RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 244. 
629
 RS Milne ―The politics of Malaysia‘s New Economic Policy‖ (1976) Vol 49 No 2 Pacific Affairs 245.  
Unfortunately this endeavour was not without its drawbacks.  Issues stemmed from duplication of 
functions between institutions to corruption and ―pervasions of their objectives‖ (246-247). 
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example the Bumiputras roughly consist of 67% of society.630  Similarly, Black South 
Africans make up more or less 79% of all South Africans.631  Another crucial 
resemblance between the two nations is that the groups placed at the receiving end 
of these preferential policies are also the groups that have enacted these policies.632  
The reason for the necessity of each policy, however, differs markedly.  The NEP 
came as a result of the Bumiputra‘s economic handicap relative to the Chinese and 
Indian economic success.  As stated earlier, South African affirmative action was 
compelled due to decades of discrimination and subordination. 
The NEP was originally devised as a 20 year policy that would elapse in 1990.633  
Despite the initial expiration date, the New Economic Policy was later in 1991 
replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP) in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-
1995 which continued to provide preferential treatment to the Bumiputras.634  
Due to the fact that Malaysia has had its NEP/NDP policy for over forty years, it is 
possible to assess whether the implementation of this policy can be considered 
largely successful.  It is therefore also possible to identify any spheres that are still 
lacking in adequate development, if any. 
As a result of the introduction of preferential policies, there has been a considerable 
increase in middle-class Bumiputras.635  This group (as well as Malaysia overall) has 
also encountered a great deal of reduction in overall poverty, although new poverty-
stricken groups have emerged.636  Fortunately this was not as a result of the 
NEP/NDP but rather due to external economic pressures.  Despite this, advocates of 
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 Malaxi ―A 28,96m people in year 2010‖   
http://www.malaxi.com/population_size_age_structure2001_2010.html (accessed 28 September 
2010). 
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 Statistics South Africa: Mid-year population estimates 2010 
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September 2010). 
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 D Sabbagh ―Elements toward a comparative analysis of affirmative action policies‖ (2004) Annual 
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the NEP/NDP policy argue that the role of affirmative action was not to alleviate the 
state of affairs for the poor, but rather to fortify cooperation between ethnic groups.637  
The Bumiputras have also received major educational benefits as a result of 
improvements in the educational sector which allowed them, in time, to compete 
equally with the Chinese and Indian elite in economic affairs.638  These 
improvements in the socio-economic standing of the Bumiputras have to a large 
extent served the goal of eliminating the identification of race with economic function 
by ensuring adequate representation of Bumiputras in all spheres of society, 
especially in the economy and upper-management.  Many of these advantages 
would not have occurred had it not been for the favourable economic climate and 
strong economic growth.639  Continuous foreign investment and the decision to shield 
the private sector allowed the economy to grow at the necessary rate that would 
allow the state to have access to funds that would supply the revenue for affirmative 
action and general poverty programmes. 
Despite being known world-wide as the affirmative action ―success story‖ Malaysia 
nevertheless had a number of setbacks.  For instance, the agencies which were 
established to promote Bumiputra interests were not as successful in fulfilling their 
mandates.  Bumiputra capital ownership has to date risen to an estimated 20%, 
which is short of its 30% goal.640  Various reasons have been put forward for this 
failure.  For one, rent-seeking behaviour spurred what is known as the ―Ali Baba‖ 
phenomenon.  This refers to Malay business officials acting as frontmen (Ali) in order 
to acquire contracts and licenses and thereafter handing them over or selling them to 
non-Malays (Baba) for a profit.641  Furthermore, trade officials and certain Malay elite 
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have largely benefitted from government concessions which in turn lead to a ―culture 
of cronyism‖ and a lack of incentive to perform.642  Actions of this genus limited the 
distributive advantages of affirmative action to the Malay elite and prevented the 
expected trickledown effect to poor Malays.643  Secondly, only the individuals who 
had access to the benefits on offer could acquire capital ownership.  Those at the 
bottom socio-economically speaking were often not fortunate enough or in any 
position to do so. 
Malaysia also experienced a period of Chinese ―brain drain‖ as South Africa did and 
continues to do with white and other professional South Africans leaving the country.  
The major difference however is that most studies tend to indicate that students who 
left Malaysia later returned upon completion of their studies abroad.  Unfortunately 
the same cannot be said for professionals who left Malaysia.  Sowell states that 
though hard to determine, ―an estimated $12 billion worth of capital left Malaysia‖ 
between 1976 and 1985.644  
A major criticism of Malaysia‘s racial policies is geared towards their counter-
democratic sedition laws which criminalise what could be healthy political debates on 
the efficiency and need for the policies in the first place.645  These draconian laws 
stifle civil society‘s ability to grow and develop and through a process of free political 
participation, choose what it deems just and equitable. Other problems that Malaysia 
has encountered in recent times include the decline of educational standards, the 
increase of intra-ethnic inequalities, and the increase of xenophobia.646 
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In essence, Malaysia has been tasked with the protection of its locals against the 
economic prowess and ingenuity of other competing nations.  Brazil, on the other 
hand, with its dark history of slavery, has had to overcome covert institutional 
discrimination. 
 
6.2 Brazil’s affirmative action policy 
 
The Brazilian government structure operates as a federation.  The various states 
within its borders are therefore entitled to enact and enforce their own legislation and 
policy, which should be in line with the Brazilian constitution.  Because of this, Brazil 
does not have a single set of affirmative action measures that apply throughout.  
Instead, a national policy is prescribed and each state can apply the measures in 
such manner as it sees fit, provided that it be in accordance with national policy.  This 
is clearly different to the approach that South Africa has taken where the affirmative 
action policy was visibly enacted within national legislation such as the Employment 
Equity Act, the Labour Relations Act and the Public Procurement Act, for instance, 
which stemmed from its authorisation in the South African Constitution‘s equality 
clause. 
Brazil does not share the same colonial past with South Africa, Malaysia or India.  
Instead, Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822 but had a long history of 
slavery which was finally abolished in 1888.647  Upon the increase of slave 
importations in the 15th century, the racial demographics of Brazil gradually began to 
change.  A once predominantly white culture soon had a vast number of black 
members.  It is no surprise that as time went by the process of miscegenation 
produced a wide spectrum of complexions ranging from pale (which is closely 
associated with being white) to very dark skinned (which is associated with being 
black).  After a period of authoritarian military rule (1964-1985), during which time 
antiracist propaganda was expressly forbidden, Brazil finally obtained its democratic 
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status in 1985.648  Subsequently, the Brazilian constitution found its footing in 
1988.649  Prior to this, several policies and practices saw to it that people of colour did 
not receive the necessary consideration.  Furthermore, there were definite attempts 
to increase the White population by ―encouraging European immigration‖ during the 
late nineteenth century lasting until the mid-twentieth century, but this came to a 
rapid end at the advent of the Second World War as the Brazilian elite found it 
unfavourable to be associated with Nazi supremacist ideologies.650  Ever since, and 
especially since the democratic period, Brazil has come to embrace a society 
consisting of a myriad of races but in the process has turned a blind eye to severe 
racial inequalities.  These inequalities are, as in South Africa, exacerbated by the 
concomitant social hardships experienced by these groups.  Black people, in both 
nations, are generally faced with being ―lower-class, lacking opportunities, working as 
a servant, and living in bad neighborhoods.‖651 
As Afro-Brazilian movements became more vocal and mobilised in campaigning for 
the rights of those suppressed by a system of pseudo-equality (albeit not nearly to 
the same extent as South African liberation movements) it became clear that positive 
action would be needed to overcome this.652  It was not until an international event, 
namely the 2001 United Nations Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa, that 
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Brazil would finally give affirmative action policies serious consideration.653  During its 
participation at this event, the Brazilian government, and more specifically the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development and the Ministry of Justice, declared that it would 
adopt affirmative action measures in the form of percentage quotas in order to grant 
black Brazilians adequate representation in higher education and public 
employment.654  In 2002 the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had 
been campaigning for the rights of Afro-Brazilians ever since being elected, signed 
the National Program for Affirmative Action after a public admission that Brazil is not 
the peaceful racial democracy it presents itself to be.655  Htun, in defining ―racial 
democracy‖, states that it entails ―that the absence of segregation, a history of race 
mixing and the social recognition of intermediate racial categories have upheld a 
unique, multi-tiered racial order.‖656  In South Africa however, it is preferred that one 
rather refer to the creation of a non-racial democracy.  The difference in each case is 
that whereas South Africa is striving for this ideal, Brazil had contended for decades 
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that it had already achieved such a state.  As part of the National Program for 
Affirmative Action a Presidential Decree introduced in 2002 relating to federal public 
administration foresaw a number of goals for its enactment.  Firstly, as in South 
Africa, it envisaged the necessary representation of affirmative action beneficiaries in 
senior administrative posts.657  Secondly it called for ―clauses of adherence to the 
program in terms of negotiated transfer of resources within the Federal Public 
Administration.‖658  Thirdly, special benefits would be conferred in public procurement 
to companies complying with program goals and in the fourth instance special terms 
and conditions would prescribe the percentage goals for affirmative action 
beneficiaries in contracts between governing agencies and international bodies.659   
Other states and educational institutions have added that the policy should serve a 
compensatory role as well as ―contribute to the diversity of experiences and 
perspectives on campus, and raise understanding of what it means to be black in 
Brazil.‖660  This abstruse statement presupposes that those who are by definition 
(and by definition only) black, would necessarily embody what it signifies to be of 
Afro-Brazilian decent.  As indicated earlier, most Brazilians had erroneously thought 
of themselves as a racial democracy void of any racial issues and would therefore 
not spontaneously act black. 
There are various arguments that support the necessity for an affirmative action 
policy in Brazil.  For one, this is a nation with deep-seated racial inequalities and the 
concomitant social injustices that underlie these disparities have made attempts at 
democratic participation increasingly difficult, especially in spheres of ―education, 
status, and employment.‖661  Currently, the Brazilian population is estimated to 
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consist of roughly equal percentages of whites (Branco) on the one hand, and mixed-
race (pardo) and blacks (preto) on the other.662  All people of colour, and therefore 
everyone except for white Brazilians, are considered Afro-Brazilians.  This group 
does not enjoy proportionate representation within various governing bodies or public 
and private employment.663  Furthermore, this group also makes up the larger part of 
the group of poor Brazilians.664  A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that it 
is the result of inadequate government delineation of the various races that are 
represented in Brazil which in turn lead to a lack of collective action by various racial 
groups which would have campaigned for adequate representation in all spheres of 
society .665   
In order to overcome this tacit oppression, a race-based policy that would favour 
people of colour was thought to be the best remedy.666  But what makes this policy 
remarkable is that because of generations of inter-mixing between different races, it 
is no longer possible to determine a person‘s race with certainty.  The policy 
therefore grants possible beneficiaries the opportunity to identify themselves as 
members of a certain race.  The Brazilian government also saw to it that preferential 
policies are implemented in favour of women and disabled individuals as well.667 
The Brazilian affirmative action policy is based on a system of quotas.668  Various 
percentages have been specified for Afro-Brazilians in a range of spheres.  These 
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include federal government employment, reservations in special government projects 
aimed at skills development, and scholarships.669  To prevent quota benefits from 
going to uneducated and under-skilled recipients, the Brazilian government 
implemented the Bolsa Escola to provide special school attendance grants to the 
poor (who are mostly Afro-Brazilian) to encourage those in need to send their 
children to school.670  Several Brazilian (public and private, and state and federal) 
higher education institutions have also voluntarily enforced the quota system in 
admissions to increase the number of Afro-Brazilian students.671  These include, for 
example, selected reservations set out by the Ministry of Foreign Relations in the Rio 
Branco Institute, a highly reputable institution for training future diplomats, and 
quotas in universities in Rio de Janeiro, the State University of Bahia and the 
University of Brasília.672  The Federal government also instructed all educational 
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institutions to include ―African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture‖ in school 
curricula.673  In 2002 a law was passed which called for the implementation of 20% 
quotas for Afro-Brazilians in ―all civil service entrance competitions, public and private 
universities and funding for poor students, and compulsory affirmative action 
programs for private businesses competing for public funds and commissions.‖674  
Moreover, the Federal Government was concerned about the public image of 
candidates in political parties and instructed ―public authorities to engage in publicity 
campaigns promoting positive images of this population.‖675  Even the arts were 
included in affirmative action measures.  Quotas were introduced for Afro-Brazilians 
starring in television programs and television advertisements.676   
Since 2002 a range of councils, special bodies and task forces have been created to 
oversee the implementation of affirmative action policies as well as the protection of 
Afro-Brazilians from various forms of racism.  This includes the Federal Council to 
Combat Racism and the Special Federal Secretariat for Policies Promoting Racial 
Equality.677  The Brazilian Constitution has also formally criminalised any forms of 
racism for which there is now no statute of limitations and no bail can be posted.678 
The new policies did not come without any resistance from opposing groups.679  
Many felt that the policies were outright racism and that ―any criterion other than merit 
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is unjust in principle.‖680  But this is not the biggest obstacle that the state had to face.  
As mentioned earlier, centuries of miscegenation has produced a nation with various 
degrees of ―blackness‖, which makes it exceptionally difficult to differentiate between 
who is black and who is pardo (mixed-race).681  Officials and panels who have been 
tasked with identifying beneficiaries for quotas have had to resort to superficial 
methods and non-beneficiaries of affirmative action policies have been known to ―try 
their luck‖ by applying for benefits.682  It is possible for a person whose complexion is 
dark enough to gain unwarranted access to affirmative action benefits because 
applicants are self-classified as the race of their choice.  In truth, matters of race are 
predominantly relegated to physical appearance, rather than ―other criteria to define 
the black identity‖.683  The university vestibular (entrance exam) is the main 
instrument used to determine acceptance within the university.  Opinions of the 
negation of meritocracy could arguably be unfounded because of the institutional 
discrepancies within the Brazilian educational system.  Some students, generally 
white, are better prepared specifically for the vestibular than those who did not enjoy 
the same standard of primary and secondary education.684  This points more to 
institutional discrimination from a younger age than it does to the undesirability of 
higher educational standards.  Therefore, socio-economic policies aimed at 
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eradicating poverty, instead of race-based preferential measures, are in theory more 
likely to address this problem.  Some researchers have found that despite quotas 
being introduced to increase the number of Afro-Brazilian students at universities and 
to diversify the racial composition, the number of Afro-Brazilian students who were 
admitted only showed a slight increase.685  They further indicate that those who were 
admitted would most likely have attended a university, even in the absence of 
quotas, and that, in addition, affirmative action did not have a significant impact on 
the wage discrepancy between Afro-Brazilians and white people after leaving 
university.686   
Others have warned that the attempt at imitation of United States racial policies is 
inappropriate for the Brazilian social structure as the fluidity of race also fosters a 
harmonious and complementary dispensation.687  Though it is unclear whether it is a 
positive or a negative outcome, the implementation of quotas have had a significant 
impact on the Brazilian society‘s consciousness of race.688  Whilst some have 
rediscovered their cultural heritage, others resent the classifications. 
Not all opponents of the policy are white Brazilians.  Some Afro-Brazilians have taken 
exception to the quotas by arguing that it is insulting, insinuates that they are 
incompetent and more importantly, ―fail[s] to address the cause of black exclusion, 
which [is] social not racial‖.689  For this reason Brazil too has had proponents of need-
based policies who insist that socio-economic standing should be the criterion for 
preferential treatment, and not race.690 
It is therefore essential to have an affirmative action policy that is capable of 
addressing systemic injustices that perpetuate racial injustices.  Moreover, some also 
consider the Brazilian affirmative action policy to be disjunctive in its application as 
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there is no uniform application of the policy in all the government bureaus.691  This 
facilitates insubstantial and ineffective implementation and prevents measures that 
were initially envisioned to accelerate the formation of a racial democracy from 
achieving this goal.   
Ultimately, Brazil has managed its preferential policies as fairly as it could see fit, 
considering the various obstacles.  However, racial issues are still exacerbated by 
impediments created by white upper management.  Unless the Brazilian government 
can find a way to change this state of affairs / status quo, Afro-Brazilians will continue 
to struggle for equal recognition.  As Telles states, ―Brazil needs to develop a set of 
policies to reduce Brazil‘s hyperinequality with race-conscious affirmative action that 
can break the glass ceiling and alleviate racist culture.‖692 
Unlike Brazil, the Indian society is not structured around issues of race or ethnicity.  
Here, however, society is ordered into a strict hierarchy according to historical 
occupations. 
 
6.3  India’s positive discrimination 
 
The Indian national system of positive discrimination was set in motion by British 
colonialists during the late 19th century.693  In fact, it has been said that India possibly 
has the ―largest affirmative action program in the world.‖694  This system was 
originally based on the prescribed castes into which the Hindu religion divides society 
which ―assumes that certain traits, qualities, functions, characteristics or powers are 
                                                     
691
 M Htun ―From ―racial democracy‖ to affirmative action: changing state policy on race in Brazil‖ 
(2004) Vol 39 No 1 Latin American Research Review 84. 
692
 EE Telles Race in another America: the significance of skin color in Brazil (2004) 250. 
693
 J Fobanjong Understanding the backlash against affirmative action (2001) 154-155, 158; J Heyer 
and NG Jayal ―The challenge of positive discrimination in India‖ (2009) CRISE Working Paper No. 55 
1 3.  MS Moses ―Moral and instrumental rationales for affirmative action in five national contexts‖ 
(2010) Vol 39 No 3 Educational Researcher 216; TE Weisskopf Affirmative action in the United States 
and India: a comparative perspective (2004) 11; T Sowell Affirmative action around the world: an 
empirical study (2004) 23.  Although India gained its independence in 1947 and formally adopted 
affirmative action measures soon thereafter, certain individual states in India had already adopted 
similar measures by 1895 and by the 1920‘s it had become more common.  J Fobanjong 
Understanding the backlash against affirmative action (2001) 154; J Heyer and NG Jayal ―The 
challenge of positive discrimination in India‖ (2009) CRISE Working Paper No. 55 3. 
694
 D Kumar ―The affirmative action debate in India‖ (1992) Vol 32 Asian Survey 290 290. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
inherent in and definitive of each of the varnas.‖695  Accordingly the varnas, a 
hierarchy of five castes, consisted of the ―Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), 
Vaisyas (traders), Sudras (laborers), and Ati-Suderas (those who do the ―unclean‖ 
work, who are ritually ―polluting‖).696  It is therefore not surprising that the Brahmans 
also dominated the political and economic sectors of India.697  Within the varnas 
there is an additional hierarchy of thousands of jati, or castes, which further 
predefines one‘s status within society.698 
Upon independence in 1947 and the adoption of the Indian Constitution, India 
formally established an affirmative action system that would protect the rights of 
certain backward groups and members of lower castes, namely the Scheduled 
Castes, otherwise known as the ―untouchables‖ or the Dalits and the Scheduled 
Tribes, otherwise known as the Adivasis.699  Historically Scheduled Castes were 
excluded from various forms of activities necessary to participate equally in society.  
These included certain occupations as well as ―access to property rights, education 
and civil rights and all source of livelihood (except manual labour, and certain 
occupations which were considered to be polluting.)‖700  As in the case of racial 
discrimination in South Africa, the caste system was notorious for its institutionalised 
discrimination against members of lower castes and affirmative action, or positive 
discrimination, was therefore necessary to ―outweigh the imbalances of the past.‖701  
In fact, this all-encompassing discrimination was not merely limited to caste.  
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Individuals were also victimised on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender and region.702  
This affected the recipients of these prejudices in all spheres of life.  Though some 
have managed to acquire economic strength and occupational success, the stigma of 
untouchability is inescapable.703  The following list describes the typical 
discriminatory practices that backward groups had to face:  
―(1) denial of access to public facilities, wells, schools, post offices and courts; (2) 
prohibition against entering Hindu temples; (3) exclusion from professional 
occupations; (4) residential segregation; (5) denial of access to restaurants, theatres 
and barber shops; (6) prohibition from using horses, bicycles, umbrellas, or wearing 
jewelry; (7) restrictions involving maintaining prescribed distance from persons of 
higher caste while on roads and streets.‖704  
Although all forms of ―untouchability‖ have been declared illegal in 1949, societal 
discrimination in this regards nevertheless remains a threat.705  In fact, pervasive 
negative stereotyping of certain castes still persists to this day, mostly due to historic 
practices and beliefs and the concomitant status disadvantage, and so much so that 
this necessitated the adoption of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities Act) 33 of 1989.706  The consequences of these enduring 
stigmatisations have been reported to include ―various aspects of violence, exclusion 
and rejection.‖707   
Fortunately the state accepted its responsibility to protect the interests of certain 
organised groups.  This sense of obligation is evident from the phrasing of Section 46 
of the Indian Constitution which states the following: ―The State shall promote with 
special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the 
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people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and 
shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.‖708  For this 
reason sections 15(4) and 16(4) of the Indian Constitution ensure special 
reservations for ―socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.‖709  However, it soon became clear that 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes were not the only Indian groups 
who were experiencing social and economic hardships.  A commission was 
appointed to investigate this issue and in 1981 the Mandal Commission published 
their report which recommended that another group of beneficiaries receive 
preferential treatment.710  This group was identified as the ―Other Backward Classes‖, 
also known as the OBCs.711  Unfortunately this report was not received very well from 
the upper-caste Hindus when Prime Minister V.P. Singh indicated that the 
recommendations were to be implemented in 1990.  This resulted in major riots and 
even mass suicides.712  Nevertheless the Indian Supreme Court finally ruled that the 
Other Backward Classes will also receive preferential treatment, but added the 
caveat that this will be subject to certain limitations.713  The most prominent of these 
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is that the upper crust of this group, known as the ―creamy layer‖, will be excluded 
from any preferential treatment as they are already socially and economically 
prosperous due to ―land reform policies in the 1970s and partly as a result of 
effectively mobilising political power‖ and therefore are in no need of any 
advancement.714  Furthermore, the Indian Supreme Court also ruled that national 
reservations would be limited to 50%, and as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes were already receiving roughly 23% of the reservations, the Other Backward 
Classes would only receive 27% of the remaining reservations, notwithstanding the 
fact that they made up nearly 52% of the population at that stage.715  Women too 
have also been recognised as deserving of preferential treatment.716  There is 
currently a 33% quota of women‘s reservations at local government level, an 
instance that was no mean feat to accomplish.717  Disabled people however do not 
enjoy the same legislative or judicial protection.718 
Religion also plays a significant role in India‘s positive discrimination scheme.  
Reservations are only applicable to Hindu Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.  
Christian or Muslim Indian citizens who fall under the OBC category fortunately do 
qualify for preferential treatment but Dalit Muslims or Dalit Christians however do 
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not.719  This has been a crucial point of contention as this could lead to various forms 
of overlapping disadvantage.  For instance, someone may experience socio-
economic and status disadvantages for firstly being a member of a lower caste, 
secondly for being a Muslim or a Christian and thirdly for being a women.    
One of the most marked differences between Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes on the one hand, and Other Backward Classes on the other, is the ability to 
identify and distinguish them from one another.  Unlike Other Backward Classes, 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have an identity ―outside the realm of 
affirmative action.‖720  The term ―Other Backward Classes‖ was created as a 
collective noun for a variety of Indian citizens who were socio-economically 
disadvantaged.  Accordingly, the group of affirmative action beneficiaries once again, 
as in the case of South Africa (and Malaysia above) comprise of the majority of the 
Indian population.721 
In India the aim has been to provide support to the oppressed classes and castes as 
a means to improve and expand their social and economic positions, as well as to 
ensure democratic participation in all societal activities, to ―overcome historic patterns 
of discrimination and backwardness‖ and to make up for centuries of injustice and 
oppression.722  It also aims to subvert the convergence of power, political and 
otherwise, in the hands of a concentrated caste elite whilst simultaneously elevating 
a number of backward castes and classes to elite status.723  Consequently, inter-
group economic disparities are addressed by focussing affirmative action policies on 
the individuals identified as victims of the caste system for centuries as well as the 
economically downtrodden.724     
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The Indian affirmative action scheme currently operates by means of reservations 
and quotas which are to a large extent based on the preferential group‘s percentage 
of the population, except in the case of Other Backward Classes as indicated 
above.725  These preferences are applied in the spheres of public education 
institutions,726 especially in university admissions, appointments in the public sector 
or ―government appointments at union and state level‖ (which has the largest total of 
the workforce in India),727 as well as ―congressional representation‖ in the House of 
the People and in the Legislative Assembly in the case of Scheduled groups.728  
More specifically, educational benefits entail ―exemption from school fees, provision 
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ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.  
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of stipends, scholarships and book grants, merit scholarships‖ and special coaching 
in certain cases.729   
What sets its policy starkly apart from South Africa‘s affirmative action policy is that 
the private sector is completely excluded from positive discrimination responsibilities 
in so far as they do not receive government subsidies or monetary assistance of any 
kind.730  As indicated above, certain shared physical characteristics between various 
castes (and classes) often make it exceedingly difficult to differentiate between them.  
This system operates by way of individuals selecting predetermined race and caste 
checkboxes during application and census stages.731  Individuals are expected to 
register their membership of specific social categories as a means of acquiring the 
benefits bestowed to the aforementioned groups.732  For obvious reasons it is not 
incomprehensible that this procedure can be easily manipulated, and often is.  
Furthermore, this method of identification can also be criticised for reifying social 
identities which further entrenches the hierarchy between various castes and 
classes.  Complaints have surfaced that due to a lack of adequate education and 
training, many of the available reservations and quotas are not utilised as the number 
of trained beneficiaries who can take advantage of the reservations are 
insufficient.733  Fortunately it was recognised that preferential treatment alone cannot 
facilitate all social and economic empowerment without additional reinforcement.734  
General and anti-poverty government programmes serve as necessary support to 
affirmative action by fortifying the human capital base.  Most of these programmes 
are aimed at the society as a whole, but as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
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Brazil‖ (2003) Vol 27 The Western Journal of Black Studies 10; T Sowell Affirmative action around the 
world (2004) 31. 
730
 J Fobanjong Understanding the backlash against affirmative action (2001) 155-156; TE Weisskopf 
Affirmative action in the United States and India: a comparative perspective (2004) 17; D Sabbagh 
―Elements toward a comparative analysis of affirmative action policies‖ (2004) Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/6/3/pages59633/p59633-1.php 
(13 July 2009) 3; S Thorat Policy Brief 14: Affirmative Action, India (2006) http://www.odi.org.uk/inter-
regional_inequality (accessed 18-8-2010) 3. 
731
 L Dudley Jenkins ―Race, caste and justice: social science categories and antidiscrimination policies 
in India and the United States: (2003-2004) Vol 36 Conn. L. Rev. 758. 
732
 F De Zwart ―The logic of affirmative action: caste, class and quotas in India‖ (2000) Vol 43 Acta 
Sociologica 237. 
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Development Report 2006 14. 
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Tribes make up a disproportionally large segment of the poor, they are therefore the 
largest group of recipients.  Additional special programmes implemented for 
corresponding purposes are aimed at Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
exclusively.735         
From the above discussion it is therefore clear that India‘s affirmative action 
programme, akin to that of South Africa, is ―constitutionally mandated‖.736  Much of 
the application of this prescribed programme has been left to judicial interpretation 
however.737  Whereas the Indian Constitution has five sections dedicated to the right 
to equality, namely sections 14 to 18, the South African Constitution only has one 
(section 9).  In previous Supreme Court decisions it was argued that affirmative 
action measures constitute an exception to the right to equality as enshrined in 
Section 16 of the Indian Constitution.  The Court however disagreed with this and in 
a similar fashion as the South African Constitutional Court in the Van Heerden case, 
stated that this is in fact an expression of equality and Section 16(1), rather than an 
exception thereto.738 
India‘s affirmative action endeavours have to date had many encouraging 
achievements.  The most obvious of these is that many individuals from backward 
groups have been granted certain opportunities that they otherwise would not have 
had access to, especially educational and public employment opportunities.739  
Deshpande also states that the ―vast majority of Dalits [(Scheduled Classes)] are not 
directly affected by affirmative action, but reserved jobs bring a many fold increase in 
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the  number of families liberated from subservient roles.‖740  Areas of education and 
occupations are now much more representative of India‘s societal composition than 
before.  In fact, of all the opportunities to be attained, a previous affirmative action 
beneficiary was fortunate enough to attain the presidency in 1997.741  Central 
government representation in the executive branch as well as the national legislature 
has been largely successful due to specific reservations for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes.  However, progress has been delayed because reservations are 
based on the backward classes population during the 1980‘s, and have not been 
updated since.742 
Unfortunately contemporary fluidity of race and caste has made it increasingly 
difficult to accurately identify the correct affirmative action beneficiaries.  Conversely, 
as briefly mentioned above, highly regulated procedures that are applied during the 
distribution phase of reservation benefits could have an adverse effect on the sought-
after goal of an equal society through the reification of societal categories of castes 
and classes.743  A great deal of time and resources are often spent on adequate 
identification of the correct categories for preferential treatment.744  Fortunately the 
reality is not as bleak as it would seem.  Through the opened opportunities that 
granted the necessary education and training, those that were generally seen as 
ignorant and incompetent now have the ability to shatter this stigma.745  However, 
this can only occur if the individuals selected for the occupations and positions to 
which they would not have had access otherwise have the necessary training to be 
successful.      
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Conflicts and resentment occur between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
especially younger generations, who feel that their opportunities are being limited in 
some shape or form.746  India also faces strong discontent from members of upper 
castes who now face more competition from each other for limited positions, whereas 
the number of suitably qualified members of backward classes is far fewer and 
therefore there is less opposition to face.747  A similar occurrence manifests itself in 
government employment.  Disgruntlement is further exacerbated when individuals 
are employed in order to fill reservations without having the necessary qualifications.  
In South Africa white employees experience similar distrust in the ―suitably qualified‖ 
criteria for employment when ―black‖ candidates are appointed in a Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) capacity.748  A further dual occurrence in both states is that 
positions are often left unfilled owing to a lack of supply of suitably qualified 
affirmative action candidates.749  Furthermore, members from lower castes in rural 
areas are yet to receive much of the prospective benefits that the policy could 
provide.750 
The restriction of the policy to public, or government, employment, also adds to its 
limited success status in empowering backward groups.  An increasing number of 
public enterprises such as education are being privatised which is beyond the reach 
of preferential policy measures.751  Ultimately, it seems that the biggest danger to 
India‘s affirmative action reservations is that it perpetuates class consciousness, or 
―exacerbate[s] consciousness of ethnic differences‖.752  An ever increasing number of 
castes are surfacing, claiming that they too deserve reservation and quota benefits 
and very little changes have occurred in the social and caste composition of India.753  
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Sowell suggests that much of the disproportionate representation of groups can be 
ascribed to inadequate elementary and secondary education, compared to members 
of upper castes.754  In this regard he states the following: ―These educational 
handicaps can lead to employment handicaps.  Patterns of unused quotas have 
existed in government employment, in part because of difficulties in passing the 
relevant examinations.‖755 
The following section will compare the three selected jurisdictions and will conclude 
with a few brief remarks on the relevance of their experience to affirmative action in 
South Africa.  
 
6.4  Possible lessons for South Africa? 
 
Though many nations around the world have also implemented affirmative action 
policies, the three case studies above were each chosen for their individual links or 
similarities to South Africa.  From the above discussion it is evident that there are 
certain common threads running through the experience of different countries. For 
instance, the policies inevitably result in the redistribution of societal resources, 
although with varying degrees of success.  They also have a prominent 
compensatory focus, especially in the case of India‘s Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes.  Lastly, rather than expecting affirmative action policies to be the 
panacea for socio-economic deprivation, each of the three countries has situated its 
policies within a more encompassing framework of intersecting policy strategies.  
 
6.4.1  Defining the group of beneficiaries 
 
Malaysia, with a policy that is aimed at remedying the cultural injustices that are 
faced by the majority of the citizens, is most commonly known as the affirmative 
action success story.  It was recognised that, without the special opportunities 
reserved exclusively for the Bumiputras, the Chinese and Indians would continue to 
dominate the Malaysian economy.  However, Malaysian affirmative action policies 
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have been subjected to similar criticisms as South African policies and are accused 
of fortifying an ―already well-off‖ elite.756  Corrupt activities of upper-management 
officials within the various special agencies that were created to promote the 
interests of Bumiputras have restrained the ability of Malaysia‘s preferential policy to 
redistribute resources to those in need.  Fortunately the Malaysian economy is 
safeguarded for the most part because affirmative action in general does not function 
at the expense of the most underprivileged members of society as the isolation of the 
private sector encourages competition and generates taxation revenue that can fund 
social policies.   
Brazil was selected as an illustration of another country where race-based policies 
are being implemented.  Racial discrimination in Brazil is an issue that is more ―subtle 
and shameful‖ rather than ―explicit or structural‖ during a period in which Brazil 
presented itself as a racial democracy.757  The structural racial discrimination referred 
to here pertains to the absence of explicit racial segregation legislation, for instance, 
that prohibited equal participation of any nature.  Instead, people of Afro-Brazilian 
decent were prevented from achieving certain achievements by experiencing 
obstacles, such as inadequate education.  Prominent figures shattered Brazil‘s 
international façade of a racial democracy which exposed the veiled economic 
oppression of Afro-Brazilians.758  Affirmative action measures were subsequently 
used to thwart this discriminatory substructure by empowering Afro-Brazilians in the 
areas where officials deemed fit.  Perhaps other measures than quotas would be 
more appropriate to address the underlying generative framework that perpetuates 
racism, however covert, and deprives Afro-Brazilians of true democratic participation.  
There are several factors that impede on the policy‘s ability to reach its goals. These 
include fraudulent representations by persons who present themselves as Afro-
Brazilians.  This highlights problems relating to the identification of beneficiaries.  
Also, there is not a coherent implementation of the policy throughout Brazil, without 
which Brazil cannot hope to achieve its racial democratic status.  Many Afro-
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Brazilians have attained economic successes however, but it is unclear whether 
these accomplishments would have been realised regardless of preferential 
measures. 
The caste system in India divided all Hindus into a predefined hierarchy and 
affirmative action now serves as an instrument to compensate those at the lower 
castes for their cultural suppression.  Not only were there significant status harms but 
these were accompanied by economic hardships.  Wealth and power was also 
centred within the upper-castes.  The affirmative action policy is therefore used to 
upgrade lower caste Indians in all senses of the word.  The aim is to create a 
stronger Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes middle class, as well as to alleviate 
the instance of poverty amongst these groups.  Although India still faces extensive 
poverty-related dilemmas, ameliorative measures have succeeded in increasing the 
democratic participative capability of affirmative action beneficiaries of all categories.  
Members from lower castes are much more widely represented in legislative and 
executive bodies and many have overcome the stigma associated with being a 
member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.  But regardless of the policy 
successes, many of the available affirmative action benefits are still not utilised as 
the educational system still does not prepare the potential beneficiaries adequately to 
compete with their higher-caste counterparts. 
The risk that most affirmative action programmes pose is that the benefits of such 
programmes are not distributed equally amongst the entire group of beneficiaries.  In 
this respect it is vital that policies should be clear on whether the goals are to 
facilitate the upper mobility of members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and 
Other Backward Groups into the middle class, or whether it seeks to aid all members 
of the aforementioned groups.  In India‘s case it was found that once again it was 
only the most prosperous members of these groups who were benefitting from 
reservations and quotas.759  Others have found that there are income disparities 
within occupational fields where lower castes are receiving less remuneration than 
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members from upper castes, though this, it is argued, is due to insufficient literacy 
capabilities.760 
 
6.4.2  Overcoming the divisions of the past 
 
Of the countries discussed above, Malaysia has the fewest issues concerning the 
identification of beneficiaries.  Those that are benefitting from affirmative action 
measures are local Malays who can be clearly distinguished from Chinese and Indian 
citizens.  Research indicates that these distinct groups have largely remained 
separate units without much miscegenation between ethnic groups.  It can also be 
argued that race consciousness has not been exacerbated by preferential policies 
too much as the three ethnic groups have throughout history acted and specialised in 
various economic activities in isolation from each other. 
It is unclear whether Brazil‘s race-based affirmative action has succeeded in 
furthering good relations between white and Afro-Brazilians.  Previously hidden racial 
tensions have arguably become more noticeable and Brazilians are now more race 
conscious than ever.  Brazil‘s history is of course different from South Africa‘s, where 
racial division and segregation have always been very much in the foreground. What 
South Africa has succeeded with more recently is creating a national affirmative 
action policy which promotes certainty and uniformity. However, only time will tell 
whether this policy will contribute to the normalisation of racial relations, or 
exacerbate existing tensions even further.   
As noted above, adequately identifying the correct beneficiaries of Indian positive 
action have presented a major problem in terms of accuracy as well as large (and 
arguably unnecessary) expenditure.  India‘s general and anti-poverty government 
programmes give affirmative action measures the necessary backing to focus its 
policies on specific targets.  By including the OBC‘s in preferential measures India 
has expanded its social benefits to another indigent group that has been identified as 
socio-economically, rather than culturally, disadvantaged (as seen above, the 
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disadvantage of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is culturally based, 
although it is accompanied by socio-economic deprivation).  Perhaps the South 
African government could look into the possibility of expanding policies to the 
poor/socio-economically disadvantaged so that its policies can reach poverty-stricken 
white people as well.  As stated in the previous chapter, this should not affect the 
majority of the current group of affirmative action beneficiaries too much as the 
number of poor white South Africans is marginal compared to the number of poor 
black South Africans. 
In conducting this comparative study, it was hoped that India‘s preferential measures 
could shed more light on class-based affirmative action and provide possible 
alternatives for South Africa.  However, it appears that the route India has chosen to 
take is so specifically tailored to its own society – which has an unprecedented 
assortment of various groups in terms of caste, religion, class and race – that it is not 
clear whether the lessons learned in India can simply be transferred to the South 
African context.  
 
6.4.3  Impact on efficiency 
 
In a period when social policies diverted large portions of revenue towards the 
alleviation of poverty of the Bumiputras, and the Malaysians in general, a steadily 
growing economy and the prioritisation of education served as the backbone for 
further social and economic advancement.  Had it not been for this, it could be 
argued that the outcome would have been bleak for the under-educated and under-
skilled Bumiputras.  The Malaysian government saw to it that social policies were not 
to the detriment of a stable economy and generally excluded the private sector from 
any responsibilities other than the usual taxation. 
The most important question to ask in relation to South Africa and Malaysia, is 
whether South Africa currently has the ability or the prospects to emulate Malaysia‘s 
success?  This is very doubtful for various reasons.  Firstly, South Africa has applied 
its preferential policies not only to government employment, but has included the 
private sector as well.  Many have argued that this has come at the price of efficiency 
and in this volatile economic climate such practices should take a backseat to 
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economic growth.  Secondly, although South Africa has prioritised education at the 
tertiary level, not enough is being done about educational standards at primary and 
secondary levels.  Institutional inequalities still leave those most in need ill-equipped 
to compete with other groups and this leads to a wide range of problems ranging 
from resentment to unemployment and the deprivation of human dignity.  Unless 
these issues are addressed, South Africa is unlikely to reach the same level of 
success as Malaysia. 
In both South Africa and Brazil it can be argued that educational standards are 
lacking.  Brazil has managed to implement the Bolsa Escola educational programme 
which provides free schooling to certain poor pupils, which later became the Bolsa 
Família, a basic welfare programme as stated above.  South Africa is yet to give 
substantive content to basic rights such as the right to education and there still 
remains uncertainty regarding the meaning of the right.761    
As in Malaysia, India also insulated the private sector from preferential policy 
responsibilities.  This was seen as a way to uphold the standards of efficiency and to 
protect the economy as the lower caste individuals still do not have the same 
educational backgrounds as many of their potential competitors in the private sector.   
 
6.4.4  Creamy layer issues 
 
India has taken an unusual route with its policies by skimming off the top of the group 
of beneficiaries regarding the OBCs.  As this group does not generally fit into the 
caste system but still experiences socio-economic deprivation, special allowances 
were made for this as well.  This could prove to be a valuable tool for South Africa as 
it is counter-productive and very expensive to sustain a small elite without reaching 
the majority of those in need.   
The previous chapter has indicated that the strong correlation between race and 
class (socio-economic standing), may provide the necessary margins for 
incorporating some of the class-based affirmative action elements in South Africa.  
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For instance, South Africa could consider imposing similar ―creamy layer‖ exclusions 
in its own policies so that very affluent black individuals do not profit any further from 
preferential measures, and so that other disadvantaged individuals may be granted 
the opportunity to benefit as well.   
 
6.4.5  Impact on race relations 
 
Since the introduction of affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa, both 
countries for the most part managed to avoid violent uproars from opposing races 
and ethnic groups, even though both had a history of violence.762  However, although 
there have not been any overt hostility amongst Bumiputras or black South Africans, 
it has become clear in recent times that resentment is building up between the 
poorest and the elite of each group.763  Corruption, exploitation, nepotism and 
cronyism have solidified the power positions of the elite, but have also hampered the 
potential trickle-down effect that their new found economic success has produced.   
In Brazil it is unclear whether race-based affirmative action has done much to further 
race relations between white and Afro-Brazilians.  Previously hidden racial tensions 
are arguably more noticeable than ever.  South Africa will do well to heed this 
warning as racial tensions are continually on a thin edge.   
It is briefly mentioned above that India‘s reservation policy is running the risk of 
exacerbating caste and class consciousness.  From the research done it becomes 
apparent that as soon as one identifies a specific group for preferential treatment, 
that identification can very easily turn into a tool used to magnify the importance of 
the distinctive characteristic, whether it be race, ethnicity, religion or class. 
 
6.4.6 Compensatory and redistributive justifications for affirmative action 
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In the previous chapters, compensatory and redistributive justifications for affirmative 
action were considered.  The comparative study in this chapter illustrates the 
currency of this distinction.  At the same time, however, it also illustrates the 
complexity of some situations, which require overlapping justifications. 
Brazil serves as an example of a redistributive policy with compensatory elements.  
To justify compensatory action, one looks to the cause of injury.  In Brazil‘s case this 
is arguably the practice of slavery which extended over three centuries.  The legacy 
of slavery as well as the policy of embranquecimento as mentioned above, which 
encouraged white immigration to Brazil during the 1930‘s, fostered racist rhetoric 
which has a lasting legacy even today.764  Racist practices are common in present-
day Brazil.  For example, as recently as 2002 a presidential candidate announced 
that the governor‘s residence in Rio de Janeiro was to be disinfected after black 
governor Benedita da Silva vacated the premises before his wife, the new governor, 
would move in.765  Brazilian affirmative action also aims to compensate for class 
discrimination by white elites that had gone unchallenged for decades.  The state‘s 
actions in this regard played a crucial role in on-going societal discrimination.  The 
absence of racial classifications, it is argued, prevented group formation that would 
have led to the necessary social mobilisation that would vie for the interests of Afro-
Brazilians.766  In the redistributive sense, Brazilian affirmative action aims to remedy 
the disparate distribution of social and economic resources.  For example, for 
decades there had been very limited representation of Afro-Brazilians in government 
or legislative bodies, as well as within the diplomatic corps.767  In a more economic 
sense, Afro-Brazilians have also had to deal with skewed distribution of wealth and 
income.  
Ultimately a culture of racist rhetoric had prevented Brazil from achieving an 
egalitarian state and it is no wonder that the state was reproached by social and 
political scientists for feigning a ―racial democracy‖ façade.   
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Malaysian affirmative action on the other hand does not have the same 
compensatory justifications.  Here, affirmative action is predominantly justified as a 
means to facilitate the redistribution of societal resources.  The wealth accumulated 
by the Chinese and the Indians had made it particularly difficult for local Bumiputras 
to overcome their dismal economic state.  Bumiputras were economically oppressed 
for a very long period and without any measures that would ensure their upliftment, 
this state would have gone unchanged. 
Finally, in India matters are clearly more multifaceted.  Affirmative action measures 
aimed at Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are predominantly compensatory 
in nature.  In fact, in this regard the policy is even referred to as ―compensatory 
discrimination‖.768  Here Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are compensated 
for the suppressive caste hierarchy in India which fuelled misrecognition and caused 
status harms, and ultimately ensured that members from certain castes would never 
progress to any other occupations than those that they were born into.  This latter 
aspect was the comcommitant maldistribution to the misrecognition mentioned.   
Conversely, redistributive justifications are met by including Other Backward Classes 
as affirmative action beneficiaries.   Due to social and economic inequalities the state 
recognised that without the necessary upliftment, these groups would be bound to a 
destitute existence. 
 
6.4.7  Final remarks 
 
A sufficient amount of time has possibly elapsed and the current policies have served 
their goal of compensating victims of past racial discriminations.  What might be 
needed now is to focus on South Africa as a united nation where preferential 
measures can serve another goal namely the creation of a more equal society.  
Large quantities of members of various races are deprived in a number of ways.  
Potential options to alleviate this can be either to create social policies that are aimed 
at all socio-economically deprived South Africans and thus to reinforce affirmative 
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action measures, or the inclusion of an additional group of beneficiaries in the current 
affirmative action policy so that the poor are directly represented.   
Everything possible should be done to prevent true non-racial democratic citizenship 
from being relegated to a mere pipedream.  As Htun states, ―[t]he goals of AA, 
whether race conscious or not, should be to improve racial justice, create role models 
for young blacks, strengthen the sense of self-worth among blacks and promote 
racial diversity at all class levels.‖769  Whether or not South Africa will expand its 
horizons and apply the lessons learned from its international counterparts is 
uncertain.  South Africa will do well to, at least, consider some of the implications of 
its policies as the negative consequences of a poorly formulated and initiated 
strategy are clearly discernible in other contexts and other parts of the world, 
including within South Africa. 
The most important question to ask in relation to South Africa and Malaysia, is 
whether South Africa currently has the ability or the prospects to emulate some of 
Malaysia‘s successes?  This is very doubtful for various reasons.  Firstly, South 
Africa has applied its preferential policies not only to government employment, but 
has included the private sector as well.  Many have argued that this has come at the 
price of efficiency and in this volatile economic climate such practices should take a 
backseat to economic growth.  Secondly, although South Africa has prioritised 
education at tertiary levels, not enough is being done about the educational 
standards at primary and secondary levels.  Institutional inequalities still leave those 
most in need ill-equipped to compete with other groups and this leads to a wide 
range of problems ranging from resentment to unemployment and the deprivation of 
human dignity.  Unless these issues are addressed, South Africa is unlikely to reach 
the same level of success as Malaysia. 
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7.1 Summary of preceding chapters 
 
Two of the main aims of this thesis were, firstly, to outline the aims and shortcomings 
of the current race-based affirmative action policy of South Africa, and secondly, to 
posit what alternatives are available to rectify the situation if necessary.  This chapter 
will consist of a basic rundown of the most important aspects of the preceding 
chapters.  The section that follows will contain an example of what course this policy 
could take if amended.  
Based on the goals outlined in the Employment Equity Act the working definition 
chosen for affirmative action was: ―an affirmative action programme is a programme 
designed to give preferential treatment to certain groups in order to redress the 
imbalances of the past, to facilitate the elimination of unfair discrimination and to 
create equal employment opportunities, with the eventual goal of creating a more 
equal society‖.770  The equality clause in the South African Constitution permits the 
implementation of ―legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination‖, and 
therefore the affirmative action policy as it stands today is a central part of this 
instruction.771  Following this, various other legislative initiatives followed, including 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and the Higher Education 
Act 101 of 1997. 
Justifications for the existence of an affirmative action policy are primarily based on 
considerations of redress and/or the creation of a more equal society.  These 
considerations can, in turn, be labelled as either backward-looking or forward-looking 
respectively.  Committing to one fixed conceptualisation could have the unintended 
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outcome of limiting the scope and prospects of success of the enacted policy.  By 
supporting backward-looking justifications for affirmative action, one ascribes to a set 
of measures that are designed to compensate for the injustices of the past.  
Unfortunately the drawbacks to this approach include the target-specific nature of the 
group gaining preference and the uncertainty surrounding the nature of reparations 
that would adequately make up for the denial of equal rights in the past.  By shifting 
the focus towards forward-looking justifications of affirmative action, one zooms in on 
the present-day hardships experienced by disadvantaged groups, whether as a result 
of the apartheid era or not.  Forward-looking endeavours include attitude-changing 
arguments and integrative arguments.772  Forward-looking justifications for affirmative 
action can be criticised for creating the impression that past injustices are 
unimportant and that the sole purpose today is to move forward and deny the past.   
Once established that affirmative action itself is a necessity, one turns to the outcome 
of the implemented policy.  Although great strides have been made toward the 
upliftment of large group of individuals, several unintended outcomes have 
unfortunately harmed the success rate of affirmative action.  This diverse assortment 
of problems range from issues of stigmatisation to the perpetuation of racial division; 
a reduction in efficiency and the denial of certain freedoms.  Not having a 
predetermined cut-off date for affirmative action has also presented the threat of 
permanent entrenchment of the policy. 
One of this policy‘s greatest limitations is that it is simultaneously over- and under-
inclusive.  By benefiting a small segment of black individuals who have come to be 
known as the black elite, the policy‘s over-inclusiveness is emphasised.  The reason 
for this is that a large portion of these individuals were not disadvantaged by 
previously discriminatory practices.  Conversely, by not distributing the benefits of 
affirmative action, such as the creation of more opportunities, to those most in need, 
the policy is critically under-inclusive.   
Chapter two set out to bring more focus to the Constitutional Court‘s equality 
jurisprudence by firstly focussing on the two main forms of equality advocated by the 
Constitutional Court, that is, substantive equality and remedial and restitutionary 
equality.  Secondly, these theoretical underpinnings were employed in a critical 
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analysis of the Constitutional Court‘s decision in Minister of Finance and Another v 
Van Heerden.773   
By examining the content of the individual parts of section 9, it was established that 
there are certain similarities between the purpose of the subsections; the visions of 
equality sought; and, different forms of justice.  Whereas remedial and restitutionary 
equality as typically envisaged by section 9(3) of the Constitution (the anti-
discrimination clause) is typically group-orientated, backward-looking and brought 
about in the pursuit of compensatory justice, substantive equality is otherwise 
forward-looking, goal-orientated and animated by endeavours toward distributive 
justice.  It was also established that through substantive equality‘s transformative 
potential, structural changes in the future are viable possibilities.  Whilst both 
remedial and restitutionary equality and substantive equality are geared towards the 
creation of an equal society, remedial and restitutionary equality aims to do so by 
remedying the scars of the past.  Substantive equality, on the other hand, does so 
through the recognition and valuation of group differences that should ultimately 
break the shackles that bind us and prevent us from moving forward. 
The Constitutional Court‘s decision in Van Heerden is a useful indication of how one 
can go about debating the various aspects of section 9.  It is curious to see how 
different judges chategorise the issues of one case under various subsections of the 
equality clause.  Whilst Moseneke J confines the dispute of affirmative action 
measures undertaken within a pension scheme as a section 9(2) matter, Mokgoro J 
conversely locates it within the ambit of section 9(3).  Sachs J‘s judgment points to a 
possible harmonisation of these views through its merger of the internal tests of 
section 9(2) and section 9(3) respectively.  He states that whether a measure was 
designed to promote equality (last leg of section 9(2) test) would ultimately determine 
whether the aim of the policy or measure could be considered to amount to unfair 
discrimination (last leg of section 9(3) test).  Sachs J‘s judgment serves as a 
reminder that future matters similar to this case should avoid rigid categorisation.  
There are no fixed interpretations of equality or affirmative action and therefore 
searching within other fields such as moral philosophy and political theory could aid 
and enrich our legal understanding of affirmative action. 
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As a theory that primarily operates in situations where there are obvious injustices 
committed in the past that clearly justify correction, compensatory justice as an ideal 
requires that the beneficial treatment necessary be determined according to the 
injustice committed.  Similarly, those who should benefit are also identified 
accordingly.  Finding such ties between the perpetrators and victims of apartheid on 
the one hand, and victims of apartheid and beneficiaries of affirmative action on the 
other, are problematic to say the least.  The correct action that needs to be taken is 
also a thorny matter.   
As a collective set of individual theories, distributive justice is concerned with the just 
distribution of societal assets.  One of these theories as coined by John Rawls, is the 
difference principle.  Chapter three outlined the operationalisation of the difference 
principle and examined how it applied to affirmative action, just as it had done in the 
case of compensatory justice and affirmative action.  One of the central assumptions 
of this thesis is that not only can affirmative action be seen as a policy employed 
within a range of measures authorised by section 9(2) in order to achieve equality, 
but it can also in itself be viewed as a distributional vehicle that aims to create a more 
optimal dispensation of societal resources in society.  Consequently, the ideal 
distributional outcome envisaged by the difference principle requires that any such 
distribution should not be to the detriment of the least advantaged individuals of 
society.  Unfortunately, many of the potential benefits of the current affirmative action 
policy employed by South Africa do not reach those who are least advantaged.  
Although this policy typically applies to the employment arena where it is expected 
that the beneficiaries at least have the basic skills to perform the expected tasks, it 
has been observed countless times that the same individuals benefit time and again 
from preferential policies, whereas many others are left to their own devices.   
Because many of apartheid‘s dysfunctional effects are still visible today, a forward-
looking approach such as the mentioned distributive justice can have transformative 
potential.  This also eliminates the necessity to identify the true victims and true 
perpetrators of apartheid.    
Chapter four introduced a number of additional axes upon which to locate 
disadvantaged groups, including Fraser‘s theories of recognition and redistribution, 
as well as her distinction between affirmative and transformative strategies.  The 
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ideal outcome is suggested to be the ensurance of participatory parity, that is, a 
situation where all individuals regardless of race, gender, disability, status, sexuality 
or otherwise, are able to compete and interact on equal footing with their peers 
without fear that arbitrary characteristics imbedded in the underlying structure would 
impede their life chances.  This chapter also illustrated how the above mentioned 
theories of equality and justice can interact with one-another in various ways 
depending on the form of discrimination in question.  As an affirmative action 
programme geared toward addressing race-based discrimination, an approach that 
incorporates substantive equality initiatives guided by the difference principle, could 
arguably have stronger transformative capabilities than an approach based on 
remedial and restitutionary equality that incorporates the guidelines prescribed by 
compensatory justice.   
The causes and nature of disadvantage pertaining to gender and disability 
discrimination differ markedly from that of race discrimination.  A complex notion of 
equality informs us, therefore, that different forms of disadvantage should be dealt 
with differently, depending on the harm in question.  In the case of gender 
discrimination, what is needed is the dismantling of societal conceptions of gender 
roles and the expectations that arise from these preconceived roles.  Women in 
general face both issues of misrecognition (via the endorsement of androcentrism as 
the price for equal respect) and maldistribution (via the perpetuation of gender 
divisions within the labour force, for example).  Accordingly, an affirmative action 
policy that seeks to correct this reality, will most likely be successful if forward-looking 
approaches that employ the difference principle and substantive equality, are used.  
Disability disadvantage, on the other hand, has stronger ties with issues of 
misrecognition as the maldistributive effects are generally caused by the erroneous 
preconception that the disabled are wholly incapable of being employed.  
Unfortunately, affirmative action in relation to disability is currently only focussing on 
the redistribution spectrum and matters of misrecognition still need to be addressed.   
It is undesirable to force affirmative action measures based on different forms of 
disadvantage (for example race, gender and disability) into a conceptual and 
theoretical straightjacket.  In each case, an argument needs to be made whether 
backward-looking compensatory motives (which include the achievement of remedial 
and restitutionary equality) can or should be sought, or whether calls for forward-
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looking distributive justice (which are endorsed by claims for substantive equality) are 
a better fit. 
The question now arises: How should a more ideal version of affirmative action be 
conceptualised that is capable of addressing the claims for equality and justice 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court and is attentive both to issues of recognition 
and redistribution?  Chapter five presented alternatives to the current race-based 
affirmative action policy that South Africa has.  The current policy has been criticised 
inter alia for the reification of racial identities.  Had this not been the case, more 
flexible notions of black and white would be allowed to develop.  This chapter set out 
to ascertain whether class-based affirmative action has greater transformative 
potential than race-based affirmative action.  As many of the problems with the 
current race-based affirmative action policy can be either directly or indirectly related 
to the re-enforcement of racial division, class-based affirmative action should be able 
to bypass some of these problems by focusing its benefits on those whom a greater 
portion of society would consider to be more deserving, and not those who 
continually profit from it, i.e. the growing black elite.  In a country where such a large 
number of South Africans are affected by poverty, policies aimed at the creation and 
promotion of equality should be mindful from the start not to exacerbate these 
hardships.  
Throughout chapter five Fraser‘s language of redistribution and recognition is 
employed, both as a useful mechanism to make sense of the complexity of the 
issues, and as an example of a more ideal social structure that focuses both on 
important redistributive arrangements whilst simultaneously answering calls for 
recognition.  The central thought behind class-based affirmative action is that it 
compensates the financially least advantaged individuals in society.  By doing so, it 
counteracts many of the disadvantages associated with race-based affirmative 
action. For example, this policy is less likely to fortify a black elite class who find 
themselves perpetually advantaged by preferential treatment.  Chapter five argued 
not only that class-based affirmative action can overcome many of the problems 
created and reinforced by race-based affirmative action, but that it is also better fitted 
to promote substantive equality by supporting the notion of ―break[ing] the cycle of 
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disadvantage associated with membership of status groups.‖774  Race-based 
affirmative action can also be argued to be more in danger of perpetuating racial 
stereotypes and thereby exacerbating the status order and promoting misrecognition.  
Due to the high correlation between class and status in South Africa, a class-based 
policy would only disseminate socio-economic benefits to the socio-economically 
marginalised.   
Two key advantages of class-based affirmative action are both related to the 
advancement of equality of opportunity. First,  it should affect a larger portion of black 
South Africans because of the widened pool of beneficiaries.  Secondly, it does not 
deny white individuals with similar economic adversities the opportunity to benefit 
from redistributive programmes.  
The operationalisation of this system might prove to be problematic as there is such 
a wide range of indicators that can be applied to measure socio-economic 
disadvantage.  However, the indicators used must be relevant to the goals of 
affirmative action and correlate with the grievances of the past that the policy seeks 
to overcome.  Other than potential difficulties associated with its enactment, class-
based affirmative action can also be criticised for a multitude of reasons, including its 
inability to reach the most deprived members of society as well as the fact that it is 
more likely to benefit the ―best-off among those who have been deemed sufficiently 
disadvantaged to be eligible for affirmative action.‖775 
Sen‘s capability theory is another alternative to race-based affirmative action that 
could be considered.  Essentially, this theory entails that the arrangement of social 
resources in society be set up to enable all individuals to realise their full potential if 
they so choose.  Examples of basic healthcare and adequate education are given to 
illustrate how certain capabilities are lacking that would ultimately enable the 
acquisition of preferred functionings.  Much of the research indicates that the 
enhancement of material equality would be necessary to sustain a larger pool of 
capabilities. 
The capability approach is more likely to address inequalities created by past 
practices.  It is uncertain whether it can bring relief to all, but it is nevertheless more 
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likely to facilitate the creation of an egalitarian society than race-based affirmative 
action.  Chapter five also recommended that should the capability approach not be 
applied in affirmative action considerations, it would nevertheless be beneficial to 
apply it in more general social and poverty-relief programmes. 
Chapter six contained a juxtaposition of three affirmative action models, namely 
those of Malaysia, Brazil and India.  As was stated earlier, each was chosen for 
certain characteristics that were particularly relevant with regards to the South African 
model.  In brief, Malaysia too has a policy that sets out to benefit a majority of its 
citizens, as the Bumiputras claim to be economically disadvantaged compared to the 
Malaysian Chinese and the Malaysian Indians.  Brazil, on the other hand, has an 
affirmative action policy that uses race as a measure to identify its beneficiaries.  
India has chosen to follow a dual approach and therefore a wider range of individuals 
are now beneficiaries of affirmative action.  Firstly, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled 
Castes receive affirmative action benefits by virtue of the suppression enabled by the 
Hindu caste system.  Secondly, Other Backward Classes have been identified as in 
need of beneficial treatment as these individuals fall outside the realm of Hindu 
castes but nonetheless experience grievous economic hardships.  This latter group is 
also an illustration of how a class-based affirmative action policy could operate. 
The indicators that were used to compare each affirmative action model with the 
others were as follows:  the definition of the group of beneficiaries; how affirmative 
action aims to overcome past divisions; what impact affirmative action has had on 
efficiency; whether affirmative action has enabled the formation of a disproportionate 
economically prosperous elite class; what impact has affirmative action had on race 
relations; and, what are the compensatory and redistributive justifications for 
affirmative action.   
In their pursuit of economic independence, the Bumiputras of Malaysia have also had 
to endure an array of setbacks.  Corruption in upper-management echelons threaten 
the potential success of affirmative action policies, as do intra-racial hostility caused 
by corruption, exploitation, nepotism and cronyism.  Fortunately the policy is 
reasonably easily managed as beneficiaries are easily identifiable and the policy 
itself is only applicable to the public sector.  Through the growing economy and the 
prioritisation of education social change is enhanced.  There are no clear 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
192 
 
compensatory-related arguments for the justification of affirmative action.  Instead, 
the focus is predominantly on the redistribution of social resources to the natives of 
the land.   
The subtle suppression of Afro-Brazilians through the limitation of educational 
opportunities or the existence of glass ceilings hindering career advancement, has 
provided the basic justification of the necessity of an affirmative action programme in 
Brazil.  Various obstacles still prevent preferential benefits from attaining much 
success.  These include the level of difficulty of adequately identifying the 
beneficiaries due to the absence of racial classifications; false claims of Afro-
Brazilian decent by non-beneficiaries; and the fact that the policy is not applicable at 
the national level.  Great efforts have been made, however, to upgrade the 
educational standards of Afro-Brazilians which ultimately grant them the economic 
independence they seek.  Although racial inequalities and tensions are more visible 
than before due to the public acknowledgment of the existence of racism by 
prominent figures, Brazil is now in a better position to overcome these disparities.  
The affirmative action policy is justifiable under compensatory and redistributive 
arguments and the legacy of slavery has provided the foundation for backward-
looking policies of preferential treatment.  Conversely, present day class 
discrimination aids redistributive justifications for affirmative action.   
The socio-economic consequences that flow from the Hindu caste system have 
placed Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in such a position that without 
ameliorative measures they would otherwise be unable to attain economic 
emancipation.  The aim of affirmative action is to enlarge the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes middle class, as well as to alleviate poverty in general.  Therefore 
affirmative action in this sense can be justified under compensatory arguments: 
backward-looking remedies are applied to compensate the individuals suppressed 
under the Hindu caste system.  Because not all Indian citizens fall within the caste 
system (due to the existence of a multitude of cultures and religions) it was accepted 
that the affirmative action policy had to be expanded to include Other Backward 
Classes (OBC‘s) which effectively transformed this aspect of affirmative action into a 
class-based policy.  In this case forward-looking arguments were employed to justify 
the application of affirmative action measures.  It was accepted that these groups 
were severely socio-economically deprived, but that there are also a select few who 
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have attained economic independence.  These individuals, collectively known as the 
creamy layer, are explicitly excluded from any affirmative action benefits. 
Many benefits have come from the implementation of this policy, for instance, it has 
increased the democratic participative capability of lower castes.  With the backing of 
general poverty relief schemes, affirmative action can proceed to focus on broader 
representivity issues.  Nevertheless, the educational system still bears a large portion 
of the responsibility to prepare lower castes for the competition they would face in 
future regarding career advancement and maintaining social well-being.  Should this 
situation not improve, the policy of affirmative action could be argued to bear a 
disproportionate responsibility to ensure the advancement of these individuals.  
Furthermore, many of the benefits reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes are utilised by the more prosperous individuals within these groups.  This also 
ensures the socio-economic suppression of the most deprived individuals in this 
society.  Some have also argued that affirmative action runs the risk of exacerbating 
caste and class consciousness. 
As in the case of Brazil, it is at times difficult to identify the correct beneficiaries of 
affirmative action and it is not uncommon for those falling outside the class of 
beneficiaries to apply for posts reserved under the auspices of the affirmative action 
programme.  Also similar to Brazil, the predominant isolation of the private sector has 
allowed taxation to fund many of the government programmes aimed at poverty 
alleviation and social upliftment as many of the lower castes are still unable to 
compete with individuals in the private sector.   
 
7.2 Towards the future 
 
The question now arises whether we should continue with the race-based policy 
implemented or whether this policy should be re-evaluated and transformed into one 
that is, first, better able to compensate the victims of previous discrimination and, 
secondly, more attuned towards the creation of an egalitarian society.  In a previous 
chapter it was suggested that a class-based policy might have the ability to bring 
about the necessary transformation.  It should be noted, however, that the potential 
benefits will not realise if sufficient transformation does not take place in the 
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educational sector.  The reason for this is that, without an adequate level of 
education that would at the very least enable the socio-economically deprived 
individuals to compete for career advancement, for instance, they would remain 
socio-economically deprived and the size of the group of black individuals who would 
benefit from this form of affirmative action would, consequently, be limited.   
But let us suppose that the educational sector remains unchanged for the time being, 
which would make a class-based policy a less viable option for effecting 
transformation.  One option that could be explored is the amendment of the current 
race-based policy so as to prevent further reification of racial identities.  As we have 
seen, Fraser‘s social theory of redistribution and recognition implores us to look at 
how an action affects both the class order and the status order of society.  Are the 
outcomes fair in terms of distribution whilst simultaneously not negatively affecting 
the human dignity of, in this case, the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the 
policy?   
There are valuable lessons to be learnt from each of the foreign jurisdictions 
examined in chapter six.  Even if the race-based policy is maintained, there are still 
ways in which we can ensure that the policy targets the correct people.  For instance, 
the Malaysian experience shows that creating new enterprises that are reserved for 
affirmative action beneficiaries exclusively, will not only decrease the instance of 
unemployment amongst these individuals, but it will also provide a valuable platform 
for such individuals to gain the necessary training for competing with the rest of the 
nation at a later stage.  South Africa should also heed the warning that follows from 
this experience by ensuring that corruption and mismanagement not jeopardise the 
success of the venture.   A crucial lesson in social transformation that Malaysia had 
realised from the start was that without a sound education, the Bumiputras would 
never match the economic prowess of the Chinese and the Indians.  A large amount 
of revenue was injected into upgrading the education provided to the Bumiputras.  
This had been possible only because the growing economy (largely driven by the 
Chinese and Indians) had generated the necessary funds.  In South Africa, economic 
growth has been affected negatively by a range a factors.  These include, but are not 
limited to, the following.  Firstly, the incidence of skills shortages places employers in 
a position where they have to appoint individuals who are not wholly qualified for the 
posts.  The Employment Equity Act prescribes the appointment of individuals who 
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are ―suitably qualified‖ but expands this concept to encompass a wide range of 
abilities which include ―formal qualifications; prior learning; relevant experience; or 
[the] capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job.‖776  It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that having an individual fill a post that cannot 
immediately assume all the responsibilities required of him or her, can leave a 
company functioning at less optimal levels.  Another indirect impediment to a growing 
economy is the number of vacant positions that are unfilled due to the lack of 
appropriate candidates.  This has proven to be the case in both the private and the 
public sector.  Thirdly, not appointing skilled individuals who fall outside the range of 
affirmative action beneficiaries constitutes a gross misuse of resources.777  Without a 
growing economy South Africa will be unable to fund other transformative 
programmes such as poverty relief programmes and the upgrading of the educational 
sector.  Furthermore, South Africa needs to bear in mind the importance of being 
globally competitive. 
The lessons that South Africa should take from Brazil are the dangers that lay in 
casting too much weight onto the notion of race.  The labels of ―black‖ and ―brown‖ 
now carry with them strong social and economic consequences.  Furthermore, 
animosity is harboured by pre-selected beneficiaries of affirmative action when non-
beneficiaries represent themselves as a race other than their own.  South Africa has 
however succeeded in generating a national affirmative action policy that applies 
throughout the nation.  This, at least, ensures a degree of certainty for all the 
affirmative action beneficiaries, as well as informs such individuals that the guarantee 
of equality is a national priority. 
At this stage of the South African democracy it is possible to argue that the groups 
identified as affirmative action's beneficiaries need to be scrutinised.  The instances 
of gender discrimination have decreased significantly and as noted in a previous 
chapter, women have managed to get adequate representation in legislative 
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 Section 20(3) Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
777
 These individuals are then often left with no other recourse than to emigrate as they are unable to 
support themselves financially as they would have been able to do had they been in the position 
progress in their careers.  This phenomenon is generally referred to as the ―brain drain‖ but is not 
limited to South Africa alone.  Another country who experienced this was Malaysia after implementing 
the New Economic Policy.  A number of Chinese and Indian citizens chose to follow other educational 
and career opportunities elsewhere, although some of them chose to return to Malaysia. 
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bodies.778  Disability discrimination, on the other hand, is still a matter to be 
addressed and therefore maintaining this group as affirmative action beneficiaries is 
essential, largely because of the socio-economic consequences that flow from the 
misrecognition of these individuals as valuable assets to society.  Finally, the Indian 
example shows that whilst a group itself can be identified as an affirmative action 
beneficiary through markers such as race, culture or religion, it is simultaneously 
possible to place limitations on the benefits awarded to that group.  In their case, 
Other Backward Classes have been identified as so socio-economically deprived that 
without preferential treatment, their indigence would persist.  But although this had 
been the case for the majority of the group, there had been a select few, an upper 
crust, which had managed to attain economic prosperity.  It was accepted that it 
would not serve the ends of justice to benefit such individuals any further and 
therefore this creamy layer was excluded from affirmative action reservations.  In 
South Africa, a select few have also managed to attain economic prosperity.  Various 
reasons for this exist.  For example, some accumulated their wealth abroad during 
the apartheid era and were not present in the era of white suppression.  Others have 
become very wealthy through political connections and continually exchange benefits 
to mutual political connections.  Lastly, some were already part of an urban elite 
under apartheid who had better opportunities and access to education and social 
capital than others.  It was also submitted earlier that affirmative action has to date 
not managed the trickle-down of wealth to a greater majority of black people as it was 
expected to do.  As a matter of policy and in light of the aims and goals of affirmative 
action, it is therefore possible to argue that we should consider the exclusion of a 
socio-economically prosperous upper crust from affirmative action benefits.  This 
would firstly widen/enlarge the size of the group receiving benefits and secondly 
provide South Africa with a stronger black middle class.  One can also posit that 
having a wider range of potential employees creates healthy competition amongst 
individuals who aspire to gain economic independence.  Whether this at least would 
suffice to tame racial tensions is unclear.   
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 By 2009 women had exceeded 40% of Members of Parliament and provincial seats.  C Schulze 
―Press Release: Number of female politicians on the rise‖ (25/01/2011) South African Institute of Race 
Relations http://www.sairr.org.za/media/media-
releases/Number%20of%20female%20politicians%20on%20the%20rise%20-
%2025%20January%202011.pdf/view (accessed 27-01-2011). 
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In the light of Fraser's theory of redistribution and recognition, one can only speculate 
what the effects of the exclusion of the prosperous black group would be on them as 
a group and on society as a whole.  The key question in this regard is:  Would the 
effect that this would have on the status and class order be of such a nature that it 
would render the said exclusion unjust?  All evidence provided in this thesis indicates 
that this group should be able to continue their financial and economic activities 
without experiencing any harm to their status.  Furthermore, one could speculate that 
by not being affirmative action beneficiaries anymore, their lives as they know it 
should remain unchanged as they have already accumulated sufficient economic 
prosperity.   
How one should go about identifying the black elite can prove to be a thorny matter.  
For instance, should the level of education, family income, land ownership or social 
standing determine whether a person falls within this elite class?  Or should one use 
a cumulative set of indicators?  In India, creamy layer categories are generally 
determined by the constitutional posts or service categories under which a person's 
parent(s) fall, as well as certain public sector posts, service in the armed forces, or 
parents that fall within the professional class.  Professional posts include the 
following: ―doctor, lawyer, chartered accountant, income tax consultant, financial or 
management consultant, dental surgeon, engineer, architect, computer specialist, 
film artists and other film professional, author, playwright, sports person, sports 
professional, media professional or any other vocations of like status.‖779  Lastly, 
certain classes of property owners and individuals who earn more than a 
predetermined gross national income shall not be deemed eligible as affirmative 
action beneficiaries.   
South Africa can follow a similar example by stating that persons who, and children 
of persons who, earn a joint income higher than for instance R50 000 per month shall 
not be eligible for preferential treatment.  Other categories that could be considered 
include owning property that is valued higher than R2 000 000 or certain categories 
of professional posts as indicated above in the Indian example.  The aim should 
clearly be to exclude an elite class of individuals only and not to exclude middle-class 
black South Africans (or coloured and Indian, women or disabled individuals either). 
                                                     
779
 Government of India: National Commission for Backward Classes “Persons/Sections Excluded 
from Reservation which constitute Creamy Layer of the Society‖ 
http://ncbc.nic.in/html/creamylayer.html (accessed 9 April 2011). 
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This should serve to ensure that those who are already well off do not benefit any 
further at the expense of someone who needs the opportunity more.   
Ultimately an affirmative action policy should facilitate transformation and not hinder 
any prospects of progress.  As a policy that makes surface reallocations, certain 
adjustments need to be made in order to bring about its transformative potential, for 
instance, by having it operate in conjunction with poverty relief schemes and coupling 
it with skills development programmes.  A co-operative effort is required to trace the 
true causes of inequality in South Africa.  Once done, it should aim to eliminate the 
causes of inequality without producing additional social ruptures.  A transformative 
affirmative action policy, is what South Africa needs.  
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